THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY WAKF AND TRUST COMMISSION MAMBOMSIIGE ZANZIBAR v SAIDE SALUM AMBAR 1991 TLR 198 (CA)
Court Court of Appeal of Tanzania - Zanzibar
Judge Makame JJA, Kisanga JJA and Omar JJA
E 6 December, 1991
Flynote
Civil Practice and Procedure - Appeals to Court of Appeal- Appeal from an order
refusing to set aside an ex-parte decree - F Whether leave is a pre-requisite -
Appellate Jurisdiction Act, 1979
-Headnote
The High Court of Zanzibar gave an ex-parte judgment in favour of the respondent.
The appellant then applied to have the ex-parte judgment set aside but the application
was refused. So he decided to appeal against the decision G of the High Court
refusing the application to the Court of Appeal. No leave was sought and obtained to
appeal to the Court of Appeal.
Held: Appealing from an order refusing to set aside an ex-parte judgment comes
under sub-section (c) of section 5 H of the Appellate Jurisdiction Act, 1979 for
which it is necessary to obtain leave first. As no such leave was sought and obtained
this intended appeal in incompetent.
Case Information
I Appeal dismissed.
1991 TLR p199
MAKAME, KISANGA AND OMAR JJA
Muccadam, for the appellant A
Kalunga, for the respondent
[zJDz]Judgment
Makame, Kisanga and Omar, JJ.A.: This appeal arises from a dispute over a house of
which the appellant is the landlord and the respondent the tenant: We assume that
Saide Salmin Ambar is the one person as Saide Salmin B Islam.
It is not necessary to go into the details of the controversy for the purpose of the task
immediately in front of us. Enough it is to say that it was the present respondent who
took the dispute to the High Court of Zanzibar sitting at Vuga and that Mnilla R.M.,
(Extended Jurisdiction), in an ex-parte judgment, found her still the lawful tenant of
the C present appellant whom he also ordered to pay the present respondent some
damages.
The appellant applied to have the ex-parte judgment set aside but the application was
refused. He has now come D to this Court wanting to appeal against that order
refusing to set aside the ex-parte judgment and is being represented by Mr
Muccadam, learned advocate. The respondent is advocated for by Mr Kalunga,
learned counsel.
Mr Muccadam filed a Notice of Motion asking to be permitted to file a supplementary
record because, he said, E High Court Misc. Application No. 10 of 1991 had not been
brought to his attention when he filed the record of appeal: That Misc. Application
contained, inter alia, his client's affidavit explaining the reasons why the ex-parte
judgment should be set aside. F
Mr. Kalunga resisted Mr Muccadam's application before us and submitted that Mr
Muccadam had not really handled his brief with any seriousness otherwise he would
have made sure that he had all the necessary papers. We wish to pause here and
observe that Mr Muccadam should not have made a general search for the alleged
affidavit. G He should have specifically asked for this file for Misc. application No.
10 of 1991 because Mr Mnilla's Rulling clearly indicated it was in that Misc.
Application, 10 of 1991, and not in the main civil case or any other cause.
It appeared to the court that the application before us would turn on a different issue,
infact, and accordingly we H invited both counsel to address us on that one. The
issue is, whether the intending appellant was entitled to come on appeal as of right, or
whether he had first to obtain leave to appeal against the order refusing to set aside
the ex-parte judgment. Mr Muccadam submitted that the order by Mr Mmilla was
itself a decree so he did not have to I obtain leave
1991 TLR p200
A first. He was entitled to appeal as of right. Mr Kalunga argued that Mr
Muccadam should have applied for leave.
Appeals to this court are governed by the Appellate Jurisdiction Act, 1979, section 5.
Subsection (a) and (b) set B out all the situations in which a party may appeal as of
right while subsection (c) provides:
With the leave of the High Court or of the Court of Appeal, against every
other decree, order, judgment or finding of the High C Court.
We are of the considered view that appealing from an order refusing to set aside an
ex-parte judgment does not come under sub-sections (a) or (b). It comes, rather,
under subsection (c), for which it is necessary to obtain leave D first. As no such
leave was sought and obtained, this intended appeal is incompetently before us. We
accordingly strike it out with costs.
Appeal dismissed.
1991 TLR p200
F
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