R. v. Dionis Crim. Rev. 99-D-71; 9/2/72; Onyiuke, J.

R. v. Dionis Crim. Rev. 99-D-71; 9/2/72; Onyiuke, J.

The accused, a learner driver was convicted on his own plea of guilty of driving a motor vehicle without a road licence, without motor vehicle insurance, without being accompanied by a qualified driver, and without displaying learner plate all offences against the Traffic Ordinance Cap. 168 and the Motor Vehicle Insurance Ordinance Cap. 169. The accused was fined but the trial magistrate declined to make an order of disqualification on the ground that since the accused was a learner “It would not help disqualifying him from holding a driving licence”. On revision of his sentence by the High Court the accused stated that on the material date he was taking his sick child to hospital and on the way the police challenged him and charged him with these offences and that he was compelled to use the car in order to save the life of his child who was very ill. The Republic accepted these facts but contended

That they did not amount to special reasons so as to warrant exemption from disqualification because the reasons given were “reasons personal to the accused offender but were not special to the offence charged.”

            Held: (1) “The order of disqualification is automatic on conviction under Section 4(1) unless the court finds special reasons to order otherwise. The order of disqualification prescribed by the sub-section is from holding or obtaining a driving licence. The learned magistrate was clearly wrong in declining to make an order on the ground that the accused was learner driver, and, by implication, did not hold a driving licence in respect of which an order could be made. The order of disqualification he is obliged to make is from either holding driving licence or obtaining one. A learner driver can be disqualified from obtaining a driving licence.” (2) “In Aloys v. Kamuzora v. R. (1968) H.C.D. 486 Seaton J. adopting the reasoning in Whittall v. Kirby (1946) 2 All. E. R. 552, stated that a special reason for not ordering a disqualification is one which is special to the facts which constitute the offence and not one which is special to the offender as distinguished from the offence. What does this mean? I am of the view that the reason must relate to the circumstances in which the offence was committed and to the facts on which the offence was founded. The reason may not amount in law to a defence but should be relevant as a mitigating or extenuating circumstance. It should be noted however that is not every fact which can be urged in mitigation of sentence that amounts to a special reason within the meaning of Section 4(2) of the Ordinance. Thus, the fact that the accused is a first offender or is of good character or that disqualification would entail great hardship on his family cannot amount to a special reason because it has nothing to do with the commission of the offence of driving without motor vehicle insurance. The fact however that a reason is personal to an offender does not necessarily mean that it may not also be special to the facts which constitute the offence. For example, a doctor who exceeds a speed limit while driving a motor vehicle to attend an emergency may in a sense be said to be giving a reason personal to himself but he is also adducing a reason which is special to the facts constituting the offence. In view of the foregoing I hold that the facts adduced by the accused in this case amount to special to the offender but were also special to the facts which constitute the offence of driving without a motor vehicle insurance. I therefore decline to make an order of disqualification. “