WILLIAM RAJABU MALLYA AND TWO OTHERS v REPUBLIC 1991 TLR 83 (CA)
Court Court of Appeal of Tanzania - Arusha
Judge Kisanga JJA, Omar JJA and Mapigano Ag JA
2nd July 1991 B
Flynote
Criminal Practice and Procedure - Jurisdiction - Court of Resident Magistrate
presided over by a district magistrate - Whether court duly constituted- s. 6(1)
Magistrate's Courts Act, 1984. C
-Headnote
The appellants, William Rajabu Mallya, Re v Father John Kiwere and Louis Augustino
Mbuya were charged in the Resident Magistrates Court for the offences of obtaining
money by false pretences and conspiracy to defraud.
When the accused appeared before the court for the first time the court was duly
presided over by a Resident D Magistrate. Subsequently the court was presided over
by a Principal District Magistrate who tried and eventually disposed of the case.
Two of the accused including Re v Father John Kiwere were acquitted by the trial
court. The DPP appealed to E the High Court against their acquittal. The High
Court found them all guilty and sentenced them to 5 years' imprisonment.
One of the accused, Re v Father John Kiwere in his appeal to the Court of Appeal
raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial magistrate, relying on
section 6 (i)(c) of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1984. F
Held: (i) If a case is designated for a particular court, then it should be heard only by a
member of that court notwithstanding that a member of some other court has
substantive jurisdiction over the offence and could hear it; G
(ii) because the Principal District Magistrate presided over the court of
Resident Magistrate when he was trying this case, the court was not duly constituted
within the meaning of section 6(i)(c) of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1984. H
Case Information
Trial a nullity.
Kimomogoro, for respondent. I
1991 TLR p84
KISANGA AND OMAR JJA AND MAPIGANO AG JA
[zJDz]Judgment
A Kisanga and Omar, JJ.A. and Mapigano, Ag. J.A.: The three appellants were jointly
charged in the Resident Magistrate's Court in one information containing four counts,
two counts being for obtaining money by false pretences and the other two for
conspiracy to defraud. The trial Court convicted one of them on the counts B of
obtaining money by false pretences only, and acquitted all of them on the conspiracy
charges. The Director of Public Prosecutions appealed against the acquittals, and the
convicted person cross-appealed against his conviction for obtaining money by false
pretences. The cross-appeal was allowed in full while the appeal was allowed only in
C part by the High Court thus resulting in each of the present appellants being
sentenced to a substantive term of 5 years' imprisonment. On the day of the
judgment by the High Court i.e. 30.4.90 only the appellant Re v Father John Kiwere
was present and although the High Court directed a warrant of arrest to issue against
the remaining D two persons, the said persons have not been arrested to date, it
being claimed that they have absconded to Kenya. Curiously enough, however, all of
them after their conviction were able to instruct Mr J.J. Mwale, advocate, who gave
on their behalf a joint notice of appeal, and who continues to act for the appellant
William Rajabu Mallya, E while subsequent to the said notice of appeal the appellant
Louis Augustino Mbuya also was able to instruct Mr D'Souza, advocate, who is
representing him now.
F We have to state that this kind of behaviour and attitude on the part of the
appellants Mallya and Mbuya is most unsatisfactory, and must be deprecated. There
can be no doubt that they knew the precise terms of the judgment of the High Court.
Yet they chose only to appeal against that judgment but deliberately ignored that
term of it which required them to serve the sentence. It amounted to a flagrant
disregard of the court order which tended to G bring the system of the
administration of justice into ridicule. This is totally unacceptable. Members of the
society must develop a culture of respect for lawful orders. While it is right and
proper that people should be aware of their rights under the law, and that every effort
should be made to help them realize those rights, it must be H emphasized that
people also have a duty to discharge their obligation under the law. By deliberately
avoiding to serve the sentence which was lawfully passed on them, the two appellants
were in breach of a society's basic norm; and that must not be allowed to continue.
I Now, when the appeal was called on for hearing, our attention was called to a
letter written by the police stating that they were
1991 TLR p85
KISANGA AND OMAR JJA AND MAPIGANO AG JA
still trying to reach the two appellants in Kenya, and for this purpose the police asked
for a fresh warrant of arrest A to issue and a copy of the judgment in the case. In the
light of this request we decided to adjourn the appeals of the two appellants, pending
the outcome of this further attempt by the police, and proceeded to hear that of the
Re v Father John Kiwere who was present. B
This appellant who was unrepresented argued the appeal in person in the course of
which he raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the trial court and
relied for this on the provisions of Section 6 (1)(c) of the Magistrates' Court Act 1984.
That provision reads: C
6.- (1) Subject to the provisions of Section 7, a Magistrate's Court shall be
duly constituted when held by a single magistrate, being -
(a)-
(b)- D
(c) in the case of a Court of Resident Magistrate, a Resident Magistrate.
(Section 7 is not relevant to the facts of the present case). A perusal of the record
shows that the case was filed in E the Resident Magistrate's Court of Arusha and
when the accused were brought before the court for the first time the court was duly
presided over by a Resident Magistrate. Subsequently, however, the court was
presided over by a Principal District Magistrate who tried and eventually disposed of
the case. There can have been no F inadvertence on the part of the Principal
District Magistrate because both the Court case file and the charge sheet were clearly
titled "IN THE RESIDENT MAGISTRATE'S COURT AT ARUSHA". The appellant in
effect contended that the Court was not duly constituted because the Principal
District Magistrate sat in the wrong Court, G in violation of the provisions of Section
6 (1) quoted above.
Mr. Kimomogoro of the Principal State Attorney's Chambers Arusha resisted the
appeal. He referred us to a decision of the High Court in the case of Lucas Mwita and
Two Others MZA Cr. App. NO. 30 of 1977 where a District Magistrate had presided
over in the Resident Magistrate's Court and the proceedings were declared a H
nullity. However the learned Counsel submitted that the proceedings in the present
case were saved under the provisions of Section 387 and 388 (1) of the Criminal
Procedure Act. We propose not to set out the provisions of I those sections and to
examine them
1991 TLR p86
KISANGA AND OMAR JJA AND MAPIGANO AG JA
A in detail, not out of disrespect to the learned counsel but because we are satisfied
that they are completely irrelevant to the issue at hand.
Again learned counsel took the view and argued at length that the error was not fatal
because the trial magistrate B had substantive jurisdiction to try the offences, and
that the wrong titling or citing of the court did not really matter. With due respect,
we do not agree. To uphold that view would render meaningless the provisions of S.
6 (1)(c) above cited. In our view the correct meaning to be attached to that provision
is that if a case is designated for a C particular court, then it should be heard only by
a member of that court notwithstanding that a member of some other court has
substantive jurisdiction over the offence and could hear it. Perhaps an analogy from
civil cases might serve better to illustrate the point. Under Section 76 of the Law of
Marriages Act the High Court, a court of D resident magistrate, a district court and a
primary court each has concurrent jurisdiction over matrimonial proceedings. But it
can hardly be maintained, for instance, that resident magistrate may properly try a
divorce suit which was filed in the High Court.
E For the reasons as expressed above, we agree with the appellant that because the
Principal District Magistrate presided over the Court of Resident Magistrate when he
was trying this case, the court was not duly constituted within the meaning of Section
8 (1) (c) of the Magistrates' Court Act. The proceedings were, therefore, a nullity F
and they are accordingly set aside. As this affects equally the trial of the remaining
appellants, our earlier order of adjourning their appeals to a later date is necessarily
overtaken by the event and is accordingly vacated.
G The question, what next, has exercised our minds quite considerably. The
appellant Re v Father John Kiwere has been very co-operative from the very
inception of these proceedings. Indeed while the offences were committed partly in
Tanzania and partly in Kenya, it is he who initiated the investigations, and he has
since co-operated with the Police at every stage. He deserves credit for that.
H On the other hand so far he has served only about one year out of the 5 years'
prison sentence meted out to him. He was charged jointly with the remaining two
appellants who have been so unco-operative and who are still at large. Again the
offences which the appellants were jointly charged with and convicted of involved
defrauding a I Bishop and Convent Sisters in Kenya a total of Kenyan Shillings
426,285/=, a substantial sum which remains unrecovered. We consider that a
practical way out of this rather complex situation
1991 TLR p87
is to leave the matter entirely with the Director of Public Prosecutions to decide
whether or not to institute the A charges afresh, having regard to the circumstances
alluded to. In the meantime the appellant is set free. It is ordered accordingly.
Order accordingly. B
1991 TLR p87
C
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