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Makusi and Another v. R. Crim. App. 520-D-7; 15/3/72; Biron, J.

 


Makusi and Another v. R. Crim. App. 520-D-7; 15/3/72; Biron, J.

The two appellant were together convicted on several counts of stealing by servant and a number of counts of fraudulent false accounting, and were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment ranging from three months to three years on the most serious charge, that of stealing Shs. 50,00/=, and they were also awarded the statutory twenty-four strokes corporal punishment, under the Minimum Sentence Act, 1963. The trial court also made an order for compensation in the sum of Shs. 50,000/= to be paid to the Morogoro Region Cooperative Union by which the appellants were employed and from which Union the money was stolen. In the course of their investigation, the police had seized numerous and a varied assortment of items of property, including two motor cars, one from each appellant, a motor-cycle, a radiogram, a refrigerator and other expensive household items of furniture and household equipment, some, if not most of which, had been bought in the names of various relatives. The trial court ordered that these items of property should be sold and the proceeds from the sale of such property should be applied towards the payment of the compensation awarded to the Union. The appellant did not appeal against convictions or sentences but only against the order of compensation and the order of the sale of the various items of property seized. The appellant’s iter-alia contended that it was usual for the court to make a compensation order effective after the release of convicted accused from prison.  

            Held: “It must be conceded that I have observed that some courts do make a compensation order to take effect as from the release of the convicted accused. However, there is no authority for so suspending the order, in fact not only is it contrary to law but extremely unwise, even foolish in the extreme, as such suspension given an opportunity to friends or relatives of convicted person to dispose of their property, so that the person or body in whose favour the compensation order is made rarely, if ever, receives any compensation, the order for which is usually not worth the paper on which it is written. It is therefore to be hoped that this practice of suspending orders for compensation will be discontinued.” (2) The judge cited s. 6(2) of the Minimum Sentences Act, 1963 (now s. 7(3) of the Minimum Sentences Act, 1972) and s. 179 of the Criminal Procedure Code ….. the later section inter-alia empowers the court to order that ‘any property taken (from a convict) or a part thereof be applied to the payment of any fine or any costs or compensation directed to be paid by the person charged’ and held that the trial court had right to order the sale of the property seized and that the proceeds of such sale should be applied towards the payment of the compensation ordered. (3) “With regard to the third complaint, that some of the property seized belongs to third parties; there is also provision for that made in the Criminal Procedure code. Section 297 of the Criminal Procedure Code sets out the procedure to be followed by a claimant to any property seized and ordered to be sold by the court The property owners or objectors to such seizure can, it they have any real claim to the property, proceed in accordance with the procedure laid down in the section referred to.” (4) Appeals dismissed.

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