SHABANI MPIRI v WILBARDA TAIRO 1993 TLR 58 (HC)

SHABANI MPIRI v WILBARDA TAIRO 1993 TLR 58 (HC)

Court High Court of Tanzania - Dar es Salaam

Judge Mwaikasu J

D MISCELLANEOUS CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7 OF 1992

7 February, 1992

Flynote

Rent Restriction Act - Protected tenant - Protected tenant need not enter a new

agreement with the landlord - E Eviction must comply with provisions of the Rent

Restriction Act, 1984, s 25(1)(e)(i).

Landlord and Tenant - Protected tenant - Eviction - Need to comply with the

provisions of s 25(1)(e)(i) of the Rent Restriction Act, 1984.

-Headnote

F The respondent was a wife of a deceased tenant of the appellant. After the death

of the tenant the appellant wanted the widow to enter into a new tenancy agreement

or else be evicted from the premises. The Dar es Salaam Regional Housing Tribunal

ordered eviction of the respondent. The Housing Appeals Tribunal, on appeal,

reversed the decision and order of the Regional Housing G Tribunal, holding that

the respondent was a protected tenant within the meaning of s 25(1)(a)(i) of the Rent

Restriction Act, 1984. Dissatisfied with this decision the appellant appealed to the

High Court.

Held: (i) Under the provisions of ss 3(1) and 25(1)(e)(i) of the Rent Restriction

Act, 1984, the respondent, upon the death of her husband, who was the tenant of the

appellant and with H whom the respondent lived as husband and wife in the

appellant's house until the day of his death, automatically became a protected tenant;

(ii) Any attempt to evict her from the premises must comply with the

provisions of section 25(1)(e)(i) regarding the provision of suitable alternative

accommodation by the landlord.

Case Information

I Appeal dismissed.

1993 TLR p59

No case referred to. A

[zJDz]Judgment

Mwaikasu J: By this appeal, the appellant, one Shabani Mpiri, challenges the decision

of the Housing Appeals Tribunal in its Appeal No 46 of 1992, originating from the Dar

es Salaam Regional Housing B Tribunal Application No 317 of 1991. In its decision

the Housing Appeals Tribunal reversed the decision of the Regional Housing Tribunal

which ordered the eviction of the respondent, one Wilbarda Tairo, from the

appellant's house by unanimously holding that the respondent, having been C the

wife of the deceased one Tairo who was the appellant's tenant and lived with him in

such house until the day of his death, was, upon the death of her husband, a statutory

tenant as defined under s 3(1) of the Rent Restriction Act 1984, and therefore as such,

a protected tenant under the provision of s 25(1)(a)(i) of the said Act, so that there

was no need for her to enter a new tenancy D agreement with the appellant.

That could not sound just and reasonable to the appellant who is on record to have

maintained before not only the lower appellate tribunal but before this court that the

respondent ought to have entered a new tenancy agreement after the death of her

husband, and that if there was such a law E that did provide such a protection as

relied upon by the respondent, then he would not recognize such law, adding that if

there was a law that required him in the circumstances of this case to provide an

alternative accommodation to such a widow if she is to be evicted, when such law, as

it did not come from God, he would not recognise it either. F

It is such ostrich mindedness of the appellant that has led him to challenge such

decision of the Housing Appeals Tribunal before this Court, arguing, in the main that

the Housing Appeals Tribunal G had erred in law by so holding that the respondent

was under the Rent Restriction Act 1984, automatically a protected tenant and that

there was no necessity for her to enter a new tenancy agreement with him, the

landlord. On the other ground that the Housing Appeals Tribunal did not adequately

consider the allegation that the respondent had been guilty of contravening tenancy

rules H for her alleged refusal to clean the backyard of the suit premises, that, in my

view, was adequately considered by the lower appellate Tribunal. This court does not

therefore, intend to address itself on the issue.

Now coming to the only legal issue raised in this appeal, which is whether under the

provisions of s I 3(1) and s 25(1)(e)(i) of the Rent

1993 TLR p60

A Restriction Act 1984, the respondent, upon the death of her husband who was

then the tenant of theB appellant and with whom the respondent used to live as

husband and wife in the appellant's house until the day of his death, thereafter

automatically became a protected tenant.

B Upon reading the definition of the word `Tenant' as provided for under s 3(1) of

the Rent Restriction Act 1984 together with s 25(1)(e)(i) of the said Act, I am satisfied

that this appeal has no substance. Under the law, the respondent is clearly as found by

the Housing Appeals Tribunal, a protected tenant. Any attempt to evict her from the

premises must comply with the provisions of s 25(1)(e)(i) regarding the provision of

suitable alternative accommodation by the landlord. If the C appellant considers

such provision of our law to be unjust, the only reasonable course for him to take is

either to raise such complaint with his Honourable Member of Parliament, with a

view of soliciting D the desired amendment or forward his memo with the law

Reform Commission of Tanzania to have it looked into with a view of reforming it, if

found to be so desirable. Otherwise he cannot stand in the way of the operation of the

law. He may do so at his own peril.

E Accordingly I dismiss this appeal with costs.

1993 TLR p60

F