Shah v. R., Crim. App. 626-M-70; 27/11/70; El-Kindy, Ag. J.

 Shah v. R., Crim. App. 626-M-70; 27/11/70; El-Kindy, Ag. J.

The appellant was convicted of permitting a motor vehicle to be driven on the public road with various defected contrary to Sections 43 (a) and 70 of the Traffic Ordinance Cap. 168 and rules 30 (1) (i) and (k) and 69 of the Traffic Rules. The appellant’s petition of appeal contained the following grounds, inter alia: “a. the conviction are unreasonable and cannot be supported by evidence in the case. b. The learned District Magistrate misdirected himself in law and on the facts. c. The convictions are against the weight of evidence in the case.”

            Held: (1) The provisions of Section 315 of the Criminal Procedure code are binding in law and “make it mandatory for the grounds of appeal, relevant to this issue were not only vague but they failed to particularize the alleged unreasonableness of the convictions, the misdirection in law and on fact, and the alleged weight of evidence. If the appellant had been a layman, this Court would have taken the petition differently.” (Riano s/o Lenalaimer & another v. R. (1960) E. A. p. 960 followed). (2) ‘Section 163 of the Evidence act 1967 is not restricted to a witness who is ‘hostile or ‘adverse’. It is sufficiently wide to include any person who gives inconsistent stories.” (3) In a prosecution for an offence under rule 30(1)(i)  of the Traffic rules, “what is needed to be shown, by evidence, was that the vehicle was not free of the defects which could lead to the consequences specified. In other words, what are required are the disclosure of facts and not the opinion of whether such facts showed that the tyre was dangerous. Whether the tyre is found to be dangerous or not is something for the Court to decide”