SIJALI JUMA KOCHO v REPUBLIC 1994 TLR 206 (CA)
Court Court of Appeal of Tanzania - Dar es Salaam
Judge Kisanga Ag CJ, Omar JJA and Lubuva JJA
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 22 OF 1994 B
7 October, 1994
(From the decision of the High Court of Tanzania at Morogoro, Bahati, J)
Flynote
C Criminal Law - Defence of alibi - Whether prior notice is required.
Criminal Practice and Procedure - Identification of accused - Identification where
offence was committed at night.
-Headnote
D The appellant appealed against the conviction for murder by the High Court on
the ground that the conviction was largely based on the uncorroborated dying
declaration of the deceased. The appellant further contended that the conditions
obtaining at the time of the incident did not favour correct identification of the
appellant as being one of the bandits who invaded the house of the deceased in the
night. E
Held:
(i) The conditions in the house did favour correct identification of the
appellant as the tube light under which a person could read was sufficiently bright to
enable the deceased to identify the appellant who was well known to him before the
incident; F
(ii) Prior notice of the defence of alibi is required under the law;
(iii) The appellant was under no legal obligation to prove the alibi but in
the fact of the allegations made against him one would reasonably expect him to call
the person he claims he was with at the time of the event.
Case Information
G Appeal dismissed.
No case referred.
Mselem, for the appellant.
Korosso, State Attorney for the respondent.
[zJDz]Judgment
H Kisanga, Ag CJ, delivered the following considered judgment of the Court:
The appellant was convicted of murder contrary to s 196 of the Penal Code and
sentenced to death by the High Court (Bahati, J) sitting at Morogoro. He has now
appealed against both conviction and sentence. I
1994 TLR p207
KISANGA Ag CJ
The facts of the case were that a group of ten bandits broke into a shop at about 1 A
am and seriously attacked the deceased and PW3 who were sleeping there after
which they made away with money and shop goods. The two victims were taken to
hospital where the deceased died about a week later. PW3 survived to tell the story of
what happened. B
The conviction is based largely if not wholly, on a dying declaration of the deceased,
consisting of what he is reported by PW3 to have said at the time of the invasion that
night, and by PW1 while he (the deceased) was at the hospital. PW3, the owner of
the shop which was broken into, testified that after the bandits had entered they
demanded money. He obliged and gave them Shs 67,000/= which C was in two lots.
However, they were not satisfied and so they started to attack him and the deceased.
They were in two groups: One group consisting of five dealt with the deceased while
the other group was on PW3. In the course of the attack D the deceased remarked
`Even you Kocho my relative of Manzese are killing me?' PW1 who was attending
the deceased at the hospital testified that deceased told him that it was his friend
Kocho who had injured him. The appellant in his defence denied the charge and put
up the alibi that on the material night he was far away at the home of his uncle. E
The trial judge rejected the defence of alibi. He relied on the dying declaration and
convicted the appellant. He was satisfied that the dying declaration was sufficiently
cogent to warrant the conviction even without its being corroborated. F
At the hearing of this appeal the appellant was represented by Mr Mselem, learned
advocate, while the Republic was represented by Miss Korosso, learned State
Attorney. Mr Mselem filed and argued only one ground essentially attacking the trial
judge for basing the appellant's conviction on the uncorroborated dying declaration of
the deceased. He contended that the conditions obtaining at the time of the G
incident did not favour correct identification of the appellant as being one of the
bandits. Miss Korosso strongly resisted the appeal.
The Trial Judge accepted the evidence that there was a tube light on in the room H
where the bandits carried out their nefarious activities that night. The tube light was
coloured but was sufficiently bright for a person to read under it. There was abundant
evidence that the appellant and the deceased were long time friends. Indeed the
appellant conceded that he went to school with the deceased in Morogoro and he
visited the home of the I
1994 TLR p208
KISANGA Ag CJ
A deceased in Moshi. The bandits did not start attacking the inmates immediately
after entering the room. They demanded money first and PW3 dished out Shs
67,000/= in two lots. It is only after they were dissatisfied with this amount that they
started to attack PW3 and the deceased.
B We are of the view that these conditions did favour correct identification of the
appellant. The tube light under which a person could read was sufficiently bright to
enable the deceased to identify the appellant who was well known to him before the
incident.
There was evidence that the bandits flashed torch light in the eyes of the inmates C
in order to dazzle them, and Mr Mselem contended that this must have prevented the
deceased from identifying his assailant or assailants. We cannot agree. Flashing torch
light did not go on all the time. For instance, there was the period between the time
the bandits demanded money and the time PW3 handed to them Shs 67,000/=in two
lots. The bandits cannot have been flashing torch D lights in the eyes of PW3 all this
time. They must have paused for some time to enable him to pick up the money from
wherever he had kept it and hand it over to them. During such interval the deceased
could have identified the appellant as one of the intruders. There is other evidence
which shows that flashing of the torch light did not dazzle the inmates to the extent
of making it impossible for them to see and appreciate what was going on. PW3 said
that the group of bandits who E entered the room that night numbered ten. If under
the conditions obtaining in the room he could see and count the number of invaders,
the same conditions should enable the deceased to identify the appellant whom he
knew so well before. Of F course, unlike the deceased, PW3 could not identify the
bandits because, he said, they were strangers to him; he did not know them prior to
the incident.
G Mr Mselem emphasized the view that the conditions were not favourable for
correct identification considering that the inmates must have been suddenly
awakened from deep sleep at 1 am, the events were taking place in rapid succession
and that the inmates were very frightened. Once again we are not H persuaded by
this argument. As pointed out earlier, the attack did not start immediately after the
bandits had demanded money and were given what they considered was not enough.
During such demand for and handing over of money the deceased, with the aid of the
tube light, would be able to identify the appellant whom he knew so well as a long
time friend. I
1994 TLR p209
KISANGA Ag CJ
As submitted by Miss Korosso, the appellant's conduct points to his guilt of the A
offence charged. The appellant and the deceased were long time friends and, indeed
according to the appellant, that friendship continued until the death of the deceased.
There was ample evidence that after the deceased was injured the appellant enquired,
though sarcastically, and got to know that the deceased was B hospitalized but he
never went to see him there even though he told lies that he visited him twice at the
hospital. It is hard to see how in ordinary circumstances the appellant would have
forsaken his long time friend at such a critical time. This point is brought out even
more clearly when the appellant told lies that he visited the deceased twice at the
hospital for this is what he should indeed have done but he did not. C
There was credible evidence that after the deceased died and during investigation into
the case, the police were searching for the appellant but as they approached him he
ran away and disappeared, only to be arrested two days later. It is only D reasonable
to conclude that he ran away because he knew that the police wanted him in
connection with this offence which he had committed. Not only that. There was
evidence also that the appellant was known by the name of Kocho by which the
deceased is reported to have identified him on the fateful night. Indeed it is the E
name under which the appellant was charged and which appeared throughout the
proceedings respecting him right up to this court. Prosecution witnesses consistently
referred to him as Kocho and they were not cross-examined. Strangely enough,
however, the appellant in the course of his defence disowned F that name. One
wonders why. In normal circumstances one does not disown one's name. The only
reasonable inference to be drawn is that the appellant did so as an afterthought in an
attempt to avoid any association of his identity with the death of the deceased. G
We are satisfied that considering all the circumstances of the case the charge against
the appellant was proved sufficiently and that the appellant's denial cannot cast any
reasonable doubt on his guilt. In his defence of alibi the appellant had claimed that on
the material night he slept at the home of his uncle. He had given H no prior notice
of this alibi as required under the law. Admittedly he was under no legal obligation to
prove the alibi but in the face of the allegations made against him, one would
reasonably expect him to call the said uncle to bear him out. However, the appellant
declined to do so despite suggestions to him in cross-examination. In these
circumstances, therefore no weight can be attached to his alibi, and the I
1994 TLR p210
A learned Trial Judge rightly discounted it. In the result the conviction was justified
and we can find no ground to interfere. Accordingly the appeal is dismissed in its
entirety.
1994 TLR p210
C
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