BURA AE v REPUBLIC 1994 TLR 13 (CA)
Court Court of Appeal of Tanzania - Arusha
Judge Makame JJA, Ramadhani JJA and Mnzavas JJA
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 129 OF 1990 D
22 October, 1991
(From the conviction of the High court of Tanzania at Arusha, Mroso, J)
Flynote
Criminal Law - Murder - Intoxication as a defence to murder - Not established where
the conduct of the accused E is inconsistent with a person intoxicated.
Criminal law - Murder - Defence of provocation - Not available where the deceased
did not utter or do the acts of provocation alleged. F
-Headnote
The Appellant was convicted of murder by the High Court of Tanzania and sentenced
to death. It was found that he had chased the deceased for some forty paces, stabbed
him twenty- six times and then dragged the body half a kilometre to a valley. That
same night he washed his blood stained shirt. G On appeal to the Court of Appeal, it
was argued that the appellant acted under provocation, and that he was so intoxicated
that he was incapable of having the necessary mens rea for murder.
Held:
(i) The conduct of the appellant during and after the assault was
inconsistent with a person H intoxicated within the meaning of the law;
(ii) Provocation was not available because the deceased did not utter or try
to carry out the threats alleged by the appellant;
(iii) The appellant had the requisite mens rea for murder.
Case Information
Appeal dismissed.
No case referred to. I
1994 TLR p14
A Loom-Ojare, for the appellant.
Mrs Lyimo, for the respondent.
[zJDz]Judgment
Makame, JA delivered the following considered judgment of the court:
B Bura Ae was condemned to death by the High Court sitting at Babati (Mroso J),
consequent upon his conviction for the murder of his brother-in-law, Qwatema
Darabe, the husband of the appellant's sister, PW1 Maria Ae. The fact of killing was
not denied, the only controversy being whether or not C the act amounted to the
offence of murder.
Mr Loom-Ojare, learned advocate, argued the appeal before us on behalf of the
appellant while Mrs Lyimo, learned State Attorney, supported the High Court
decision. Mr Loom-Ojare submitted and argued four grounds of appeal. One of them,
the third one, that there was a miscarriage of justice D because the learned judge
asked the assessors for their `views' rather than their `opinions', we did not take
seriously. It was pointed out to the learned advocate that he was splitting hairs really,
one definition of `opinion' being a `mental view'. We wish to add that Hornby and
Parnwell's An English-Reader's Dictionary gives `opinion' as one of the meanings of
`view'. We certainly do not E think there is any merit in this third ground.
In the other grounds Mr Loom-Ojare submitted that his client was so intoxicated that
he was F incapable of having the necessary mens rea for murder, that he in fact acted
under grave provocation, and lastly that the finding of murder was on the whole
against the weight of the evidence.
The deceased was married to PW1 and they had children together. The evidence was
that he would G often assault her whenever he abused himself with liquor. On such
occasions PW1 would remove herself to the homestead of the appellant and stay
there until reconciliation was effected. She had done so eight times before the fateful
occasion. On the material day PW1 had been at the appellant's place for two or three
days before the deceased arrived at about 9 in the evening when the found H PW1
and their three children eating in a house about fifteen paces from the appellant's,
and whose door faced that of the appellant's own house. According to PW1 the
deceased, who was unarmed, called the children but when the eldest one said he was
sleepy the deceased allowed them to go and sleep. Just then PW1 heard the repeated
cries of her sister-in-law, the appellant's wife, Yasinta Uo, I (who declined to testify
in
1994 TLR p15
MAKAME JA
accordance with s 130 of the Evidence Act) to the effect that Bura, that is the
appellant, had a spear. A Then PW1 heard the deceased crying out for help and
people running. The following morning PW1 and Yasinta found a pool of blood some
forty paces from PW1's house and some drag marks which they followed for about
half a kilometre before they found the deceased's dead body in a dry valley. B
As we have already said, at his trial in the High Court the appellant owned that he
had killed the deceased. He told the trial court that he had earlier that day imbibed a
liquor called `Mangure', made of millet, and then drank an orange squash bottleful of
`Moshi'. He got home at 6 pm and retired to C bed at 7 pm. When he went out to
ease himself at about 9 pm he heard the deceased announce loudly that he would set
the house on fire; indeed the deceased struck a match so as to set the appellant's house
ablaze. The appellant took his spear, chased the deceased with it, and after some D
five paces, when the deceased made to disarm the appellant, the latter stabbed the
deceased once with the spear. Then the appellant dragged the deceased's body to a
valley `because I was afraid and I knew I had done wrong. I threw the spear away
from the dead body. . . .'
Mrs Lyimo urged us to find that the appellant was not intoxicated at the material
time. She said if he E was he would not have done the things he did after the killing.
Mrs Lyimo also submitted that the appellant lied about the deceased threatening to
set the appellant's house on fire but later, in response to a question from the Bench,
Mrs Lyimo said the appellant could have been provoked by the deceased to the house
in which PW1 and her children were without first calling on the appellant. F
We are satisfied that this was a sure case of murder. We are convinced that the events
and their sequence were as told by PW1. Like the three assessors and the Trial Judge
himself, we are G satisfied that the appellant's story about the deceased wanting to
set the appellant's house on fire was a fib. PW1's testimony, believed by the trial
Court, and which we also accept as true, cannot accommodate the appellant's version
of the events that evening. On his own account, when the appellant went outside, the
deceased was calling his own children. `I heard him also say loudly that H people in
the house would all be burnt down.' If this were true PW1 would have heard the
utterance and we are also of the view that the deceased would not have been so daft
as to allow his own children to go to bed in a house so close to the one he wanted to
burn down.
We also regard the appellant's conduct during the assault and I
1994 TLR p16
A thereafter as inconsistent with a person who was intoxicated within the meaning
of the law. He gave chase for some forty paces, not for only five as he said during his
trial. He had the capacity to run that far and, after the twenty six stabs, he had the
presence of mind, ability and composure to B drag the body half a kilometre to a
valley, and know that `I had done wrong'. His blood-soiled shirt he washed the same
night until `there was no blood stains left on the shirt', and he had already left his
homestead by the time his sister and his wife went looking for the deceased. Quite
apart from his prevarication as to whether or not he was drunk that day, we have
been unable to see evidence that C would reasonably persuade us to say he was
intoxicated. We do not agree that Provocation was available because we do not
believe that the deceased uttered the threats or tried to set the house on fire. Also we
are unable to hold that the appellant was provoked by the deceased not first stopping
by D the appellant's house before going to converse with his own wife and children.
We respectfully agree with the learned Trial Judge that the appellant had the
requisite mens rea and that it was therefore murder that the appellant committed. We
are satisfied that the High Court E decision was decidedly sound and so we dismiss
the appeal entirely.
1994 TLR p16
F
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