MWENDWA MTINANGI v JUMA MAHUMBI 1984 TLR 47 (HC)

MWENDWA MTINANGI v JUMA MAHUMBI 1984 TLR 47 (HC)

Court High Court of Tanzania - Singida

Judge Lugakingira J

November 22, 1984

F CIVIL APPEAL 25 OF 1984

Flynote

Civil Practice and Procedure - Assessors - Whether trial court's award invalid where

assessor does not express opinion.

G Family Law - Cohabitation - Whether court can compel cohabitation - Law of

Marriage Act, 1971 section 140.

-Headnote

The respondent sued the appellant before the Primary Court for adultery and claimed

compensation. The adultery was found established and compensation awarded but the

respondent appealed to the H District Court against the measure of the

compensation and the court allowed the appeal. That decision prompted the present

appeal.

Held: (i) An award of a Primary Court is a valid award so long as it proceeds on a

majority view even I if one of the assessors does not express his opinion thereon;

1984 TLR p48

LUGAKINGIRA J

(ii) in view of section 140 of the Law of Marriage Act, 1971 no court is

empowered to compel A cohabitation.

Case Information

Appeal allowed.

No case referred to. B

[zJDz]Judgment

Lugakingira, J.: The respondent sued the appellant before the Primary Court for

adultery claiming compensation of seven head of cattle. The adultery was found

established but the respondent was awarded two head of cattle only. He appealed to

the District Court against the measure of C compensation and the court allowed the

appeal, awarding him seven head of cattle or 7,000/= as originally prayed. That

prompted the present appeal.

In deciding as he did, the learned appellate magistrate proceeded on two grounds.

Firstly, he was of D the view that the trial court's award was invalid because only

one of the two assessors did express his opinion on the question of compensation.

Secondly, he considered it an aggravating factor attracting enhanced compensation

the fact that the appellant "alimtwaa Fatuma (the E respondent's wife) na kuishi

naye nyumbani kwake, na kadhalika."

I have given consideration to these grounds but I think, with respect, that they

proceed on a misapprehension of the law. First of all, it is true one of the assessors

expressed no opinion on compensation on the quantum thereof. However, it has to be

appreciated that decisions in Primary F Courts proceed on the majority view, and

this includes the view of the trial magistrate. In this case, the trial magistrate adopted

the view of one of the assessors in the course of judgment and this, to my mind, made

that view a majority view. I am thus unable to agree with the appellate magistrate

that G the award was invalid for to say so presupposes that the trial magistrate had

no vote, which is incorrect. In my judgment an award of a Primary Court is a valid

award so long as it proceeds on a majority view even if one of the assessors does not

express his opinion thereon. It is in fact interesting that the assessor who was silent

on compensation signed the judgment. In effect, H therefore, the award was

unanimous.

Next, I do not see, really, how the appellant's act of cohabiting with the respondent's

wife constituted an aggravating factor. After all, that was the adultery complained of.

The appellate I magistrate expressed anxiety that the respondent's marriage was

imperilled,

1984 TLR p49

A but I cannot see the significance of this since, in fact, that is the effect of adultery.

Perhaps more unfortunate is that the learned magistrate's reaction overlooked the

local (Nyaturu) law on the subject. According to the assessor who expressed himself

on the matter, the customary B compensation for adultery is one calf. The assessor

then suggested the imposition of an additional cow because of the trouble the

appellant had occasioned to the respondent. In other words, the second cow was good

way of exemplary or punitive damages. The trial court thus considered the law and

the surrounding circumstances in awarding the compensation it did. I think there is

C authority for saying that where the decision of a Primary Court is based on the local

customary law that decision cannot be interfered with on appeal unless the law on

which it is based is patently unconscionable. I find nothing unconscionable in the

Nyaturu law on this subject. On this ground, D too, the decision of the District Court

is difficult to support.

The decision of the trial court may be criticized in one aspect. The court also ordered

Fatuma to return to the respondent and even threatened her and the appellant with

criminal proceedings if she E did not comply with the order. That order was

unlawful in view of the provisions of section 140 of the Marriage Act, 1971. Under no

circumstances is a court empowered to compel cohabitation.

I allow the appeal with costs, set aside the judgment of the District Court and restore

the judgment of the Primary court. The respondent will have his 2000/= which I

gather is already paid into the F Primary Court. However, I set aside the order

compelling Fatuma to return to the respondent.

Appeal allowed

1984 TLR p49

G