Parties to crime.

📚 Previous Segment:

Causation refers to the relationship between the accused's actions (or omissions) and the consequences of those actions.

Parties to crime.

At common law, parties to a crime are categorized into four groups:

1. Principal in the First Degree
2. Principal in the Second Degree (Aider and Abettor)
3. Accessory Before the Fact
4. Accessory After the Fact

Principal in the First Degree

This is the person who directly commits the criminal act. They are the primary offender, whose guilty intent (mens rea) and actions (actus reus) constitute the crime. Sometimes, the crime may be committed through an innocent agent. For example, if A directs a child under the age of criminal responsibility to steal from B, A is considered the principal in the first degree. Multiple individuals can also share this role if they collectively commit the offence, even from different locations.

Principal in the Second Degree (Aider and Abettor)

An aider and abettor is someone who assists, encourages, or facilitates the commission of a crime, either by being physically present or providing other forms of support. Mere presence at the crime scene is insufficient for liability unless it is coupled with actions or intentions to aid the principal offender. To establish liability, it must be shown that the aider and abettor had a shared intent or common purpose with the principal at the time of the offence.

Accessory Before the Fact

An accessory before the fact is someone who counsels, procures, or commands another to commit a crime, which is subsequently carried out as a result of their influence. Key elements of liability include:

• Knowledge of the crime being planned.
• Approval of the criminal act.
• Active encouragement or advice before the offence occurs.

Even if the method of committing the crime differs from the original plan, the accessory remains liable unless a completely different crime is committed.

Accessory After the Fact

This person knowingly assists the offender after the commission of the crime to evade detection or justice. Active assistance is required to establish liability, except in cases involving a wife assisting her husband, where common law exempts the wife from criminal liability for aiding her husband after a felony.  

Parties to Crime in Tanzania

1. Principal Offenders

The legal framework in Tanzania, governed by the Penal Code, differs from that in England. While English law classifies parties to crime into distinct categories such as principals in the first and second degree, accessories before the fact, and accessories after the fact, Tanzania recognizes only two main categories of parties to crime: principal offenders and accessories after the fact, as outlined under sections 22 and 387 of the Penal Code, respectively.

Section 22 of the Penal Code defines principal offenders as:

1. Persons who directly commit the act or omission constituting the offence.
2. Persons enabling or aiding another to commit the offence.
3. Persons aiding or abetting in the commission of the offence.
4. Persons counselling or procuring others to commit the offence.

This classification consolidates roles that would be separate under English law. For instance, in Kamau v R (1965) EA 501, the Kenyan Court of Appeal noted that, under the laws of Kenya and Tanganyika, individuals who counsel, procure, aid, or abet offences are treated as principal offenders.

Counselling and Its Consequences

Section 24 of the Penal Code addresses counselling, specifying that the counsellor remains liable if the offence committed is a probable consequence of their counselling, regardless of variations in how it was carried out. This principle aligns with the English case of R v Beits and Ridley (1930), where the court found both parties guilty of murder despite minor deviations in the planned execution of the crime.

Joint Offenders

Section 23 of the Penal Code governs situations where offences are committed by joint offenders. For liability to arise, three conditions must be met:

1. A common intention to pursue an unlawful purpose.
2. An offence committed during the execution of that purpose.
3. The offence committed being a probable consequence of the common purpose.

The doctrine of common intention was emphasized in R v Mughuira and Others (1943) 10 EACA 105, where all participants in a burglary that led to a murder were held equally liable under this doctrine. However, common intention does not require prior agreement, as illustrated in R v Tabuiayanka s/o Kinya (1943) 10 EACA 51, where individuals spontaneously attacking a suspect shared a common intention based on their collective actions.

Independent Intentions

The distinction between common and independent intentions was made clear in R v Okute and Anor (1941) 8 EACA 78, where two defendants acted independently to harm the deceased, resulting in different levels of liability.

Accessory After the Fact

Section 387 of the Penal Code defines an accessory after the fact as a person who knowingly assists an offender to evade justice. This provision does not apply to assistance given by spouses under certain conditions. In Andrea Nicodemo v R (1969) HCD 245, the High Court clarified that conviction as an accessory after the fact requires active steps to help the offender escape punishment. Mere knowledge of the offence is insufficient for liability.

Conclusion

The Tanzanian approach to parties to crime, though influenced by British law, is adapted to local conditions, simplifying the classification into principal offenders and accessories after the fact. This streamlined distinction is essential for understanding liability under Tanzanian law and comparing it to English legal precedents.

📖 Next Segment:

Attempts and conspiracies are known as "inchoate" crimes. This is because the full actus reus of the principal offence had not been reached. However, as far as an attempt is concerned, the "full" actus reus of attempt must be there. The problem with these crimes rests primarily on the question of actus reus and not mens rea.