Tanzania Vehicle Finance Ltd. v. Tanzania Motor Transport Company. Civ. Ref.1-M-70; 26/10/70; El-Kindy Ag. J.

Tanzania Vehicle Finance Ltd. v. Tanzania Motor Transport Company. Civ.  Ref.1-M-70; 26/10/70; El-Kindy Ag. J.

The applicants filed a suit against the respondent for a declaration   that the applicants were the owners of a vehicle in dispute. They prayed for the return of the vehicle or its value or damages in conversion. They also claimed arrears of hire rentals of Shs.25,572/=plus interest of Shs.3,060/=, court fees, advocates fees, plus such other relief as the court may deem fit. Consent judgment was granted and costs ordered to be taxed. The amount claimed as instruction fees in the bill of costs was Shs.5, 460/= being roughly 10% of the value of the suit, but the taxing master taxed off Shs.3, 460/=. It was argued on appeal that as a matter of practice the taxing master accepted 10% of the value of the suit as reasonable instruction fees, that the suit was complicated as it involved purchase law and involve a lot of money, and therefore the taxing master did not exercise his discretion judicially in reducing the fees on insufficient reasons.

       Held:  (1)  “As it is well known the desertion of the taxing master will only very rarely be interfered with unless there is an error in principle (see ATHUR v. NYERI  ELECTRICITY  (1961) E.A. p.422).”  (2) The Taxing Master “considered carefully what was argued before him.  He said that he was aware that the value of the subject matter of a suit is a fact to be considered but he also knew that sometimes it was not one of the more important factors in   the assessment of instruction fees. And after perusing the plaint and the annexture, he disagreed that the suit was complicated.  He also took into consideration the fact that the suit had not been defended. I think he gave his reasons clearly as to why he decided    to reduce the figure, as he did. It may well be he departed from the practice, as shown in the two cases quoted, of granting the 10%, but it seems to me that he had sufficient reasons for doing so.” (3) “As far the point of complexity of the suit was concerned, the taxing master was not satisfied that it was complicated and I cannot say that he erred in this. (4)  “I am satisfied that the learned taxing master had exercised his discretion judicially and reduction is not so pitiably low so as to amount to an error in principle.”  (5) Application dismissed.