Recent Posts

6/recent/ticker-posts

Manasse v. R. Crim. App. 219-M-70; 1/7/70; Onyiuke, J.



Manasse v. R. Crim. App. 219-M-70; 1/7/70; Onyiuke, J.

The appellant was convicted on 2 counts (a) for failing to stop for police signal c/s 56 (h) and 70 of the Traffic Ordinance, Cap. 168 and (b) for corrupt transaction with agent c/s 3(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Ordinance, Cap. 400. The appellant’s main ground of complaint was that a signal was given to him to stop within the meaning of section 56(h) of the Traffic Ordinance. The evidence on which the conviction was founded was tendered by Police Corporal Kitande and is as follows: - “I am a police corporal, Geita. My duties include arresting charging offences. On 4/3/70 I was at Busigi with Senior Inspector Mchole. We were in a police land rover. We saw a bus MZE 3 Ford. I was in uniform. I suspected accused that he was carrying excess passengers. I signaled accused to stop. He never stopped. I chased accused and I met him at the ferry. I told him I was charging him’. The evidence tendered in support of the 2nd count was that on 28/3/70 the appellant went to Kitanda’s house, but he was not in. appellant was treated to tea by Kitande’s wife. He then gave her a parcel which contained 4 tea cups and saucers. According to Kitande appellant later told that he had brought the parcel as a present and asked Kitande to do him a favour in his case.

            Held: “It is my view that it is not enough for a police officer to state that he signaled an accused driver to stop. He must adduce evidence from which the court can infer a proper signal was given and the accused saw it or ought to have seen it. In other words, there must be evidence to who that the signal amounted to an order to stop and that it was properly communicated to the accused ….” (2) “I am of the view that it cannot be said that the intention has been proved beyond reasonable doubt in the sense that the inference to be drawn from the appellant’s statements leads irresistibly to the conclusion that the appellant gave the present so that he should not be charged with a traffic offence. I am aware of the decision of Mustafa, J. (as he then was in Amir Nathoo v. R. [1970] H.C.D. No. 51. in that case the accused gave 800/- to the Regional Education Officer as an inducement ‘so that the said Education Officer would give him the examination papers for Standard VII for 1969 at which his sister was a candidate’. The accused in that case stated, in his plea, as follows: “It is true I gave 800/- to Mr. Percival Maridadi so that he would release the 1969 Standard VII examination papers to me for use by my sister Naaz Nathoo’. This was entered as a plea of guilty. On appeal it was contended that the plea was equivocal in that he did not admit that the 800/- had been given corruptly. The learned Judge held that ‘it is inconceivable appellant could have though the Regional Education officer could give him the said examination papers other than dishonestly or in a corrupt transaction’. In this case the statements made by the appellant were too ambiguous and equivocal to justify the inference that the present could not have been given other than dishonestly or for a corrupt transaction ……” (3) Appeal allowed, appellant acquitted and discharged.

Post a Comment

0 Comments