Shekilango v. The Internal Revenue Officer Lushoto Misc. Civ. App. 7-A-70; 30/6/71; Kwikima Ag. J.

Shekilango v. The Internal Revenue Officer Lushoto Misc. Civ. App. 7-A-70; 30/6/71; Kwikima   Ag. J.

The appellant was sued for arrears of personal tax and penalty. Ex-parte judgment was entered against him. He unsuccessfully moved the court to set aside the ex-parte judgment. He appealed against he judgment order of the District, alleging that he had paid his tax for 1969 and that he was late to appear for hearing due to transportion difficulties.

Held; (1) “Had the appellant acquainted the court with the fact that he had a tax receipt for 1969, the year for which he was alleged to be in arrears, the court could not have reached the same decision as it did. For in the light of this fact the trial court ought to have found it reasonable to set aside the judgment. This was the principle laid down in the case of Kimani v. McConnell [1965] E. A. 547 and followed in the case of Mbogo v. Shah [1966] E. A. 93. in allowing the application the trial court would not be assisting” a person who has deliberately sought (whether by evasion or otherwise) to obstruct of delay the cause of justice” but rather it would be avoiding injustice of hardship resulting from …………… excusable mistake or error.” (2) “Justice demands that the appellant be given opportunity to present his quite strong case.” (3) Appeal allowed.