MWALIMU PAUL JOHN MHOZYA v ATTORNEY GENERAL (No. 1) 1996 TLR 130 (HC)
Court High Court of Tanzania - Dar es Salaam
Judge Samatta JK
E
CIVIL CASE No. 206 of 1993
25 April 1994 F
Flynote
Constitutional law -- Separation of Powers -- Purpose and function of the doctrine of
separation of powers.
Constitutional Law -- Removal or suspension of the President from office -- Whether
the President G may be removed or suspended from office by the High Court --
Sections 42(1) and 46A of the Constitution of Tanzania
-Headnote
In this application the applicant sought an interlocutory injunction restraining the
President of the United Republic of Tanzania from discharging his functions pending
H determination of the main cae in which the applicant sought orders of declaration
that: (a)the Constitution of the United Republic had been violated; (b) the President
was guilty of having allowed or enabled the said violation; and (c) the continued
exercise of presidential powers by President Ali Hassan Mwinyi was unconstitutional
and a potential I danger to the well being of the country and its citizens. The
Attorney General raised a preliminary objection
1996 TLR p131
against the application on the grounds that the affidavit in support of the application
was A fatally defective, and that the Court had no jurisdiction to make the orders
sought:
Held:
(i) The concern of the Court is substance rather than form and its function
is to get to the bottom of the dispute and determine the real issues in it and; for that
B purpose, the Court may allow steps to be taken to cure any defects in a pleading or
an affidavit provided that the other party is not prejudiced thereby;
(ii) The affidavit in this application did not strictly comply with the
provisions of the Civil Procedure Code 1966, but the Court could grant leave to the
applicant to cure the defects in the affidavit; C
(iii) The principle that the functions of one branch of government should
not encroach on the functions of another branch is an important one to ensure that
the governing of a state is executed smoothly and peacefully;
(iv) As s 42(3)(d) of the Constitution states that the President shall be in
office until D he ceases to hold office `in accordance with the provisions of' the
Constitution, and s 46A of the Constitution lays down the procedure by which the
legislature may remove or suspend the President from office, any attempt to remove
or suspend the President in a manner other than that laid down in the Constitution
would not be legal; E
(v) No provision of the Constitution or any other law authorises the High
Court to hold that the President can be removed or suspended from office by a body
other than that which the Constitution specifically provides for;
(vi) This Court has no jurisdiction to issue the order of injunction sought
against the President. F
Case Information
Application for temporary injunction rejected
Cases referred to:
1. Hornal v Neyberger Products Ltd [1956] 3 All ER 970
2. Attorney General of the Gambia v Momodou Jobe [1984] 3 WLR 174
G
3 re: Coles and Ravenshear [1970] 1 KB 1
[zJDz]Judgment
Samatta JK: This is an application for an interlocutory injunction restraining His H
Excellency Ali Hassan Mwinyi, the President of the United Republic, from
discharging presidential functions pending the determination of Civil Case No 206 of
1993, filed in this Court, in which the applicant seeks, inter alia, the following
declarations:
I (1) The Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania (herein-
1996 TLR p132
SAMATTA JK
A after referred to as the Constitution) was violated by Zanzibar joining
an organisation known as Islamic Conference Organisation.
(2) The President is guilty of allowing or enabling that violation to take
place and is therefore personally answerable for the violation. B
(3) His Excellency Ali Hassan Mwinyi's continued exercise of presidential
powers is unconstitutional as well as a potential danger to the well-being of the
United Republic and its citizens.
The application has been strenuously opposed by Mr Salula, Senior State Attorney, on
C behalf of the respondent. Although he is a teacher by profession, the applicant,
who appeared in person at the hearing, has argued the application, including legal
issues, with much confidence.
At the hearing Mr Salula raised a preliminary objection to the application. He based
the D objection on three principal grounds. These are:
1. The application is incompetent because the affidavit sworn and filed by
the E applicant in support of it is fatally defective in that it does not comply with the
provisions of Order 19 Rule 3(1) of the Civil Procedure Code.
2. The application contravenes s 46A of the Constitution in that it
attempts to move the court to do an act in respect of which Parliament has provided a
F special and entirely different procedure. In other words, this Court does not have
jurisdiction to make the order sought by the applicant.
3. The provisions of s 11(2) of the Government Proceedings Act, 1967,
and those of Order 37 Rule 2 of Civil Procedure Code as amended by the Govt G
Proceedings (Procedure) Rules, 1968 (Govt Notice No 376 of 1968) prohibit the
granting of the kind of injunction sought in this application.
In performing my task in the instant application I must make it perfectly clear that I
bear H in mind, inter alia, the following principles:
1. A court will not be deterred from a conclusion because of regret at its
consequences: Hornal v Neuberger Products Ltd (1) at 978.
I 2. It is wrong for a court of law to be anxious or to appear to be anxious to
avoid treading on executive toes.
1996 TLR p133
SAMATTA JK
A 3. A constitution is a living instrument which must be construed in the
light of present day conditions. The complexities of our society must be taken into
account in interpreting it. A workable constitution is a priceless asset to any country.
4. A constitution should be given a generous and purposive
construction:Attorney-General of the Gambia v Momodou Jobe (2). B
Respect must, of course, be paid to the language used in the instrument.
5. The balance of power between the three branches of government,
namely, the executive, the legislature and the judiciary, and the relationship of the
courts to C the other two branches must be carefully maintained. Any statutory
alteration of that balance must be in unmistakable terms. One branch of government
should not usurp the powers of another branch.
6. The notion, apparently harboured by some people in this country, that
the D President of the United Republic is above the law is subversive of the
Constitution and the laws. All Government leaders, including the President, are, like
the humblest citizen, bound to comply with the laws of this country. The maxim
`The King can do no wrong' has no place in our law even if the word `President' is
substituted for the word `King'. Everyone and every institution or E organisation in
this country is enjoined to pay respect to the principle of supremacy of the law, see s
26(1) of the Constitution.
7. Flexibility in the application of procedural law is a desirable thing, for
it assists to F ensure that at the end of the day justice triumphs. When it comes to
the issue of compliance with rules of procedures the instinct for strictness should,
where appropriate, be subdued. Substance rather than form should be the courts'
primary concern. G
Having stated the above principles, I turn now to consider Mr Salula's preliminary
objection. I propose to start with the argument concerning the applicant's affidavit.
As will be recalled, it was the learned Senior State Attorney's contention that the
affidavit is defective for non-compliance with the provisions of Order 19 Rule 3(1) of
the Civil H Procedure Code. Order 19 Rule 3(1) provides:
`3.-(1) Affidavits shall be confined to such facts as the deponent is able of his
knowledge to prove, except on interlocutory applications, on which statements of his
belief may be admitted: I
Provided that the grounds thereof are stated'.
1996 TLR p134
SAMATTA JK
It cannot be argued, and the applicant, if I understood him correctly as I believe I did,
did A not venture to argue, that the supporting affidavit in this application strictly
complied with the above quoted provisions of the Civil Procedure Code. I would not,
on that ground alone, however, drive the applicant from the judgment seat in this
application. It is the B function of a court of justice to try to get to the bottom of the
real dispute and to determine what are the real issues in the matter before it provided,
of course, no party can be prejudiced. As already remarked, substance rather than
form should be the courts' primary concern. If legal steps can be taken to cure any
defects in a pleading or C an affidavit, without substantially prejudicing with the
opposite party, a court of justice should grant leave to the party to take these remedial
steps, if he so wishes. I would call attention to the elaborated words of Lord Collins
MR, in Re Coles and Ravenshear (3)
D `Although a court cannot conduct its business without a code of procedure,
the relation of the rules of practice to the work of justice is intended to be that of
handmaid rather than mistress; and the court ought not to be so far bound and tied by
the rules, which are after all only intended as general rules of procedure, as to be
compelled to do what will cause injustice in the particular case'. E
If I will be satisfied that this court has jurisdiction to grant the relief sought by the
applicant, I will be prepared to grant leave to him to take remedial stops. I now turn,
therefore, to the question whether this court has that jurisdiction. F
Mr Salula's submission on this point was that, as the Constitution contains specific
provisions governing how and under what circumstances a person holding the office
of the President of the United Republic will cease, temporarily or otherwise, to hold
that office, the suspension or removal of such a person from office is not by way of
judicial G process. In support of that submission the learned Senior State Attorney
cited s 42(2) and (3) of the Constitution as read with s 46A of the same legislation.
Countering that argument, the applicant contended, among other things, that s 26(2),
30(3) and 108(2) of the Constitution, whether read together or separately, empower
this court to grant the H temporary injunction sought. Section 42 (2) and (3) of the
Constitution reads as follows:
`42-(1) ...
(2) Unless he sooner resigns or dies, a person elected as President shall, subject
to subsection (3) I of this section, hold office for a term of five years from the date on
which he is elected President.
1996 TLR p135
SAMATTA JK
A (3) A person elected President shall hold the office of President until:
(a) the day when his successor in office takes the oath of office; or
(b) the date when he dies in office; or
(c) the day of his resignation from that office; or
(d) he ceases to hold the office of President in accordance with the
provisions of this constitution.' B
Section 46A provides as follows:
`46A.-(1) Notwithstanding the provisions of article 46 of this Constitution the
National Assembly may C pass a resolution to remove the President from office if a
motion to impeach the President is moved and passed in accordance with the
provisions of this Article.
(2) Subject to the other provisions of this article, no motion to impeach the
President shall be moved save only if it is alleged that the President- D
(a) has committed acts which generally violate the Constitution or the law
concerning the ethics of public leaders;
(b) has committed acts which contravene the conditions concerning the
registration of political parties specified in article 20(2) of this Constitution; or
E (c) has conducted himself in a manner which lowers the esteem of the
office of President of the United Republic, and no such motion shall be moved within
twenty months from the time when a similar motion was previously moved and
rejected by the National Assembly.
(3) The National assembly shall not pass a motion to impeach the President
save only if- F
(a) a written notice signed and supported by not less the twenty per cent
of all the member of Parliament is submitted to the Speaker thirty days prior to the
sitting at which such motion is intended to be moved in the National Assembly,
specifying the wrong committed by the G president and proposing that a Special
Committee of Inquiry be constituted to inquire into the charges brought against the
President.
(b) at any time after the Speaker receives the notice duly signed by the
Member of Parliament and satisfies himself that the provisions of the Constitution for
the moving of the motion have been H complied with, to vote on the motion to
constitute a Special Committee of Inquiry, and if it is supported by not less than two
thirds of all the Members of Parliament, the Speaker shall announce the names of the
members of the Special Committee of Inquiry I
(4) The Special Committee of Inquiry for the purpose of this article shall
consist of the following members, that is to say-
1996 TLR p136
SAMATTA JK
A (a) the Chief Justice of the United Republic who shall be the Chairman of
the Committee;
(b) the Chief Justice of Tanzania Zanzibar; and
(c) seven members appointed by the Speaker in accordance with the
Standing Orders of the National Assembly and taking into account the proportional
representation amongst the B political parties represented in the National Assembly.
(5) In the event that the National Assembly passes the motion to constitute a
Special Committee of Inquiry, the President shall be deemed to be out of office, and
the duties and functions of the office of president shall be discharged in accordance
with the provisions of article 37(3) of this Constitution C until the Speaker shall
inform the President about the resolution of the National Assembly in connection
with the charges brought against him.
(6) Within seven days after the Special Committee of Inquiry is constituted, it
shall sit, inquire into and analyse the charges preferred against the President,
including affording the president the opportunity D to be heard in his defence in
accordance with the procedure prescribed by the Standing Orders of the National
Assembly.
(7) As soon as possible and in any event within a period of not more than
ninety days, the Special Committee of Inquiry shall submit its report to the Speaker.
E (8) After the Speaker receives the report of the Special Committee of Inquiry,
the report shall be tabled before the National Assembly in accordance with the
procedure prescribed by the Standing Orders of the National Assembly.
(9) After the report of the Special Committee of Inquiry is submitted pursuant
to sub-article (8) the F National Assembly shall discuss the report and shall afford
the President the opportunity to be heard, and then by the votes of not less than two
thirds majority of all the Members of Parliament, the National Assembly shall pass a
resolution either that the charges against the President have been proved and that he
is unworthy of continuing to hold the office of President, or that the charges have not
been proved.
(10) In the event the National Assembly passes a resolution that the charges
against the President have been proved and that he is unworthy of continuing to hold
the office of President, the Speaker shall inform the President and the Chairman of
the Electoral Commission about such resolution of the National Assembly,
whereupon the President shall be obliged to resign before the expiry of three days
from the day the National Assembly passed the resolution.
(11) In the event the President ceases to hold the office of President by reason
of the charges against him being proved he shall not be entitled to receive any
payment by way of pension or to receive any benefits or other privileges which he
has under the Constitution or any other law enacted by Parliament.'
1996 TLR p137
SAMATTA JK
The sections of the Constitution which were the main-stay of the applicant's
contention A that the Court has the jurisdiction to make an injunction order which
has the effect of suspending the President of the United Republic from office read as
follows:
`26(2) B
`Every person is entitled, subject to the procedure provided by the law, to
institute proceedings for the protection of the Constitution and legality'.
`30(4) C
`Subject to the other provisions of this Constitution, the High Court shall have
and may exercise original jurisdiction to hear and determine any matter brought
before it in pursuance of this section; and an Act of Parliament may make provision
with respect to-
(a) the procedure regulating the institution of proceedings under this
section; D
(b) the powers, practice and procedure of the High Court in relation to the
hearing of proceedings instituted under this section;
(c) ensuring the more efficient exercise of the powers of the High Court,
the protection and enforcement of the basic rights, freedom and duties in accordance
with this Constitution.' E
`108(2)
`Where it is not expressly stated in this Constitution or in any other
legislation that any specific matter shall be first heard and determined in a certain
court, the High Court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine that matter. In
addition, the High Court shall have jurisdiction in respect of any other F matter
which, in accordance with legal traditions and conventional practices obtaining is
ordinarily to be heard and determined by the High Court; save that, the provisions of
this section shall apply subject to the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal of Tanzania
as provided for in this Constitution or in any other legislation'. G
I have given careful and earnest consideration to the competing arguments addressed
to me on the issue of jurisdiction and in the end I am satisfied that Mr Salula's
argument is sound in law. The principle that the functions of one branch of
government should not H encroach on the functions of another branch is a very
important principle, one of the principles which ensure that the task of governing a
State is executed smoothly and peacefully.
It seems to me to be an incontrovertible proposition of law, having regard to the use
of I the words `in accordance with the provisions of this constitution' in s 42(3)(d) of
the Constitution, that
1996 TLR p138
SAMATTA JK
removal or suspension from office of the President of the United Republic is the A
legislature's exclusive prerogative. Since s 46A of Constitution lays down the
procedure to be used in removing or suspending the President, the attempt to remove
or suspend him by a procedure other than that would not be legal. If Parliament had
intended this B Court to exercise concurrent jurisdiction of dealing with politicoconstitutional
offences it could easily have said so when enacting s 46A of the
Constitution. The omission to provide such a provision in the constitution would
appear to strongly suggest that Parliament did not want judicial process to be used in
removing or suspending the C President from office. It is not for this Court to say
whether or not that was a wise decision. None of the sections of the Constitution
cited by the applicant compels me to hold a different view. The right granted by s
26(2) to institute proceedings for the protection of the Constitution and legality
cannot, in my considered opinion, be regarded D as providing an authority to this
Court to grant a relief which, according to the Constitution itself, is a remedy
available only through a parliamentary procedure. As regards s 30(4), the following
can be said. The subsection deals with the subject of limitations upon and the
enforcement and protection of basic rights and duties. No issue E concerning basic
rights arises in the instant application. With regard to enforcement of duties, it can be
said without inaccuracy, I think, that that matter does not authorise the court to hold
that the President can be removed or suspended from office in a manner other than
that which the Constitution has specifically provided for. As for s 108(2), let F me
say without ambiguity that I know of no legal traditions or conventional practices
which authorise this Court to try alleged politico-constitutional offences, and the
applicant cited none in his argument. It may well be (and I say no more than that, G
because the issue is not before me at this stage of the case) that the court has
jurisdiction to give a declaratory judgment as to the commission or otherwise of such
offences, but I will, I hope, be forgiven for stating the obvious, namely, that a
temporary injunction and a declaratory judgment are two different things.
But under the common law does this court not have the jurisdiction to grant the H
injunction sought by the applicant? I can, I think, answer that question very briefly.
Under the common law (the Crown Proceedings Act, 1948, reaffirmed the rule) no
injunction can lie against the Crown: see SA de Smith: Judicial Review Administrative
Action, 2nd I ed pp 461--462; Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th ed para 168 p 161. It
follows from this position that under that
1996 TLR p139
law this court could not have jurisdiction to issue an injunction against the President.
In A any case, any rule of common law granting this court such a jurisdiction would,
by necessary implication, have been abolished in this country by the provisions of s
42 and 46A of the Constitution.
While paying due respect to the applicant's gallantry, I have, for the reasons I have
given, B reached a clear conclusion that this Court lacks jurisdiction to grant the
relief sought by the applicant in this application. This conclusion renders it
unnecessary to decide whether, as was strenuously contended by Mr Salula, the
provisions of s 11(2) of the Government Proceedings Act, 1967, and these of Order 37
Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure C Code as amended by the Government Proceedings
(Procedure) Rules, 1968, stand in the applicant's path in the instant application.
The point taken in limine succeeds and the application for interlocutory injunction is
rejected. D
1996 TLR p139
E
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