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R. v. Omari Isumail Crim. Rev. 98-D-70; 7/10/70; Georges C.J.



R. v. Omari Isumail Crim. Rev. 98-D-70; 7/10/70; Georges C.J.

A charge was framed in the words of the Traffic Ordinance [s. 44A (1) (a)] that accused had driven a vehicle on the road “in a manner which having regard to all the circumstances of the case including the nature, condition and use of the road and the amount of traffic on the road at the time, was dangerous.” Neither the charge nor the statement of facts by the prosecution disclosed any particular act of dangerous driving. The charge merely stated the fact of the accident. The case came up to the High Court for confirmation of sentence.

            Held: (1) The statement of facts is inadequate. “It does not even allege that the defendant failed to stop at the major road, or that he was driving too fast, or any of the other particulars of negligence which one would expect to be met out in a matter of this sort. All that is stated is the fact of the accident. By agreeing to this account, the defendant did not agree to any act of dangerous driving. The account given by the police does not even state on what road the other vehicle involved was traveling immediately before the collision.” (2) “The statement of facts should distinctly state the act of dangerous driving on which the prosecution depends. This is important not only from the standpoint of placing on the record a proper admission of guilt, but also for the purpose enabling the Court to assess the appropriateness of the sentence. The degree of negligence of the defendant is a vital a factor in the assessment of punishment as the circumstance of death.” (3) Conviction set aside. Accused to plead again before another magistrate.

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