FANUEL MANTIRI NG'UNDA v HERMAN MANTIRI NG'UNDA AND TWO OTHERS 1995 TLR 155 (CA)
Court Court of Appeal - Arusha
Judge Kisanga JJA, Ramadhani JJA and Lubuva JJA
Civil Appeal No 8 of 1995 E
May 24, 1995
(From the decision of the High Court of Tanzania at Moshi, Mushi, J) F
Flynote
Magistrates' Courts - Jurisdiction - Jurisdiction over land held under customary law -
Magistrates' Courts Act 1984.
Civil Practice and Procedure - Pleadings - Order of the High Court granting leave for
case to proceed before the Resident Magistrate not pleaded - consequences thereof. G
-Headnote
The High Court had given leave for a dispute involving land held under customary
law to be heard by the Court of Resident Magistrate. However, the order of the High
Court granting leave was not pleaded in the plaint and the trial court came to know
about the order when it was produced as an exhibit during trial. It was H evident
that the order was granted before proceedings commenced. The trial court heard and
determined the suit. On appeal the High Court ruled that the Magistrates' Court had
no jurisidiction to entertain the dispute because the order granting leave to the court
to hear and determine the dispute was not pleaded in the plaint. On further appeal to
the Court of Appeal of Tanzania: I
1995 TLR p156
LUBUVA JA
A Held:
(i) Although the proceedings were commenced without the order of leave
of the High Court being produced and pleaded in the plaint that the trial court had
jurisdiction, the matter was saved when in the course of evidence the order of the
High Court was availed to the trial court;
B (ii) As the order was in existence at the time the proceedings were
commenced, as a matter of equity and justice, the proceedings before the Magistrates'
Court were not vitiated and the Court was properly vested with jurisdiction over the
case.
Case Infomation
Appeal allowed.
C No case referred to.
Jonathan, for the appellant
[zJDz]Judgment
Lubuva, JA, delivered the following considered judgment of the court: D
This is a second appeal. It arises from the decision of the High Court of Tanzania
(Mushi, J) setting aside the judgment and decree of the Magistrates' Court in RM civil
case no 1 of 1992.
E Briefly, the facts that gave rise to the case were as follows. The suit involved a
dispute between the Ng'unda clan members over a piece of land in Losaa Village, Hai
District, Kilimanjaro Region. In the Magistrates' Court Moshi, the appellant
successfully sued the respondents for trespass. He was declared the lawful owner of
the land in dispute and the respondents were further ordered to pay compensation of
Shs 300,000/= for loss of use and damages to the appellant. F
An order of injunction was also issued to restrain the respondents from entering the
disputed land. From that decision of the Resident Magistrate, the respondents
appealed to the High Court. Dealing with the appeal, the learned judge without G
going into the merits of the appeal disposed of the matter on the ground that the
Magistrates' Court had no jurisdiction to adjudicate on this case. In allowing the
appeal, the learned judge held that although the Magistrates' Court Moshi had been
granted leave of the High Court to entertain the suit, the Court's jurisdiction was H
not properly invoked because it was not pleaded in the plaint. The learned judge thus
ordered the plaint to be struck out as it was bad in law. Dissatisfied with the decision
of the High Court, the appellant has appealed to this Court.
Mr Jonathan learned Counsel who had represented the appellant before the Courts
below also appeared for the appellant before us. I
1995 TLR p157
LUBUVA JA
Although he had filed seven grounds of appeal, he preferred to argue only grounds A
one and two together in which in his view, the points raised in the rest of the grounds
were sufficiently canvassed. In these two grounds the appellant complained that:
1. The learned Judge erred in allowing the appeal on a point not raised in the B
memorandum of appeal and not otherwise urged at its hearing.
2. The learned Judge erred in condemning the appellant unheard on the
particular point determining the appeal. C
Arguing on these grounds, Mr Jonathan, learned Counsel assailed the learned judge in
allowing the appeal on a point which had not been raised on appeal on which the
appellant had not been given a chance to be heard. He further submitted that it was
erroneous on the part of the learned judge to allow the appeal on the ground that the
Court (Magistrates' Court Moshi) had no jurisdiction over the case D because leave
of the High Court had been granted and the order was tendered in Court as exhibit P1
in the course of the proceedings in court. Mr Jonathan however, conceded that it was
not proper for the court to proceed with the hearing of the case on the assumption
that the Court had jurisdiction to deal with the case. E Mr Jonathan however, firmly
maintained that in this case, though initially the proceedings were commenced when
the order granting leave of the High Court due to oversight had not been availed to
the Court, the situation was saved when the order was produced in court as a matter
of evidence. He finally submitted that F as the court order granting leave was issued
on 29 November 1991, at the time of the commencement of the proceedings (9
January 1992) the court was properly vested with jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the
case. He prayed the Court to allow the appeal and order the case to be remitted to the
High Court to be heard on merit. G
On behalf of the other respondents, Ibrahim Athumani Ng'unda, the second
respondent briefly addressed the Court. He stated that the respondents were not
aware that leave of the High Court had been granted vesting jurisdiction in the
Magistrates' Court Moshi to hear this case. However, at the Court's prompting that H
the High Court order granting leave was tendered in Court as exhibit P1, he (Ibrahim
Athumani Ng'unda)did not pursue this point any further. As for the arguments raised
in support of the appeal, Ibraham Athumani Ng'unda, was of the view that since the
issues involved were of a legal nature, they (respondents) had I
1995 TLR p158
LUBUVA JA
A left the matter the Court to decide according to the law and merit of the case.
The determination of this appeal turns around the issue whether the Magistrates;
Court Moshi had jurisdiction to hear the case. This is an issue which is governed by
the provisions of s 63(1) of the Magistrate's Courts Act, 1984 which provides: B
'63 (1) Subject to the provisions of any law for the time being in force where
jurisdiction in respect of the same proceedings is conferred on different courts, each
court shall have a concurrent jurisdiction therein: C
Provided no civil proceedings in respect of marriage, guardianship or
inheritance under customary law, or the incidents thereof, and no civil proceedings in
respect of immovable property, other than proceedings relating to land held on a
Government lease or a right of occupancy granted under the Land Ordinance or
proceedings under Section 22 or 23 of the Land Ordinance shall be commenced in any
Court other than a primary court unless the D Republic is a party thereto or unless
the High Court gives leave for such proceedings to be commenced in some other
Court; (emphasis supplied)
E From the wording of this provision, it is unambiguously clear that suits involving
land held under customary law are to be instituted before the primary court unless
leave of the High Court is obtained for other courts to entertain such cases of this
nature. In this case, the fact is that the Magistrates' Court Moshi had by order of F
the High Court been granted leave to have the proceedings of the case commenced in
that Court. However, in the plaint, it was not indicated that leave had been granted or
that the Court had jurisdiction to deal with the case. As a result, the learned judge on
appeal held that such omission in the pleadings was fatal. Furthermore, from the
record, it is apparent that the order of the High Court G granting leave was produced
in court as exhibit (P1) in the course of evidence by the appellant (original plaintiff).
That to us clearly shows that the proceedings before the Magistrates' Court Moshi
were commenced before the order of the High Court was availed to the court. For
that reason, the learned judge held that the Court had assumed jurisdiction which it
did not have. The plaint was thus ordered H to be struck out. In this connection,
with respect, we do not accept Mr Jonathan's complaint that the learned judge
decided the appeal on the question of jurisdiction which was not raised or on which
the appellant was not heard. This we think is baseless because the record clearly
shows that the matter was raised I
1995 TLR p159
LUBUVA JA
in the written statement of defence at the trial and the learned Counsel is also on A
record addressing himself on this point on appeal before the learned judge. We reject
that ground.
The question of jurisdiction for any court is basic, it goes to the very root of the
authority of the court to adjudicate upon cases of different nature. In our considered
view, the question of jurisdiction is so fundamental that the courts B must as a
matter of practice on the face of it be certain and assured of their jurisdictional
position at the commencement of the trial. This should be done from the pleadings.
The reason for this is that it is risky and unsafe for the court to proceed with the trial
of a case on the assumption that the court has jurisdiction to C adjudicate upon the
case. For the court to proceed to try a case on the basis of assuming jurisdiction has
the obvious disadvantage that the trial may well end up in futility as null and void on
grounds of lack of jurisdiction when it is proved later as matter of evidence that the
court was not properly vested with jurisdiction. D
Addressing himself on this point, with respect, we are in agreement with the learned
judge's reasoning behind the logic of requiring leave of the High Court when he said:
E
'The purpose of obtaining leave is to show that the RM's Court or District
Court has been given special jurisdiction to determine cases of land held under
customary law. This leave is the key to the opening or instituting the suit in the RM's
or District Court. Jurisdiction of the Court must be evident on the fact of the plaint
and not a matter of evidence to be gathered at the trial. In fact F not only that the
plaint should state that such leave had been granted, but the High Court order
granting such leave should form part of the plaint as an annexure....'
This, we are satisfied, was a correct restatement of the principle involved in the G
Court's ascertainment of its jurisdiction at the commencement of cases. In the
circumstances of this case, where as already indicated, the jurisdiction of the court
was not included in the plaint and the Court's order granting leave to the Magistrates'
Court Moshi was availed at a later stage of the trial, was the court's H jurisdiction
ousted? Mr Jonathan, learned Counsel for the appellant has contended that as the
High Court order granting leave was already issued since 29 November 1991 and the
court proceedings before the Magistrates' Court were commenced on 9 January 1992,
the court was vested with juridiction to try the case.
Indeed it is a gainsay that the court order exhibit P1 granting I
1995 TLR p160
LUBUVA JA
A leave was issued by the High Court on 29 November 1991. For some reason
however the order was not availed to the Magistrates' Court Moshi by 9 January 1992
when the proceedings were commenced. It was on 5 June 1992 when, in the course of
the proceedings that the order was tendered in court as exhibit P1. In these
circumstances, we think the situation is different. That is, at the B commencement
of the proceedings, the order granting leave was already in existence in which case
the court of the Resident Magistrate Moshi was vested with jurisdiction over the case.
To our minds, the situation would be different if C there was no order at all in
existence at the time of the commencement of the proceedings as there would be no
legal basis upon which the court could adjudicate upon the case. On the other hand if
the order of the High Court was issued after the commencement of the proceedings,
such order would not operate retrospectively so as to validate the proceedings which
had commenced previously. Here, as already explained the order granting leave in
terms of s 63(1) D of the Magistrates' Courts Act, 1984 was already in existence
when the proceedings commenced but had not then been communicated to the court.
It was communicated later in the course of evidence. In our view, the order granting
leave having been tendered in court as exhibit in the course of the evidence, it formed
part of the record. E
In the result, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, we are with respect,
in agreement with Mr Jonathan, learned Counsel for the appellant that although the
proceedings were commenced without the order of leave of the High Court being
produced and the fact that it was not pleaded in the plaint that the F court had
jurisdiction, the matter was saved when in the course of evidence, the order of the
High Court of 29 November 1991 was availed to the court. As the order was in
existence at the time when the proceedings were commenced we are of the settled
view that as a matter of equity and justice, the proceedings G before the Magistrates'
Court were not vitiated and that the court was properly vested with jurisdiction over
the case.
In concluding this matter, we wish to re-emphasize one point. That is, that even H
though we have found in the particular circumstances of this case that the nonavailability
of the order of the High Court granting leave at the commencement of the
proceedings did not vitiate the trial by the Magistrates' Court, as a matter of practice,
it is essential for the courts at all times in the first instance to ascertain from the
pleadings stage if they are properly vested with jurisdiction and not to let the matter
to chance. Furthermore, it is I
1995 TLR p161
LUBUVA JA
also our view that in order to control and avoid unscrupulous litigants from taking A
advantage of obtaining leave of the High Court after the commencement of the
proceedings, the courts should be very strict and meticulous in scrutinizing the orders
for such leave when produced in court at the appropriate time of pleadings. B
For these reasons, we allow the appeal and set aside the judgment and decree of the
High Court. We also order that the matter be remitted to the High Court for hearing
the appeal on its merit before another judge. It is accordingly ordered. Each party to
bear its own costs of this appeal. C
1995 TLR p161
D
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