KENETH MANDA v REPUBLIC 1993 TLR 107 (HC)

 KENETH MANDA v REPUBLIC 1993 TLR 107 (HC)

Court High Court of Tanzania - Arusha

Judge Mroso J

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 7 OF 1993 B

12 March, 1993

Flynote

Criminal Practice and Procedure - Plea of Guilty - Appellant pleaded guilty and

admitted facts not constituting the offence charged - Whether plea of guilty

unequivocal. C

Road Traffic - Causing bodily injury through reckless driving - Ingredients of reckless

driving - Road Traffic Act 1973.

-Headnote

The Appellant was charged with causing bodily injury through reckless driving. He

was convicted on D his own plea of guilty. But the particulars of the offence in the

charge sheet, and the facts stated in court by the prosecution, did not suggest any

reckless driving by the Appellant.

Held: (i) An accused person can only be convicted on his own plea of guilty if it

is ascertained that he has accepted as correct facts which constitute the ingredients of

the offence charged; E

(ii) As no particulars or facts constituting reckless driving were put to the

appellant, his plea of guilty was equivocal and should have been entered as a plea of

`not guilty'.

Case Information

Appeal allowed. Case remitted to the lower court to enter a plea of `not guilty' and

the case to F proceed to hearing.

No cases referred to.

[zJDz]Judgment

Mroso J: This is an appeal against a conviction and sentence by the District Court of

Moshi in Traffic Criminal case No 288/92. The appellant is shown to have pleaded

guilty to a charge of causing bodily G injury through reckless driving, contrary to ss

42(1)(a), 63(2)(b) and 27(1)(a) of the Road Traffic Act, No 30 of 1973. He was

convicted on the plea of guilty and sentenced to a fine of shillings 10,000/= or 12

months' imprisonment in default. He was also disqualified from holding or obtaining

a H driving license for a period of three years. His appeal is based mainly on the

complaint that the plea of guilty was equivocal.

At the hearing of this appeal the learned State Attorney for the respondent Republic

did not seek to support the conviction. He conceded that the plea of guilty was

equivocal, I proceeded to I

1993 TLR p108

MROSO J

A allow the appeal by quashing the conviction and setting aside both the sentence

and the disqualification order. I ordered that the fine if already paid be refunded to

him. The case was remitted to the lower court with a direction that a plea of not

guilty be entered against the appellant and the case to proceed to hearing.

B There is no doubt that the plea of guilty by the appellant was equivocal. The

particulars in the charge sheet read:

`That Keneth s/o Manda charged on the 15th day of October 1992 at about

15:35 hrs along Himo Road within the C Municipality of Moshi Kilimanjaro Region

being the driver of motor vehicle Reg No 95843 make Toyota Coaster PSV did drive

the said motor vehicle on the said road recklessly. To wit he failed to control well the

said motor vehicle as the result went off the road and overturned thereby caused

bodily injuries to Aisia d/o Nichola and Regina d/o Phillipo who were passengers in

the said motor vehicle.'

D The appellant accepted these particulars as true. The Court entered a plea of

guilty following that plea. When the prosecution was called upon to give the facts of

the case he said:

E `On 15/10/92 at about 3:35 along Himo Road In Moshi Town, accused was

driving a motor vehicle registration number TZ 95843, a mini bus for carrying

passengers. He was driving from Himo towards Moshi Municipality. Accused failed to

control the motor vehicle as such it overturned and injured two passengers namely

Asia Nichola F and Regina Phillipo. I produce PF3 in respect of the injured people as

exhibits.'

After the exhibits were tendered the appellant said the facts were correct. The court

then proceeded G to convict him on his own plea of guilty.

As is obvious, there was nothing said either in the particulars of the offence or in the

facts as given by the public prosecutor which suggested reckless driving apart from

the bare assertion that the appellant failed to control well (sic) the motor vehicle he

was driving and that consequently it H overturned. Now, to fail to control a motor

vehicle one is driving can be as a result of either careless or reckless driving or

because of a factor for which the driver is not personally responsible. The appellant,

belatedly perhaps, explained that his failure to control the motor vehicle was because

a main leaf has broken. That might have been true. Incidentally, it is curious the

prosecutor did not I tender to court a vehicle inspection report, if it

1993 TLR p109

MROSO J

existed, to show the condition of the motor vehicle before and after the accident. A

If, as claimed by the appellant, the failure to control the motor vehicle resulted from

the broken main leaf, he would not be blamed for the overturning of the motor

vehicle and the resultant injuries to B passengers. Furthermore, admission by the

appellant of the particulars of the offence and the facts narrated by the prosecutor as

correct was non-committal and innocuous. It by no means suggested he was pleading

guilty to the offence charged, unless the doctrine of res ipsa loquiter was being

invoked. That is to say, that the mere fact that the motor vehicle overturned and

passengers were C injured that meant the appellant had been reckless. But, as has

often been stated by this court, the doctrine of res ipsa loquiter has no application in

criminal law.

An accused person can only be convicted on his own plea of guilty if his plea is

unequivocal. That is, where it is ascertained that he has accepted as correct facts

which constitute all the ingredients of D the offence. That was not the case here. As

already said, no particulars or facts constituting the offence of reckless driving were

put to the appellant. So, the plea by the appellant was equivocal and the court ought

to have entered a plea of not guilty and required the prosecution to adduce evidence

E in proof of the offence charged.

The lower court should comply with the directions of this court as already given in

this judgment.

1993 TLR p110

A