R. v. Rajab s/o Ayub, Crim. Rev. 5-M- 72, 26/5, Jonathan, Ag., J.

R. v. Rajab s/o Ayub, Crim. Rev. 5-M- 72, 26/5, Jonathan, Ag., J.

The accused was convicted on his own plea of causing death by dangerous driving contrary to Section 44 A of the Traffic Ordinance and sentenced to one year’s imprisonment. He was also disqualified from driving for a period of 4 years. The particulars of the offence alleged that, on the material day at about 10.00 a. m the accused drove a motor vehicle on a public road in a manner which was dangerous having regard to the circumstances that existed, thereby causing the death of one Mushimo s/o Ntungi. After the charge was duly read and explained to the accused, he is recorded as saying “It is true”, following which the learned Resident Magistrate entered a plea of guilty to the charge.

            Held: (1) “As so often reminded by this Court, the words “It is true” are not a satisfactory form of pleading so as to ground a conviction, and in the particular case the accuseds plea was clearly equivocal, the more so as the particulars did not state the negligence that the accused committed which constituted dangerous driving.” (2) “The prosecution then stated the facts. Unfortunately, these, too, did not throw sufficient light on the matter. All that was stated was that the accident occurred on a tarmac adamised road at a point where a maximum speed limit of 30 m. p. h. was indicated, and that the accused failed to stop his vehicle in time, thereby knocking down the deceased, a school boy who was crossing the road ……. With respect to the lower Court, the facts did not necessarily constitute the offence charged and, as agreed by the Republic, the conviction was glaringly erroneous. It was  a serious charge that faced the accused, and it was imperative for the court to satisfy itself that particulars of negligence were clearly stated which constituted dangerous driving before proceeding to convict for causing death b dangerous driving. It may well be that the accused was merely careless, but that would not, in itself, ground a conviction for the offence charged.” (3) Appeal allowed and conviction quashed.