VIDYADHAR GIRDHARAL CHAVDA v THE DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION SERVICES AND OTHERS 1995 TLR 125 (HC)
Court High Court of Tanzania - Dar Es Salaam
Judge Samatta JK B
Misc Civil Cause No 5 of 1995 C
March 7, 1995
Flynote
Administrative Law - Prerogative orders - Ad-interim injunctive orders pending
hearing application for leave - Whether court may grant ad-interim injunctive order
before granting leave to apply for prerogative orders.
Administrative Law - Injunctive orders against the Government - Whether the High
court has power to grant injunctive orders against the Government, its ministers or
officials - Section 11 of the Government Proceedings Act 1967. D
-Headnote
In this application the High Court considered, inter alia, whether it has power to E
grant an injunction against the Government, a government minister or official in the
light of the provisions of the Law Reform (Fatal Accidents and Miscellaneous
Provisions) Ordinance Act 1968 as amended by the Written Laws (Miscellaneous
Amendments) (No 3) Act 1991 and s 11 of the Government Proceedings Act, 1967. In
particular the Court considered whether the term 'civil proceedings' as defined in s
2(1) of the Government Proceedings Act includes an application for an F order of
injunction against the Government, government minister or official.
Held:
(i) The term 'civil proceedings' was intended to have a restricted meaning;
it was intended to mean civil matters as understood in the traditional sense of the
term, that is to say, civil matters that are dealt with under the High G court's general
civil jurisdiction;
(ii) Any statutory provision which purports to restrict this Court's
jurisdiction, including inherent jurisdiction, must in the interest of everyone, be
construed strictly;
(iii) The application of that principle in the interpretation of s 11 of the H
Government Proceedings Act compels the holding that the term 'civil proceedings' in
the subsection does not embrace proceedings for prerogative orders;
(iv) The prohibition imposed by ss (2) of s 11 of the Government
Proceedings Act was not intended to, and does not, extend to an application in which
the relief sought is injunction itself; I
1995 TLR p126
SAMATTA JK
A (v) the High Court has power to grant an interlocutory injunction before
hearing application for leave to apply for a prerogative order.
Case Infomation
Order accordingly
Cases referred to:
B (1) M v Home Office [1993] 3 WLR 433
(2) R v Bishop of Oxford [1879] 4 QBD 245
Mkono for the applicant.
Mallaba for the respondents.
[zJDz]Judgment
C Samatta, JK:
In this application, an issue of novelty and great importance arises, namely whether
this court has the power to grant an injuction against the Government, a government
minister or official. The issue has arisen in this way. The applicant is engaged in a
legal battle against a deportation order made against him by the D second
respondent, who is Minister for Home Affairs, under the Immigration Act. On 2
February 1995, he filed before this Court an application against the Director of
Immigration Services (the first respondent), the second respondent and the E
Attorney General, who was made a party to the proceedings in compliance with s 17
of the Law Reform (Fatal Accidents and Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance Act,
1968, as amended by the Written Laws (Miscellaneous Amendments) (No 3) Act,
1991, for two reliefs, namely; (1) leave to apply for order of certiorari, mandamus and
prohibition, and (2) an injunction (in the Chamber summons the F word used is
prohibition) restraining the first two respondents, pending the disposal of the prior
application from detaining or deporting him for reasons which need not be given
here. The application for injunctive relief was heard a day before the application for
leave was heard. Mallaba, Senior State Attorney, appearing for G all three
respondents, strongly opposed the application (for injunction) contending that this
Court, before granting leave to apply for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition, has no
power to grant an interim order. I rejected the argument and H made an order
restraining the first and second respondents, pending the hearing of the application
for injunctive relief, from detaining or deporting the applicant.
When, six days later, the application for interlocutory injunction was called on, Mr
Mallaba raised a point in limine. He contended, citing s 11 of the Government
Proceedings Act, 1967 (the Act), that this Court has no power to make an injunctive
order against the I
1995 TLR p127
SAMATTA JK
Government, its ministers or officials. According to the learned Senior State A
Attorney what the Court can do in circumstances in which the parties are private
persons is grant injunctive orders, or to make an order declaratory of the rights of the
parties. Section 11 of the Act reads:
11. (1) In any civil proceedings by or against the Government the court shall,
subject to the B provisions of this Act, have power to make all such orders as it has
power to make in proceedings between private persons, and otherwise to give such
appropriate relief as the case may require:
Provided that - C
(a) Where in any proceedings against the Government any such relief is
sought as might in proceedings between private persons be granted by way of
injunction or specific performance, the court shall not grant an injunction or make an
order for specific performance, but may in lieu thereof make an order declaratory of
the rights of the parties; and D
(b) in any proceedings against the Government for the recovery of land or
other property the court shall not make an order for the recovery of the land or the
delivery of the property, but may in lieu thereof make an order declaring that the
plaintiff is entitled as against the Government to the land or property or to the
possession thereof. E
(2) The court shall not in any civil proceedings grant any injunction or make
any order against an officer of the Government if the effect of granting the injunction
or making the order would be to give any relief against the Government which could
not have been obtained in proceedings against the Government. F
The term 'civil proceedings' is defined in s 2(1) of the Act as including proceedings in
this court or a magistrate's court for the recovery of fines or penalties, and the phrase
'proceedings against the Government' is defined by the same subsection G as
including a claim by way of set-off or counterclaim raised in proceedings by the
Government. Mr Mkono, for the applicant, sought to counter Mr Mallaba's argument
by contending that s 11 of the Act has no application where s 30 of the Constitution
of the United Republic (constitution) is applicable. It was the learned H advocate's
contention that the constitutional provision is applicable to the instant application.
He drew my attention, citing M v Home Office (1) that in spite of the fact that s 21 of
the Crown Proceedings Act, 1941, contains prohibitions identical with these imposed
by s 11 of the Act, the House of Lords decided, in the cited case, that courts in
England have the power to issue coercive orders, including injunctions, I
1995 TLR p128
SAMATTA JK
A against a government minister or department. Section 11 of the Act and s 21 of
the English legislation are, save for the use of the words 'Crown' and 'subjects' instead
of 'Government' and 'private persons', respectively, in pari materia with s 30 of the
Constitution which deals with limitations upon and the enforcement and protection
of basic rights and duties. B
It cannot be doubted that Mr Mallaba's preliminary point raises an issue of
considerable importance on the enforcement by this court of the provisions of the
Law Reform (Fatal Accidents and Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance (Amendment)
Act, 1968, the legislation which confers on this court the power to C grant
prerogative orders. While I find Mr Mkono's argument concerning s 30 of the
Constitution very interesting, I do not find it necessary, in law, to determine Mr
Mallaba's preliminary point on constitutional grounds. I think the point can be
adequately dealt with on non-constitutional grounds. It is a rule of constitutional D
interpretation that if the court can decide a case before it on non-constitutional
grounds, that course should be preferred; see The Guide to American Law, at 375. I
proceed, therefore, to consider the merits or otherwise of the non-constitutional
contentions addressed to me.
E The decision of the House of Lords in M v Home Office, supra, demonstrates, I
respectfully think, the modern approach of courts towards their (courts) duty to
control government actions and omissions which affect the freedoms and rights of the
individual. The complex facts of the case are accurately summarised by the learned
authors of Cases and Materials on Constitutional and Administrative Law 3rd ed at
197-198. I gratefully adopt that summary: F
'M, a citizen of Zaire, arrived in the UK seeking political asylum. The Home
Office rejected his application and ordered his removal from the UK, which was to
take place by 6.30 p.m. on 1 May 1991. At 5.20 p.m. (after the Court of Appeal had
refused an application for leave to apply G for judicial review of the decision) a fresh
application for leave to apply to move for judicial review, alleging new grounds, was
made to Garland J in chambers. Garland J indicated at about 5.30 p.m. that he wished
his departure to be postponed pending consideration of the application, and he
understood from counsel for the Home Office that an undertaking to that H effect
had been given. (Counsel understood that he had only undertaken to endeavour to
prevent M's removal.) Due to bungling and breakdown in lines of communication,
M's departure was not prevented nor was he removed from the onward flight to Zaire
during a stopover at Paris. At 11.20 p.m. Garland J, being informed of M's removal
from the jurisdiction, made an ex parte order I
1995 TLR p129
SAMATTA JK
requiring the Home Secretary to procure the return of M to the jurisdiction
and granting the A Home Secretary the liberty to apply for variation or discharge of
the order on the morning of 2 May. Home Office officials then made arrangements
for M's return. On the afternoon of 2 May, the Home Secretary, having taken advice
from his officials and Treasury Counsel, concluded that the underlying asylum
decision had been correct and that Garland J's ex parte order, B being a mandatory
interim injunction against a minister of the Crown, had been made without
jurisdiction. Thereupon he cancelled the arrangements for M's return. On 3 May he
applied to Garland J to set aside the order of 1 May, which Garland did. Proceedings
were then brought on behalf of M against the Home Office and the Home Secretary
alleging contempt of court in C respect of the breach of the undertaking and the exparte
order requiring M's return. Simon Brown J dismissed this motion on the basis
that since the Crown's immunity from injunction was preserved by s 21 of the Crown
Proceedings Act, 1947, neither it nor its departments, ministers and officials acting in
the course of their duties could be impleaded for contempt of court. The applicant
appealed'. D
The Court of Appeal, by a majority, allowed the appeal, holding that Brown J had
mistakenly interpreted the law. The original order by Garland J should not have been
made as injunctions could not be issued against the Crown. The Court went E on to
hold, however, that as the order was binding until set aside, failure to comply with it
constituted a contempt. It also held that while the Crown and Governments
Departments are not subject to the contempt jurisdiction of the High Court because
they are non-persons, Mr Baker, the Home Secretary, was F personally guilty of
contempt. The Home Secretary appealed and the applicant cross appealed in respect
of his original application against the Home Office. The House of Lords had to decide
two issues of constitutional import, namely:
1. Could an injunction be issued against a government minister, and G
2. Could a government minister or department be found to be in contempt of
court for failure to comply with an order of court? H
The House answered both issues in the affirmative. Their Lordships founded their
decision on two grounds; firstly, on the wording of s 31 of the Supreme Court Act,
1981, which essentially, contains provisions regarding (i) the procedure for applying
for prerogative orders of mandamus, prohibition and certiorari, (ii) the powers of the
High Court in such applications and (iii) non-prerogative reliefs I
1995 TLR p130
SAMATTA JK
A which may be sought and granted in an application for prerogative orders and (2)
on the undesirability of the English law being inconsistent with the Community law
on the matter. Their Lordships were of the opinion that s 21(2) of the Crown
Proceedings Act, 1947, did not apply to judicial review jurisdiction as that branch of
the law was controlled by the Supreme Court Act. In the course of his speech, B
Lord Woolf (with who all their Lordships agreed) said, at 456H--C:
'... as in private law proceedings, once the Crown or a body representing the
Crown is a party to proceedings, unless some express restriction exists, the Crown,
like any other litigant, is liable to have interlocutory orders made against it with
which it is required to comply....' C
And at 461 his Lordship said:
D '[the] decision not to amend section 21 (of the Crown Proceedings Act) is not
really surprising bearing mind that the exercise in hand related to public law
proceedings while section 21 dealt with private or 'civil' law proceedings.'
E In the course of his short speech, Lord Templeman said, at 431:
'My Lords, the argument that there is no power to enforce the law by
injunction or contempt proceedings against a Minister in his official capacity would,
if upheld, establish the proposition that the executive obey the law as a matter of
grace and not as a matter of F necessity, a proposition which would reverse the
result of the Civil War. For the reasons given by noble and learned friend, Lord
Woolf, and on principle, I am satisfied that injunctions and contempt of court
proceedings may be brought against the minister in his official capacity ...'
G What is the legal position here in Tanzania? To that question I now turn my
attention. In the scope of the meaning of the words 'civil proceedings' in s 11 of the
Act (the Government Proceedings Act, 1967), so wide as to embrace proceedings in
which, as in the instant application, a temporary injunctive relief is sought? H
Although in the Act there is no provision similar to s 31 of the Supreme Court Act (of
England, I am of the settled opinion, bearing in mind the definition of term civil
proceedings' in s 2(1) of the Act, and taking into account of the definition of the
phrase 'proceedings against the Government' given in the same subsection, that the
word 'civil' there has not been used to mean the opposite of I
1995 TLR p131
SAMATTA JK
'criminal'. Thus, constitutional proceedings and proceedings which are instituted A
under this Court's supervisory jurisdiction, that is to say, the jurisdiction to supervise
statutory and domestic tribunals conferred on the court by s 17(2) of the Law Reform
(Fatal Accidents and Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance (Cap 360) as amended by
the Law Reform (Fatal Accidents and Miscellaneous Provisions) B Ordinance
(Amendment) Act, 1968, must be held to be excluded by the term. The term was
intended to have a restricted meaning; it was intended to mean civil matters as
understood in the traditional sense of the term, that is to say, civil matters that are
dealt with under this Court's general civil jurisdiction. Any statutory C provision
which purports to restrict this courts jurisdiction, including inherent jurisdiction,
must, in the interests of everyone living within the territorial boundaries of the
United Republic, be construed strictly. The application of that principle in the
interpretation of s 11 of the Act compels me to hold, as I have already indicated, D
that the term 'civil proceedings' in the subsection does not embrace prerogative
proceedings. In my opinion, s 11 is related to private law litigation only.
Even assuming that the words 'civil proceedings' cover prerogative proceedings, I
would still regard Mr Mallaba's contention as untenable in law, because there is E
another ground which compels the rejection of that argument. The relief referred to
in ss 11(1) of the Act must, in my considered view, be a relief other than an
injunction and specific performance. I have not the faintest doubt that to construe the
subsection otherwise would make the words 'by way of' therein superfluous. It F is a
settled canon of statutory interpretation that a statute should be so construed that, if
it can be prevented, no clause, phrase sentence or word shall be superfluous, void or
insignificant: See R v Bishop of Oxford (2) at 261. Unless the necessity or
intractability of language in a legislation dictates otherwise, it is the G duty of a
court to give effect to all words contained in the legislation. I can see no
characteristics in ss 11(1). In my opinion, the words 'by way of' are not, and were not
intended to be, insignificant in the provision. Those words were intended to, and do,
control the meaning to be attached to the word 'relief' preceding them. They have the
effect of excluding in intended and specific performance from the H meaning of that
word. If the word (relief) were construed to include injunction the subsection would
read very oddly, indeed. How can one, I ask, speak of a relief of injunction being
granted by way of injunction? Neither to a lawyer not to an expert in English
language would that statement make any sense. I refuse to reduce the subsec- I
1995 TLR p132
SAMATTA JK
A tion to the rank of absurdity. In my judgment, the prohibition imposed by the
subsection was not intended to, and does not, extent to an application, like the instant
one in which the relief sought is injunction itself. I would be skipping the words 'by
way of' in the subsection, as the learned Senior State Attorney appears to have done,
to hold that the word 'relief' there includes injunction. I can see no B warrant for
doing so. On the contrary, I am profoundly convinced that both the law and common
sense force one to the view that the use of those words was, as I have already, I hope,
sufficiently demonstrated, intended to limit the scope of the meaning of the word
'relief' in the subsection. It is my duty to attach due weight to C the words which
Parliament, in its wisdom, has chosen to use. If, in my opinion, Mr Mallaba's
argument on the effect of the subsection were right, personal freedoms and rights
would have been placed in great jeopardy, as there would be inadequate judicial
protection against unlawful conduct on the part of those who D are entrusted with
the power of governing this country or determining, non-judicially, the rights of
individuals. If that situation were to exist, the rule of law in the country would
greatly suffer, with the result that members of the public would be tempted to regard
the law as being a series of hazards separating the litigant from justice. The courts
must do everything possible under the law to E prevent that wrong impression of
the law being formed. The law should be there to promote and not impede justice. In
this country, a decision or order of a government minister or official, regardless of his
or her rank, cannot outweigh the law. To borrow the argument of Lord Woolf in his
speech in the M case supra (at 445H): F
'... circumstances can occur where it is in the interests both of a person who is
subject to powers of government and of the government itself that the courts should
be in a position to make an order which clearly sets either what should or what
should not be done by the government.' G
Any collision between the freedom of the individual and the security of the State, in
any sphere of national life, does not, in my considered opinion, dictate the H
acceptance of Mr Mallaba's argument. If the law were as contended by the learned
Senior State Attorney, justice would have been wearing a bandage over her eyes as
she could not bear to see some of the decisions made in her name in that branch of
the law. I can find no reason for believing that Parliament could have intended to
create such a situation. I
1995 TLR p133
SAMATTA JK
Before parting with this application, I should, I think, say a word or two on one A
important point. Since overruling Mr Mallaba's objection to this Court granting an
injunction pending the hearing of the application for leave to apply for certiorari,
mandamus and prohibition on the ground that the court lacked jurisdiction to do so, I
have found a passage in the judgment of Lord Woolf in M's case, supra, which if I B
may respectfully say so, plainly demonstrates that the High Court in England has the
power to grant an interlocutory injunction pending the hearing of an application for
leave to apply for judicial review. The passage, at 463--464, reads: C
What has been said so far does not mean that Garland J was necessarily in
order in granting the injunction. The injunction was granted before he had given the
applicant leave to apply for judicial review. However, in a case of real urgency this
was, the fact that leave had not been granted is a mere technicality. It would be
undesirable if, in the situation with which Garland J was faced he had been compelled
to give leave because he regarded the case as an D appropriate one for an Interim
injunction. In the case of civil proceedings there is recognition of the jurisdiction of
the court to grant interim injunctions before the issue of a Writ, etc. (See Ord 29, rule
(3)) and in an appropriate case there should be taken to be a similar jurisdiction to
grant interim injunctions now under Ord. 53. The position is accurately set out in
notice 53/1--14/24 to The Supreme Court Practice 1993 where it is stated that: E
'Where the case is so urgent as to justify it, (the judge) could grant an
interlocutory injunction or other interim relief pending the hearing of the application
for leave to move for judicial review. But if the judge has refused leave to move for
judicial review he is functus officio and has no jurisdiction to grant any form of
interim relief. The application for an interlocutory injunction or other interim relief
could, however, be renewed before the Court of Appeal along with the renewal of the
application for leave to move for F judicial review.'
If I may repeat what I ventured to say in my earlier ruling, there is no room for doubt
G that this Court has the power to grant an interlocutory injunction before hearing
an application for leave to apply for a prerogative order.
For the reasons I have given, I am satisfied that the law, justice and common sense
dictate that I uphold Mr Mkono's contention that s 11 of the Government H
Proceedings Act does not stand in the applicant's path in the instant application.
Except to autocrats, it must be intolerable that, in a democratic society like ours,
courts should be impotent to grant a temporary injunction in favor of an individual
who complains of unwarranted or oppressive use of statutory powers by a
government minister or official. It should be I
1995 TLR p134
SAMATTA JK
A made perfectly clear, I think that this Court can halt the bulldozer of the State
before it squashes the right of an individual, company or society.
The preliminary point fails. B
1995 TLR p134
C
0 Comments
PLACE YOUR COMMENT HERE
WARNING: DO NOT USE ABUSIVE LANGUAGE BECAUSE IT IS AGAINST THE LAW.
THE COMMENTS OF OUR READERS IS NOT OUR RESPONSIBILITY.