Gosbert Mujumuzi v. Dihumulali Matonde, (PC) Civ. App. 253-M-68, 13/2/69, Seaton J.

 Gosbert Mujumuzi v. Dihumulali Matonde,  (PC) Civ. App. 253-M-68, 13/2/69, Seaton J.

The appellant successfully sued in the primary court to establish his ownership of a disputed plantation which he had given to the respondent to maintain and from which he alleged, the respondent had permitted unauthorized persons to take coffee berried and bananas. The respondent did not appeal but instead complained to the Area Commissioner, who sent a letter to the district court concerning the case. On the strength of the Are Commissioner’s letter, without hearing the appellant, the district court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction, quashed the proceedings and ordered a trial “de novo unless it involves tenancy”. The reason for the district court order is stated as follows: - “As this case involves tenancy (Nyarubanja) I find that you ought not to have tried it because a case of such a nature does not come under your jurisdiction.”

Held: (1) “It would appear that the order for a re-trial is ambiguous. If the reason for quashing the proceedings was that the case involves tenancy, then a re-trial is prohibited by the condition attached by the district Court, i.e. “unless it involves tenancy”.

(2) “The powers of district courts in exercise of their revisional jurisdiction are set out in section 17 and 18 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act, Cap. 537. The provisions are not quite free from complexity but it would seem from section 18(3) of the Act that a district court may quash the proceedings of a lower court without first hearing the parties. If this interpretation is correct, then the appellant cannot complain of the procedure followed by the district court in the present case”.

(3) “However as to the substance of the district court’s decision, I can find nothing in the Nyarubanja Tenure (Enfranchisement) Act, 1965 which supports the proposition that in cases involving Nyarubanja tenancy the jurisdiction of the courts is excluded. For these reasons and in view of the ambiguous nature of the district court’s order, I would set it aside. The judgment and order of the primary court are accordingly restored.”  Appeal allowed. However, leave given to the respondent to appeal from the judgment and order of the primary court to the district court within 30 days.