M/S SOUTHERN HIGHLAND v M/S TANZANIA OXYGEN LIMITED 1989 TLR 187 (HC)
Court High Court of Tanzania- Mbeya
Judge Mwaikasu J
13 October, 1989
Flynote
Contract - Agency - Termination - Terminable at instance of either party by three
months G notice - Termination by principal - No evidence that termination notice
served on or received by agent - Effect.
Contract - Agency - Termination of authority of - When it takes effect. H
Contract - Agency - Termination of authority of agent - Onus of proof.
Contract - Agency - Terminable by notice - Wrongful termination by principal -
Agent claims damages in lieu of notice - Measure of damages. I
1989 TLR p188
Contract - Agency - Termination - Express or implied contract that agency to be
continued A for a period of time - Wrongful termination - Consequences.
-Headnote
The plaintiff entered into and executed the defendant's standard form contract of
agency B for the distribution of the defendant's full oxygen gas cylinders at an
agreed commission. The contract had a termination clause providing for a three
months termination period at the instance of either party. While the contract was
subsisting the Managing Director of the plaintiff company went abroad on a private
mission. C
He however, entrusted the management of the business of the plaintiff company to
another person. While the said Managing Director was absent, the defendant
terminated the agency contract by three month notice. The notice termination was
not addressed in D the plaintiffs company's business name but was addressed to the
person entrusted with the management of company's business. The defendant alleged
that the termination of the contract was prompted by the plaintiff's breach of the
contract. The plaintiff incurred loss of profit and claimed shs. 300,000/= as relief in
lieu of notice. In an action before the E High Court by the plaintiff for breach of
contract arising out of the defendant's termination of the agency contract.
Held: (i) Since the notice of termination was not addressed to the plaintiff company as
the contracting party and in its business name, the said notice, if it ever reached its F
destination in the absence of the plaintiff company's Managing Director, was and
must have been treated as a private affair by the care-takers of the plaintiff company's
business in respect of the plaintiff company so that should the notice have come to
the knowledge of the Managing Director on his return, it could not be properly taken
as a G proper business communication with the plaintiff company, and plaintiff
would therefore be entitled to ignore it;
(ii) in terms of section 160 of the Law of Contract Ordinance, Cap. 433
termination of the authority of an agent does not so far as regards the agent, take
effect H before it become known to him. The onus of proving that such notice of
termination of the agency had come to the knowledge of the agent, in this case the
plaintiff company, rests with the principal, in this case the defendant company;
(iii) the plaintiff having had no evidence to show how damages to the tune of
I shs.300,000/= were arrived at, the only reasonable
1989 TLR p189
MWAIKASU J
amount to be claimed as relief in lieu of notice must be the amount which ought to
have A been due to the plaintiff company by way of commission;
(iv) in terms of section 157 of the Law of Contract Ordinance where there is
an express or implied contract that the agency should be continued for any period of
time, B the principal must make compensation to the agent for any premature
revocation or renunciation of the agency without sufficient cause.
Case Information
Judgment for plaintiff. C
[zJDz]Judgment
Mwaikasu, J.: By the defendant's standard form of contract, Exhibit P.1, on 16th day
of October 1978, the plaintiff entered into and executed a contract of agency for the
distribution of the defendant's full gas cylinders, to its customers in Mbeya, at an
agreed fee. The gas was oxygen for welding and medical purposes. D
The contract continued to be in force for seven years until it was terminated by the
defendant as from 31st August 1986, by a purported three month's notice dated
19/5/86.
It is now the contention of the plaintiff that such contract was wrongfully terminated
and E therefore breached by the defendant for want of the contract three months'
notice as clearly stipulated under clause one of the contract. Hence the plaintiff's
claim for the reliefs as prayed in his plaint.
That, however, has been categorically denied by the defendant.
Thereupon the following issues were agreed by the learned counsel for the parties: F
(a) Whether or not the defendant had issued to the plaintiff notice of
termination of the agency relationship on 19/5/86; G
(b) Whether or not, if such notice had been so issued the same was in
accordance with the procedure agreed under the contract between the parties;
(c) If agency relationship was then still existing, whether the defendant
paid the plaintiff the agreed commission. H
(d) What reliefs, if any, are the parties entitled to.
The case for the plaintiff company centres on the only evidence of its proprietor, the
P.W.1, one Mr. Vinod K. Babla, a businessman resident of the Municipality of Mbeya,
I at short street, Block L. Plot 52.
1989 TLR p190
MWAIKASU J
His evidence is to the effect that he is the proprietor of the Plaintiff Company, known
as A Southern Highlands Motors Ltd., situated along Karume Avenue, within the
Municipality of Mbeya, registered as Limited Company in 1982.
While the contract in question between the parties was still in operation, in March
1986, B the P.W.1 went abroad for marriage, and returned in August 1986. In his
absence his business through the plaintiff company was then left in the hands of his
secretary one Miss Mourine Nyondo. It is further his testimony that on his return
from abroad, he did not receive any notice of termination of the plaintiff company's
agency relationship with C the defendant, nor was he aware that in his absence his
secretary received such notice. He has added that on his departure for his marriage
abroad, he wrote a letter to the defendant company and personally handed it to an
official of the Defendant Company in D Dar es Salaam, one Rwegoshora notifying
them of his absence, and that he would be back in three months time. It would also
appear that the defendant company was also informed that in his absence his office
would remain open and taken care of by his friend one Thaker. On the P.W.1's return
the said Thaker could not inform him anything as to E whether a notice or the
termination of the agency relationship between the plaintiff and the defendant
company had been received from the defendant business transactions did then
continue as usual until sometime in August 1986, when a truck carrying full cylinder
gas that called at the company premises had to be diverted by an official of the F
defendant company called one Nkondo, (D.W.1) and sent the consignment to another
person; within the Municipality. That is when the plaintiff company came to know
that the agency had been terminated by the defendant company. He went on to
testify that he G used to get a commission for the sale of the defendants gas,
dependant upon the amount of gas cylinders supplied by the defendant company.
That, however, is said to have ranged between shs.4,000/= and shs. 8,000/= paid
monthly.
On the other hand, it is the defence case, inter alia, as testified the D.W.l, one Juma
s/o H Nkondo, a Mechanical Engineer working with the defendant company, and
the D.W.2, one Dr. Asajile s/o Kapungu, being the medical officer i/c., of Isoko
Hospital, that following the absence of the P.W.1, while abroad for marriage, there
developed deteriotion in the agency services rendered by the plaintiff company
because the plaintiff I company could not make regular distribution of full gass
cylinders particularly for hospital oxygen, as the person left to act for the P.W.l called
at the premises part
1989 TLR p191
MWAIKASU J
time, leaving the plaintiff company's office premises closed often times. That then
forced A the medical customers, as the D.W.2 once did, to follow the gas to the Head
quarters in Dar es Salaam. According to the D.W. 2, such problem of supply became
more acute between the months of March, April and May 1986.
Thereupon on account of such deteriotion in the plaintiff company's agency service
with B the defendant company, on 19/5/86 the defendant company issued a three
months' written notice to the plaintiff company for the termination of such agency
contract between the parties. Such notice was tendered before this court as Exhibit
D.1, and is C also Annexure "C" to the written Statement of Defence. According to
the D.W.1, such notice is unreferenced; it was not addressed to the plaintiff company,
but to one Mr. Babla, the P.W.l in person, of Southern Highlands Motors, P.O. Box
252, Mbeya, it was sent by post but the D.W.1 could not tell whether it was by
ordinary or registered post. D
It was then on the basis of such notice that on the expiration of the three months
period of notice, on 31st August, 1986, the contract was brought to an end.
On being cross-examined, the D.W.1 has maintained that such termination of the
contract was justified on the ground that the plaintiff company had committed several
E breaches contrary to the provisions under clauses Nos. 4, 5, 9 and 21. The D.W.1,
however, admitted that there was no evidence to show that the notice had
SOUTHERN HIGHLAND v. T.O.L. (Mwaikasu, J.)been received by the plaintiff
company, and that F Mr. Babla (P.W.1) was not a party to agency agreement, adding
that before the P.W.1 went abroad, there was no business problem with the Plaintiff
company. He went on to say that there was no prior communication between the
plaintiff company and the defendant company regarding dissatisfaction of the
defendant company's customers, with G the plaintiff company's agency services
rendered. He could not also tell how much earnings had been lost by the defendant
company during the absence of the P.W.1. Neither could he say how many deliveries
had been made to the plaintiff and sales made during the absence of the P.W.1 as he
had no documents to support the same, nor could H he produce any when time was
given to the purpose.
From the above evidence it is evident that the contracting parties to the contract of
agency the subject of this suit were Southern Highlands Motors Ltd., a limited
company registered under Companies Ordinance and Tanzania Oxygen Ltd. The
contract was I concluded on 16/10/78 and continued to be in force up to 31/8/86.
1989 TLR p192
MWAIKASU J
It is also common ground that in March 1986, the P.W.1, one Vinod K. Babla, the A
proprietor and managing director of the plaintiff company had to travel abroad for his
marriage, leaving his business in the hands of his secretary one Miss Maurine
Nyondo, and Thaker, who worked part time. I also find as an established fact that
during the B P.W.1's absence while he was abroad, his business premises were not
regularly kept open to his customers. However, in absence of any documentary
evidence to show the volume of business in respect of the oxygen gas, between the
plaintiff and defendant companies, this court is unable to accept the evidence for the
defendant and say that any C of the alleged breaches of the agency agreement
clauses were actually so committed by the plaintiff company.
Nevertheless, any party was at liberty to terminate the contract at any time after
giving a D three months notice to the other as provided for under clause I of the
agreement.
Under Clause I of the agreement the parties agreed in the following terms and I
quote:
I. This agreement shall be deemed to have commenced on the 16th day of
October 1978 and shall continue until terminated by either party giving to the other
three months E notice in writing of its intention so to do or as provided in clauses 23
and 24.
Clause 23, of the agreement provides: F
If there shall be any breach by the Distributing Agent of any provision of this
Agreement or if the Distributing Agent shall commit an act of bankrupting the
company may forthwith terminate this agreement.
Under Clause 24 of it is there provided as follows: G
In the event of either party thereto selling or ceasing to carry on its business
they shall have the right to terminate this agreement by giving one month's notice in
writing.
In my view, the import of the above clauses is that, the contract could be terminated
in I either one of the three situations: first, on the decision of either party, as he
pleases, to end the contract agreement, when, in terms of clause I, he would then be
required to give a three months' notice to the other party; second, whenever the
Distributing Agent, in this case the plaintiff, breached any of
1989 TLR p193
MWAIKASU J
the provisions of the agreement, in which case in terms of clause 23, the Principal, in
this A case the Defendant company, would be entitled to terminate the agreement
immediately without prior notice to the Distributing Agent; and third, whenever
either party happened to sell or cease to carry on his business, in which case the other
party would be entitled to terminate the contract after giving a one month's notice. B
It is clear in the instant case that it is the first option under Clause I of the agreement
that the defendant invoked in terminating the contract of agency with the plaintiff
company.
The issue in respect of such three months' notice is whether the same was properly
and C actually served upon the plaintiff company.
According to the evidence that is before this court, it is clear and undisputed that the
purported notice dated 19/5/86 was not addressed to the plaintiff company as the D
contracting party as such, but was addressed to one Mr. Bable of Southern Highlands
Motors, P.O. Box 252. As such notice, if it ever reached its destination in the absence
of the P.W.1, the Company's managing director, was and it must have been treated as
a private affair by those left to look after the P.W.1's business in respect of the
plaintiff company. For it was not addressed in the business name of the contracting
plaintiff E company. So that should that have come to the knowledge of the P.W.1
on his return, it could not be properly taken as a proper business communication with
the plaintiff company, and therefore would be entitled to ignore it. F
On the other hand it is the P.W.1's contention which could not be effectively
challenged by the Defendant company that such alleged notice was not brought to his
notice and he did not in fact receive it.
The defendant company has been unable to prove that such notice was actually
received G by the plaintiff company or that it was aware of it in any way. For no
proof could be offered as to how the posting of such notice was effected, and whether
it actually reached the plaintiff company.
Yet in terms of s.160 of the Law of Contract Ordinance Cap. 433, the termination of
the G authority of an agent does not so far as regards the agent, take effect before it
comes known to him. The burden to prove that such notice of termination of the
agency had come to the knowledge of the agent, in this case, the plaintiff company,
rests with the principal, in this case, the defendant company. That the defendant
company has failed to I discharge. It
1989 TLR p194
MWAIKASU J
follows, therefore, that the termination of the agency contract with the plaintiff
company A must be regarded as wrongful.
The consequence of such wrongful breach of such contract of agency between the
parties is to be found under the provisions of s.157 of the Law of Contract Ordinance.
It is there provided thus: B
157. Where there is an express or implied contract that the agency should be
continued for any period of time, the principal must make compensation to the agent
... for any previous revocation or renunciation of the agency without sufficient cause.
C
I also accept as an established fact, as it was not at all challenged by the Defendant
Company during the trial of this suit and as also laid down in Clause 19 of the
agreement, that the plaintiff company used to be paid a commission by the Defendant
D Company for the oxygen gas cylinders sold. It does not appear that such
commission was paid to the plaintiff company for the period of September 1986 to
October 1987, when this suit was instituted following such wrongful termination of
the contract by the defendant company. E
I now proceed to consider the reliefs claimed. The first is for shs.56,000/= being loss of
profits. I consider the same to be founded and it is accordingly granted. Then there is
the second relief of shs.4,000/=, per month as loss of profits from the second relief of
shs.4,000/=, per month as loss of profits from the month of November 1987, a month
F following the institution of this suit to the day of judgment. That as well appears to
be merited. It is accordingly granted. On the other hand, I find it hard to understand
the basis for the relief of shs.300,000/= as prayed in item (c). For no evidence has been
led G for the plaintiff company to show how such amount of loss has been arrived at.
Nor does the agreement have any provision to such effort. The only reasonable
amount to be claimed as relief in lieu of notice must be the amount which ought to
have been due to the plaintiff company by way of commission. Thus for the requisite
three months' notice the H plaintiff company is entitled to shs.18,000/=, in lieu of
such notice, being the average of commission of between shs.4,000/= and shs.8,000/=
that could be paid to the plaintiff per month.
In the final analysis judgment is entered for the plaintiff and it is hereby ordered that
the defendant do pay the plaintiff as follows: I
1989 TLR p195
(a) Shs.56,000/= being loss of profit for the period of 14 months from
September 1986, to A October 1987, at the rate of shs.4,000/= per month.
(b) Shs.76,733/= being loss of profits for the period of November 1987 to
13th October 1989, at the rate of shs.4,000/= per month, for 24 months and 13 days. B
(c) Shs.18,000/= being payment in lieu of three months' notice.
(d) Interest at the rate of 12% on the decretal amount from date of
judgment to full settlement of the decretal amount.
(e) Costs of the suit. C
Order accordingly
1989 TLR p195
D
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