Francis Chilemba, v. R., Crim. App. 503-D-68, 30/10/68, Biron J.

Francis Chilemba, v. R., Crim. App. 503-D-68, 30/10/68, Biron J.

Accused was convicted on 4 counts of stealing by public servant c/ss 270 and 265, Penal Code, and sentenced under the Minimum Sentences Act to 2 years imprisonment on each count, to run concurrently, and 24 strokes. Three months previously, he had been convicted on a similar charge, but as the sum was less than Shs. 100/- and he was a first offender, he received a sentence of 9 months. The sentence imposed in the instant case was to commence on the expiry of the sentence imposed in the previous case. Accused appealed from sentence, submitting that the sentence imposed in the instant case should be made to run concurrently with the previous sentence.

            Held: Appeal allowed. The sentences imposed in this case are ordered to run concurrently with the sentence imposed in the previous case, as from the date the previous sentence itself was imposed. (1) It was to the accused ’s credit that he pleaded guilty to the charges. “It is generally, if not universally, recognized that an accused pleading guilty to an offence with which he is charged, qualifies him for the exercise of mercy from the court. The reason is, I think, obvious, in that one of the main objects of punishment is the reformation of the offender. Contrition is the first step towards reformation, and a confession of a crime, as opposed to brazening it out, is and indication of contrition. Therefore, in such a case, a court can and does impose a milder sentence than it would otherwise have done. “ (2) “By section 295 of the Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Act, 1963(by the addition of the words “or in the Penal code” at the end thereof):- “….Every sentence shall be deemed to commence from and to included, the whole of the day of the date on which it was pronounced, except where otherwise provided in this Code or in the Penal Code.” It is evident from the respective provisions of the Penal Code [s36] and the Criminal Procedure Code, before that in the latter was amended by the addition of the words “in the Penal Code,” the power of a court to order a sentence of imprisonment to run concurrently with a previous one imposed was limited to ordering it to run concurrently with only the unexpired portion of such previous sentence, as there is no provision in the Criminal Procedure Code which permits a court to order a sentence to run earlier than the day on which it is pronounced. On my construction [of s. 295, Criminal Procedure Code as amended, and s. 36, Penal Code] read together…… a court is empowered to order a sentence to run concurrently with a previous sentence as from the date the previous sentence itself commenced to run.”