HEMED S TAMIM v RENATA MASHAYO 1994 TLR 197 (CA)
Court Court of Appeal of Tanzania - Dar es Salaam
Judge Omar JJA, Mnzavas JJA and Mfalila JJA G
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 44 OF 1993
30 September, 1994
(Appeal from the Judgment of the High Court of Tanzania at Dar es Salaam, Bahati, J)
H
Flynote
Family Law - Presumption of marriage - Presumption rebutted after eight years of
cohabitation - Whether parties have any rights under the Law of Marriage Act 1971 I
1994 TLR p198
-Headnote
A The appellant's third appeal follows from dissatisfaction with the decisions of the
Primary, District and High Courts in which he had sought divorce and division of
matrimonial assets in the form of a dwelling house which had been acquired in the
course of cohabiting with the respondent for a period of eight years. In the Primary
Court the respondent's claim was established and reliefs granted namely B
dissolution of the marriage and equal division of the dwelling house. But the
presumption of marriage was found to have been rebutted by the District and High
Courts. On further appeal to the Court of Appeal:
Held:
C (i) Where the parties have lived together as husband and wife in the
course of which they acquire a house, despite the rebuttal of the presumption of
marriage as provided for under s 160(1) of the Law of Marriage Act 1971, the courts
have the power under s 160(2) of the Act to make consequential orders as in the
dissolution of marriage or separation and division of matrimonial property acquired
by the parties during their relationship is one such order;
D (ii) Having found that the parties were not duly married, the decision of
the lower court regarding the dissolution of marriage is void.
Case Information
Appeal dismissed.
No cases referred to.
[zJDz]Judgment
E Mfalila, JA, delivered the following considered judgment of the Court:
This is a third appeal from the decision of the Primary Court of Ilabo district at F
Bwquauni. In that court, the present respondent Renato Mashayo sued the appellant
for divorce and division of assets in the form of a dwelling house acquired while they
were cohabiting. The Primary Court found the respondent's claim established and
granted the reliefs sought namely dissolution of marriage and equal division of the
dwelling house. The appellant successfully appealed to G the district court which
held that as the appellant had rebutted the presumption that they were duly married,
there was no marriage to dissolve and that therefore the question of dividing
matrimonial assets acquired during marriage did not arise. The respondent was
therefore as it were condemned to get out of the eight year H relationship with the
appellant empty handed. She fought back and successfully appealed to the High Court
where Bahati,J held that although the presumption under s 160(1) of the Law of
Marriage Act had been rebutted, the respondent still had some residual rights to
property under s 160(2) of the Act which empowers the court, upon rebuttal under ss
(1) of the same and upon the woman satisfying the court (as she did in this case) that
she I
1994 TLR p199
MFALILA JA
and the man did in fact live together as husband and wife for two years or more, A
`to make order or orders for maintenance and upon application made
therefore either by the woman or the man, grant such reliefs including custody of
children as it has jurisdiction under this Act to make or grant upon or subsequent to
the making of an order for the dissolution of a marriage or an order of separation as
the court may think fit, and the provisions of this Act B which regulate and apply to
proceedings for and orders of maintenance and other reliefs under this section.' C
The learned judge then allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment and orders of the
district court and restored those of the Primary Court. The appellant Hemed S Tamin
applied for leave to appeal to this court arguing that there was an important point of
law involved which cried for determination by this court. The Judge (Kyando, J) who
heard this application and granted it, certified the following point of law for
determination by this court: D
`Whether the respondent was entitled in law to a share of assets in the
circumstances of this case.' E
We think the law on this point is quite clear under s 160(2) of the Law of Marriage
Act 1971 on which Bahati, J based his decision. It was held by all the courts that on
the evidence, the appellant and the respondent had lived as husband and wife for
eight years in the course of which they acquired the house at Kiwalani. Both the F
District court and the High Court found that the presumption under s 160(1) had
been rebutted but the High Court held correctly that following this rebuttal the court
had the power and jurisdiction to make the same consequential orders as in the
dissolution of marriage or separation. The order for division of matrimonial assets G
is one such order, consequently the learned judge ordered equal division of the house
at Kiwalani which was acquired by the parties during or in the course of their
relationship. However, having found that the parties were not duly married, the
learned judge should not have ordered the restoration of the Primary Court order H
regarding the dissolution of marriage, for quite obviously there was no marriage to
dissolve. Consequently the order of dissolution of marriage upheld by the High Court
is set aside.
Apart from this variation in the High Court judgment, the appeal is otherwise
dismissed with costs. I
1994 TLR p200
A
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