Samuel Shandrack Machango v. Tulsidas Narandas Morjaria, Misc. Civ. App. 9-D-67, 30/9/67, Georges C. J.

Samuel Shandrack Machango v. Tulsidas Narandas Morjaria, Misc. Civ. App. 9-D-67, 30/9/67, Georges C. J.

On July 1, 1959, the date on which “standard rent” is determined under the Rent Restriction Act, the premises in issue were being let at Shs. 1,250/- per month; one month later, the rent was reduced to Shs. 700/- per month. In 1961, the respondent in this case became the tenant, paying Shs. 600/- per month; in September of 1962, he sublet the premises to the appellant here at Shs. 1,250/- per month, a sum which he now justifies by citing improvements made during his occupancy. Although it was clear that the improvements could not justify such a rent, the sub lessee was content to pay it until September of 1964 when the tenant asked for Shs. 1,500/- The sub lessee paid this sum for four months, through December of 1964, and then refused to continue. In March of 1965, the tenant filed suit in District Court for the January and February rent; this suit was eventually transferred to the Rent Restriction Board.

During the pendency of these proceedings, in September of 1965, the sub lessee surrendered his sub tenancy to the owner of the building, who then leased it to NUTA, the present occupant; the tenant made no objection to these arrangements.

In July of 1966, the tenant made his application to the Rent Restriction Board. He incorrectly stated that Shs. 700/- had been the rent charged on 1 July 1959, arguing that Shs. 1250/- should be fixed as the “standard rent” on the grounds that this amount had been charged immediately prior to the date prescribed in the Act. His application claimed rent for January and February of 1965, and mesne profits from 1 February 1965 until the surrender of the sub lessee’s occupancy in September 1965. The mesne profits claim was based upon the tenant’s supposition that the tenancy had been terminated by a notice from him dated 31 January 1965.

The Board held that the standard rent was Shs. 1250/-, since records produced during an adjournment of the proceedings established that this was the amount charged on 1 July 1959. They further held that the tenancy had not terminated in January of 1965, since service of the notice of termination could not be proved. They awarded arrears of rent from January to September of 1965, allowing Shs. 1000/- for rent overpaid from October to December of 1964. From this judgment the sub lessee appealed.

            Held: (1) The fixing of the standard rent at Shs. 1250/- was proper, despite tenant-applicant’s apparent concession, in his application, of a lower figure. The parties to proceedings before the Board are not “ confined to their pleadings;” the Board was intended to be “a body which, while judicial in its approach, will not become tied down to procedural formalism.”[Citing Rex v. Brighton &Area Rent Tribunal (1950) 2 K.B.410, 419.] (2) Nor may the lower figure be accepted by operation of the doctrine of estoppel; even assuming that the tenant’s statement in the application was a “representation” by him, the sublessee “has not acted on this representation to his detriment.” Moreover, “the standard rent once determined adheres to the property until changed in one of the methods envisaged in the Ordinance. To fix a standard rent on the basis of estoppel between two parties, neither of whom is the owner of the premises, appears …. To raise insuperable difficulties.” (3) Although, as the sublessee contends, it may have been “iniquitous” of the tenant to rent the premises for Shs. 600/- and sublet at Shs. 1250/-, the tenant would not run afoul of the Act unless he sublet at more than the standard rent or attempted to increase the rent contracted for before the sub tenancy were

Lawfully terminated. [Citing Rent Restriction Act, ss. 15,17,19(d).] Under section 4(2) (a) of the Act, the Board might have fixed the standard rent at a lower figure than that charged on 1 July 1959, if such an alteration were deemed “fair and reasonably in “the special circumstances of the case;” but it was not request to do so in this case. (4) The award to the tenant of “rent” for the period for which “mesne profits” were requested was proper. Although “rent” is a contractual matter, and “mesne profits” one of damages, the distinction here is “technical” only. The figure awarded was “one agreed by the (sublessee) and paid by him over a long period without complaint.” It was therefore a fair sum to be awarded “for occupation” for the period January September 1965.