IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF TANZANIA
AT DAR ES SALAAM
(CORAM: MUNUO, J.A., KILEO, J.A. And BWANA, J.A.)
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 109 OF
2007
PATRICK
SHIRIMA…………………………………….APPELLANT
VERSUS
THEOPHIL
KABWOGI……………………………….RESPONDENT
(Appeal
from the judgment of the High Court of Tanzania
at Dar es Salaam )
(Ihema,
J.)
dated
the 25th day of October, 2001
in
Civil Appeal No. 36 of 2001
---------
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
28 November & 24
December, 2008
MUNUO,
J.A.:
This is a third appeal from Civil Appeal
No. 36 of 2001 in the High Court of Tanzania at Dar es Salaam in which the
respondent successfully challenged the reversal of the compensation order of
Sh. 1,500,000/= by the Deputy Chairperson of the Housing Appeals Tribunal in
Civil Appeal No. 51 of 2000. The Sh. 1,500,000/=
refund of construction costs order had been given in favour of the respondent,
Theophil Kabwogi in Regional Housing Tribunal Application No. 21 of 1998. That is, the landlord Patrick Shirima, had to
repay the construction costs of Sh. 1,500,000/= to his licencee, Theophil
Kabwogi before the latter vacates the suit house. Ihema, J. as he then was, restored the
compensation order of Sh. 1,500,000/= whereupon the landlord lodged this third
appeal seeking to reverse the compensation order.
Out of goodwill and mutual
understanding, the landlord, Partick Shirima allowed the respondent to
construct a four bedroom house at the cost of Sh. 1,500,000/= on the former’s
plot at Manzese and stay in the said house without paying rent for an undefined
period. The deal was concluded in
1991. The parties had good relations
until 1997. In 1998, the landlord filed
Application No. 21 of 1998 in the Regional Housing Tribunal, seeking vacant
possession from the respondent. The
respondent counter-claimed for a sum of Sh. 1,500,000/= construction costs he
paid to build the house on the appellant’s plot. The Deputy Chairperson of the Housing Appeals
Tribunal, in Housing Appeal No. 8 of 2000 reversed the compensation order of
Sh. 1,500,000/= giving rise to Civil Appeal No. 36 of 2001 in the High Court of
Tanzania, wherein, Ihema, J. as he then was, affirmed and restored the
compensation order. Dissatisfied with
the decision of the High Court, the appellant preferred the present appeal.
Mr. Hyera, learned advocate for the
appellant filed three grounds of appeal, namely that –
1. The learned judge erred in law and fact by
granting the respondent compensation of Sh. 1,500,000/= in the absence of evidence
that he spent the same for constructing the disputed premises.
2.
The
learned judge erred in law and fact by not considering that what is attached to
land forms part of the land.
3.
The
learned judge erred in law and fact by not considering whether the appellant
and respondent entered in any construction agreement in respect of land owned
by the appellant under a Right of Occupancy.
At
the hearing, counsel for the appellant abandoned ground 2 of the appeal and
argued grounds 1 and 3 generally. He
contended that there is no proof to establish that the respondent spent Sh. 1,500,000/=
for constructing the four bedroom house in dispute so the compensation order is
not sustainable in law. The said
compensation order should be struck out, counsel for the appellant contended. Insisting that the compensation order is not
justified, Mr. Hyera pointed out that the respondent said he spent Sh.
300,000/= for construction, (page 13) but later, the figure changed to Sh.
1,500,000/=: see page 9 line 29. Such
inconsistency, counsel for the appellant submitted, makes the claim of compensation
incredible and thence not sustainable or justified. Considering that the respondent occupied the
house he built for 16 years without paying rent, the Sh. 1,500,000/= he spent
for construction, had since been set off so the order for compensation should
be quashed and set aside. In any event,
counsel for the appellant argued, the respondent tendered no documentary
evidence to prove that the appellant authorized him to construct the
house.
Mr. Rutabingwa, learned advocate for the
respondent supported the decision of the High Court. He submitted that even DW4, Grace Thomas,
stated that the respondent built the house of the appellant so the respondent
is entitled to a refund of Sh. 1,500,000/= he spent for constructing the said
house. Furthermore, counsel for the
respondent argued, the appellant did not call evidence to prove that he built
the house in dispute, which indicates that the respondent’s assertion that he
constructed the house for Sh. 1,500,000/= is correct. Mr. Rutabingwa conceded that the respondent
stayed in the house in dispute free of charge for 16 years but he claimed that
occupying the house for 16 years not withstanding, the respondent should be
refunded the Sh. 1,500,000/= he spent on the construction of the house. Hence counsel for the respondent prayed that
the appeal be dismissed with costs for it lacks merit.
The issue before us is whether the
appellant should pay Sh. 1,500,000/= compensation to the respondent as
compensation for constructing the house in dispute for the appellant.
Before considering the above issue, we
first considered the relationship of the parties. One, there was no landlord-tenant
relationship between the parties because there was no tenancy agreement of
whatever type between them. Second, from
the evidence on record, mutual goodwill and understanding caused the appellant
to allow the respondent to build a house on the former’s Manzese plot at the
construction cost of Sh. 1,500,000/=.
Apparently other parties also contributed to the building by providing
iron sheets. On his part, the appellant
disputed that the respondent contributed Sh. 1,500,000/= towards the
construction of the suit house. Even if
such contribution had been made, the appellant contended, the fact that the respondent
occupied the house for 16 years without paying rent, set off the
contribution. Thence the High Court
should not had restored the compensation order for Sh. 1,500,000/=.
It appears to us that the relationship
of the parties was that of licensor and licencee. The appellant being the licensor, he allowed
the respondent licencee, to build a house on his Manzese plot which
construction cost the respondent a meagre Sh. 1,500,000/= only in 1991. We are fortified in this view by definition
of licencee in Black’s Law Dictionary 8th Edition by Bryan A.
Garner, Thomson West, Page 939:
“Licence: permission, usually revocable……..an agreement
not amounting to a lease……..that is lawful for the licensee to enter the
licensor’s land to do some act that would otherwise be illegal…………
A licence is an authority
to do a particular act or series of acts, upon another’s land, without
possessing any estate therein. It is
founded in personal confidence, and not assignable, nor within the statute of
frauds. [James Kent, Commentaries, on American Law ‘452-53’ George Comstock ed
11th Edition. 1866]”
We are satisfied that the appellant gave
a licence to the respondent, Theophil Kabwogi, to construct a house on the material
plot in 1991. The licence operated until
1998 when the appellant sought vacant possession by instituting Application No.
21 of 1998 in the Regional Housing Tribunal Dar es Salaam seeking vacant
possession.
We are, furthermore, satisfied that
since the respondent occupied the appellant’s house for sixteen years free of
charge, the Sh. 1,500,000/= construction costs were more than repaid. Under the circumstances, we find merit in
this appeal. We accordingly allow the
appeal with costs.
DATED at DAR ES SALAAM this 19th
day of December, 2008.
E. N. MUNUO
JUSTICE
OF APPEAL
E. A. KILEO
JUSTICE
OF APPEAL
S. BWANA
JUSTICE
OF APPEAL
I
certify that is a true copy of original.
(P. B. KHADAY)
DEPUTY
REGISTRAR
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