Recent Posts

6/recent/ticker-posts

Dhirani v. R., Crim. App. 426-M.70, 12/11/70; Onyiuke, J.

 


Dhirani v. R., Crim. App. 426-M.70, 12/11/70; Onyiuke, J.

The appellant was charged with causing death by dangerous driving contrary to section 44A of the Traffic Ordinance, Cap. 168. the magistrate found as a fact that the appellant’s vehicle had knocked down the deceased and the deceased died as a result of the injuries sustained thereby and that the appellant drove his vehicle in a dangerous manner. At the hearing of the appeal counsel for the appellant contended that the word ‘dangerous did not mean merely being negligent but involved such a degree did not mean merely being negligent but involved such a degree of negligence that it could be regarded as dangerous.

            Held: (1) “The cases cited by the counsel for he appellant were cases dealing with manslaughter. There would have been no need for the subsequent enactment in 1964 of Act No. 41 of 1964 which amended the Traffic Ordinance by adding there to Section 44A which created the offence of causing death by dangerous driving if the burden of proof in that section was the same as manslaughter. It is my view that section 44A of the Traffic Ordinance and the offence of manslaughter by negligent driving do not cover the same ground and what is required to be proved is not the same in both cases. The areas covered by the offence of manslaughter by negligent driving and the offence created by section 44A may sometimes overlap but they do not cover the same ground.” 92) “It is not open to a person charged with causing death by dangerous driving under section 44A to argue that the prosecution must, in addition to proving that the driving was dangerous, go further and prove that the dangerous driving was due to a high degree of negligence. Dangerous driving due to mere carelessness is such an offence under section 44A as dangerous driving due to deliberate recklessness.” The appeal against conviction was dismissed.

Post a Comment

0 Comments