Mapanda v. The Manager, East African Airways. Civ. App. 21-D-69; 18/12/69; Georges C. J.

 

Mapanda v. The Manager, East African Airways. Civ. App. 21-D-69; 18/12/69; Georges C. J.

The appellant in this case was employed by East African Airways as a security clerk. On the 9^th February, 1967, the Personnel Officer of the company sent a letter to him informing him that his services had been terminated by one month’s notice effective from the date of the letter. He informed the appellant that he would in fact be given one month’s salary instead of notice and that he would also be paid whatever other emoluments to which he would be entitled. Two reasons were stated in the letter for the termination of his services. It was alleged that he had come to work late on one occasion. He had reported at 8.00 a.m. instead of at 5.30 a.m. In addition, he had altered the time-sheet to read

5.30 a.m. instead of 8.00 a.m. it was also alleged that he had disobeyed an order to remain on board a certain plane until he had been relieved. It is quite clear that both these matters would be offences under the Disciplinary Code set out in the Security of Employment Ordinance which, if established, would justify the summary dismissal of the appellant. The company, however, did not choose to dismiss him summarily, but chose instead to terminate his services. The appellant took the letter to N.U.T.A., his trade union; a consultation took plans between N.U.T.A and the Personnel Department of the respondent company. As a result of these consultations, it seemed to have been established that the appellant had in fact reported late for work and has in fact altered the time-sheet. It does not appear to have been established that he had failed to stay on the ‘plans until his relief had arrived. On the advice of the N.U.T.A. steward, he wrote a letter to the company asking forgiveness for having arrived late and having altered the time-sheet. The appellant stated that he was compelled to write this letter by his N.UT.A. Adviser. He denied that he was late or that he altered the time-book. He asked that the altered time-book be produced in Court. This was not done in the court below. The trial magistrate was satisfied that he appellant had committed the offence. The appellant did not state in the court below that he had been compelled to write the letter.

            Held: (1) The trial magistrate was justified in finding that the appellant had committed the offence. (2) “Even if, however the offence had not been established against the appellant, I am satisfied that he could not succeed in his claim. This was an oral contract of service. Section 32 of the Employment Ordinance, Cap. 366, as amended by the Employment ordinance (Amendment) Act, No. 82 of 1962, specifically provides that an oral contract of service may be terminated by payment to the other party of appropriate entitlements under the contract. This right does not seem to have been abrogated by the Security of employment Act, Cap. 574. The Security of Employment Act deals entirely with summary dismissal, not with termination of contract of employment. Before me, the appellant based his claim largely on the Security of Employment Act. He argued that he should have been taken before the Words Committee and that his offence should have been established before them. He states that since that had not been done, the termination of his services had been improper. All that he says would be quite true if he had been summarily dismissed, but in fact he has not been summarily dismissed.” (3) “It is also worth pointing out that the jurisdiction of the courts has been entirely ousted under the Security of Employment Ordinance. If the appellant’s claim, therefore, was under this Ordinance, he would have had no right of audience, except, of course, by way of certiorari or mandamus, in order to challenge the correctness of the procedure followed.” (4) Appeal dismissed.