The Ministry of Pensions v Ffrench

 

The Ministry of Pensions v Ffrench

CONSTITUTIONAL; Other Constitutional: INDUSTRY: HEALTH; Health and safety at work: TORTS; Negligence

KING’S BENCH DIVISION

DENNING J

29 JANUARY 1946

Emergency Legislation – Compensation – Personal injuries – Factory worker injured on way to shelter during alarm – War injury – Reduction of lights –

Enforcement of blackout – “Injurious act” – “Use of weapon” – Personal Injuries (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1939 (c 82), s 8(1).

All England Law Reports 1936 - books on screen™

All ER 1946 Volume 1

Preamble

The respondent was employed as a sweeper in the machine bay of a factory which had 6 1/2 miles of glass roofing. In the event of the approach of enemy

aircraft there was a system of warning upon which the arc lights in the factory were switched off and the personnel went immediately to shelter. After a

regular warning had been given the respondent, while on her way to shelter, fell over a bag of steel material and sustained a fractured elbow. In an appeal by

the Minister of Pensions against a decision of a Pensions Appeal Tribunal in the respondent’s favour, it was contended on her behalf (i) that the reduction of

the lighting and the regulations that the personnel should go to shelter on a warning were injurious acts within the definition of war injuries in sect 8(1) of the

Personal Injuries (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1939; (ii) that the enforcement of the blackout was the use of a weapon for the repulse of enemy action within

the same definition; and (iii) that the claim had originally been wrongfully rejected because there was no incident involving bombs or gunfire:—

Held – (i) The general system of blackout, the reduction in lighting and the regulations that the personnel should go to shelter on a warning, were none of them

intended to cause injury nor was the natural and probable consequence of them to cause injury, and that, therefore, the injury was not caused by an “injurious

act” within the definition.

(ii) the word “weapon” was used in the section in its ordinary and not in an extended sense and the enforcement of the blackout was not the use of a

weapon for the repulse of enemy action within the definition.

(iii) if there had been bombs or gunfire the only question might be one of causation, and the injury would not necessarily have been a war injury.

Notes

This case establishes that “injurious act” in the definition of war injury in the Personal Injuries (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1939, means an act which is in its

nature injurious, and not merely one which causes injury. Blackout ordered in view of an imminent raid is not such an injurious act, nor is it a “weapon” used

in repelling the enemy.

For the Personal Injuries (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1939, s 8(1), see Halsbury’s Statutes, Vol 32, p 1065.

Appeal

Appeal by way of case stated from a decision of a Pensions Appeal Tribunal. The facts are fully set out in the judgment.

Rt Hon Sir Donald Somervell KC and Hon H L Parker for the appellant.

John Thompson for the respondent.

29 January 1946. The following judgment was delivered.

DENNING J. This appeal raises the question whether the injury suffered by the respondent was a war injury within the Personal Injuries (Emergency

Provisions) Act, 1939.

The facts in the case stated have, by agreement, been supplemented before me by the statement of the case. They show that the respondent was employed

as a sweeper in the machine bay of a factory at Ruislip, in Middlesex. It was a factory where there was 6 1/2 miles of glass roofing, and in the case of enemy

aircraft approaching there was a system of warning upon which the arc lights in that factory would be switched off and the personnel would go to shelter at

once. At the time of the accident the respondent, after the regular warning for taking shelter had been given, was proceeding to the works’ shelter. On her

way she fell over a bag of steel material and sustained a fractured elbow. There was a lot of machinery in the place and it was particularly difficult for her to

see her way in the lighting which was then existing, when the arc lights had been shut off.

The question is whether her injury was a war injury. The definition in the Personal injuries (Emergency Provisions) Act, 1939, s 8(1), is:

‘“War Injuries” means physical injuries—(a) caused by (i) the discharge of any missile (including liquids and gas); or (ii) the use of any weapon,

explosive, or other noxious thing; or (iii) the doing of any other injurious act; either by the enemy or 􀂭 272􀀉 in combating the enemy or in repelling an

imagined attack by the enemy.’

The main argument in this case for the respondent was that the injury was caused by the doing of an injurious act within the section. The acts which are

particularly suggested to be “injurious acts” are two, the reduction of the lighting in the glass-roofed part of the factory, and also the regulation that under

those conditions the personnel shall go to the shelter on a warning being given.

I am quite satisfied that the words “injurious act” in this section do not mean simply an act which causes injury. Some meaning must be given in addition

to that, because the word “injurious” would otherwise be completely otiose. In my view an “injurious act” is an act which is in its nature injurious, that is, an

act which is either intended to cause injury, or an act the natural and probable consequence of which is to cause injury.

In this case I am quite satisfied that there was no injurious act which caused the injury. The general system of blackout, the reduction of lighting, and the

regulations that the personnel should go to shelter on a warning, are none of them intended to cause injury, nor is the natural and probable consequence of

them to cause injury. That being so, I am satisfied that this injury was not caused by an “injurious act” within the definition.

It has been suggested in the case stated that the enforcement of the blackout is the use of a “weapon” for the repulse of enemy action. I do not think that

it is. The word “weapon” is used in the section in its ordinary sense, not in an extended sense. Then it was said that the Minister of Pensions rejected the

claim because there was no incident involving bombs or gunfire, but I do not read that as meaning that if there had been bombs or gunfire it would necessarily

have been a war injury. If there had been bombs or gunfire taking place, there would be the discharge of missiles and the use of weapons, and then in such a

case, the only question might be one of causation. That is absent here. This case must depend on whether this injury was caused by any “injurious act,” and I

find that it was not.

It is not necessary for me to consider the question whether these things were done “in repelling an imagined attack by the enemy.” It is sufficient for me

to say that on the facts found by the Tribunal this is not a war injury, and the appeal will be allowed.

Appeal allowed.

All England Law Reports 1936 - books on screen™

All ER 1946 Volume 1

Preamble

Solicitors: Treasury Solicitor (for the appellant); L Bingham & Co (for the respondent).

R Boswell Esq Barrister.

[1946] 1 All ER 273