DPP v. Mussa Manase, Crim. Application 9-M-70; 11/1/71; El-Kindy Ag. J. (Sitting as E. A. C. A.)

 

DPP v. Mussa Manase, Crim. Application 9-M-70; 11/1/71; El-Kindy Ag. J. (Sitting as E. A. C. A.)

           The respondent was convicted by the District Court of Geita of corrupt transaction with agent c/s 3 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Ordinance cap. 400 and sentenced to two years imprisonment and 24 strokes of corporal punishment. His appeal to the High Court of Tanzania was allowed and conviction quashed. The present application was by the Director of Public Prosecutions for leave to appeal against the acquittal by the High Court and for leave to extend the time within which to file notice of appeal.

                        Held: (1) (after quoting from the judgments of the District court and the High Court on appeal) “It can be seen therefore there is an issue of what inference is to be drawn from the evidence on record. It is a matter of discretion of this court whether such an application is granted or not …………. And that the application would be granted if good cause is shown or, as it was said in the case of Brown s/o Mpetwa v. Rex 15 E. A. C. A. p. 138, ‘a sufficient reason’ is shown for exercising the discretion vested in this court.” (2) “When the first appellate court has reversed a judgment of a subordinate court, there is always a question of law involved as to whether there existed sufficient reasons for such reversal (See Fazeabbas Sulemanji and Another v. Reginam 22 E. A. c. A. p. 395). In this case, the learned Judge has reversed the decision of the District Court of Geita and, therefore, a question of law, in my view of public importance has arisen for consideration of this court. In my view, the delay in filing notice of appeal and in appealing is not unreasonable as sufficient reasons have been disclosed by the affidavit, for not giving notice in time and appealing in time. In the result, I grant both applications.”