Joseph lello v. R., Crim. App. 561-M-69, 27/9/69, Bramale J.

Joseph lello v. R., Crim. App. 561-M-69, 27/9/69, Bramale J.

The appellant was convicted on three charges of careless driving, driving without being accompanied by a competent driver and driving without fixing ‘L’ plates. These offences took place on the runway at an aerodrome.

            Held: “The only question raised in this appeal is whether the runway came within the definition of Road for the purposes of the Traffic Ordinance. It is to be noted that the definition was amended by Act No. 20 of 1969……… The amendment is as follows “’road’ means any road within the meaning assigned to that term in the Highways Ordinance and includes any other road ……. On which vehicles are capable of traveling and to which the public has access, whether such access is restricted or otherwise ………. The definition of ‘road’ in the Highways Ordinance is “every way over which the public have a right of way and includes a bridge or culvert.” This was the meaning formerly given to “road” in the Traffic Ordinance and it is clear that the new definition has extended the term considerably. No longer is a public right of way the only guide since the word now also includes ‘any way on which vehicle are capable of traveling and to which the public has access whether such access is restricted or otherwise. The appellant has mentioned in his Petition of Appeal a number of restrictions on entry to the Aerodrome and indeed it is common knowledge that there is no public right of entry. The public have conditional access and so long as there is a way on which vehicles can travel this satisfies the definition for a road. I am of the view that the runway is a ‘road for the purposes of the Traffic Ordinance.” Appeal dismissed.