HALIMA KAHEMA v JAYANTILAL G. KARIA 1987 TLR 147 (HC)
Court High Court of Tanzania - Mwanza
Judge Mwalusanya J
29 October, 1987 F
Flynote
Family law - Custody of infant child - Mother unable to take care of the child.
Family law - Custody of a child - Material changes on the part of mother - S. 133 of the Law G
of Marriage Act of 1971.
-Headnote
At trial the appellant admitted in writing her inability to take care of the child. The trial court
unanimously granted custody to the father. Appellant's appeal to the District H Court was
rejected. She is appealing to the High Court arguing that there are material changes in her
circumstances, to enable her to maintain the child.
Held: (i) The welfare of the child requires that it be in the hands of either parent not I child's
grandparents;
(ii) where there are material changes in the circumstances of
1987 TLR p148
MWALUSANYA J
the parties after a custody order has been made, the aggrieved party has to apply to the A same
original court so that it varies its earlier order;
Obiter: Under s.125(3) of Law of Marriage Act, 1971, there is a rebuttable presumption that it is
for the good of an infant to be with the mother. The younger the B child, the harder it is to
rebut that presumption.
Case Information
Appeal dismissed.
No case referred to. C
[zJDz]Judgment
Mwalusanya, J.: The respondent Jayantilal G. Karia made an application at Nansio Primary Court
in Ukerewe District, claiming the custody of an infant child, a boy called D Sunny aged more
than one year. The child was born to the appellant Halima d/o Kahema with the respondent, out
of wedlock. When the application was made both mother and father of the child were living
separately in Ukerewe District. The child at the time of the application was under the custody
of the appellant's parents at Mwanza. E
The application was not controverted at the trial, as the appellant mother readily admitted that
she was not in a position to take care of the child who was then with her parents at Mwanza.
The admission was in writing and duly signed by her. The trial court finding that the appellant
mother had no objection to granting the custody of the F child to the respondent, unanimously
granted the application. That was quite proper as the welfare of the child required that the child
be in the hands of either of the parents rather than the child's grandparents.
The mother's appeal to the District Court was in my view rightly rejected. As correctly G
pointed out by the District Court, as the mother was not in the position to take care of the child,
it was not in the interest of the welfare of the young child to remain with his grandparents when
his father was fit and able to maintain him.
In the memorandum of appeal, the appellant has argued that there are material changes H in
the circumstances of this case, to enable this court to vary the original order made by the
Primary Court. She said now she is ready to take the child and maintain him. She also said that
she is employed and has acquired her own accommodation at her new station in Mwanza. I
The answer to that submission is that the appeal is
1987 TLR p149
MWALUSANYA J
misconceived. Under s. 133 of the Law of Marriage Act. No. 5 of 1971, if there are any A
material changes in the circumstances of the parties, after a custody order has been made, the
aggrieved party has to apply to the same original court so that it varies its earlier order. An
appeal to a higher court will not do. The original court has to be B satisfied that indeed in the
meantime, there has been material changes in the circumstances of the parties since the original
order of custody was made, to warrant variation of the same.
The application could be in the same original case file; but one may choose to file a fresh
application in the same court for variation of an original order. And perhaps a fresh C
application in a different court of concurrent jurisdiction will be proper so long as the applicant
satisfies the court that there are material changes warranting a variation of an order made by
another court. But I am sure, an appellate court is not a proper forum for that prayer. D
In this case it appears highly probable that indeed there are some material changes in favour of
the appellant mother. This is because she is now ready to take the child instead of dumping it at
her parents. And moreover she has secured her own accommodation at her new station in
Mwanza. And thirdly it has all along been E conceded since the trial commenced that she is
gainfully employed in the government with a reasonable salary. And most important in favour
of the mother is that the child is under seven years of age (infant he is only 1 year and three
months old) there is a rebuttable presumption that it is for the good of an infant to be with his
mother. The F younger the child, as is the position here, the harder it is to rebut the
presumption. Let it be noted here that the question of legitimation of the child is irrelevant in
the question of deciding the granting of the child. Therefore the Primary Court and the District
Court were to go out of their way in considerating the matter of legitimation of the child. G
In the event this appeal fails and it is dismissed. As indicated earlier the appellant should go to
the original court for an application for variation of its original order as provided under s. 133 of
the law of Marriage Act No. 5 of 1971. This is not the proper forum for H that prayer. I make
no order for costs for this appeal.
I Order accordingly.
1987 TLR p150
A
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