AT
DAR ES SALAAM
(CORAM:
RAMADHANI, C.J.; MUNUO, J.A; And NSEKELA, J.A.)
CRIMINAL
APPEAL NO. 43 OF 2004
BETWEEN
1. KOSEI KOLESOYI @ MBAMBALI }
} APPELLANTS
2. AMANI KOLESOYI @ MBAMBALI }
THE
REPUBLIC … RESPONDENT
(An
Appeal from the Decision of the High Court of Tanzania ,
at Dar es Salaam )
(Ihema,
J.)
dated
the 14th day of July, 2003
in
Criminal
Appeal No. 28 of 2001
…….
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
25 April & 4 June, 2008
RAMADHANI, C. J.:
On
27/02/2001 the appellants, Kosei and Amani, were convicted on their own plea of
guilty to a charge of robbery with violence , contrary with c/ss 285 and 286 of the Penal Code
and were sentenced to serve a term of sentence of fifteen years each.
They
appealed to the High Court and IHEMA, J. agreed with the learned State
Attorney, Ms. Maganga, and gave the following order on 16/07/2001 :
The record to be
remitted back to the trial Magistrate at Kilosa to certify that the plea of
guilty was unequivocal.
That
was done and the learned trial District Magistrate added some explanation to
the original court record which we shall reproduce later.
The
record was returned to IHEMA, J. who on 17/04/2003 , that is, after 21 months from his earlier order,
gave another one:
Hearing on 14/7/2003 . Parties to be
notified. Further let the DPP be served with copy of proceedings of the Kilosa
District Court.
On
14/07/2003 the
learned State Attorney, Mr. Mapinduzi, admitted before IHEMA, J. to have
received the certification by the District Magistrate that the plea of guilty of
the appellants was unequivocal. Mr. Mapinduzi added:
Further perusal of
the record indicates that there is no notice of the intention to appeal in
terms of section 361(a) of the CPA, 1985. As such the appeal would be
incompetent.
Thereupon
the learned Judge struck out the appeal under sections 360(1) and 361(1) of the
CPA. This is an appeal from that order.
On
three occasions, on 03/07/2007 ,
24/10/2007 and 30/11/2007 , the appeal
came up for hearing before this Court but the appellants, who were without
counsel, remained silent claiming that they did not understand Kiswahili. This
time a translator was obtained and the appeal was heard with Ms. Eveta Mushi,
learned State Attorney, representing the respondent/Republic.
Before
we get into the merits of the appeal, we have to make one observation. The way
IHEMA, J. conducted the matter the first time it was before him was unprecedented. We do not know under what provision the
matter was sent back to the District Magistrate for certification that the plea
of guilty was unequivocal. If the High Court had doubts as to the plea it
should have ordered a retrial.
We
agree that if there was no notice of intention to appeal then there was no
appeal before the High Court. However, what beats us is how the record of
appeal was prepared and the matter sent to the High Court if there was no such
notice. Anyway, we are prepared to take it that that was so and that the appeal
was properly struck out. We, therefore, cannot fault the learned judge and this
appeal ought to be dismissed in its entirety.
However,
we are of the decided opinion that we ought to use our powers of revision under
section 4(2) of the Appellate Jurisdiction Act. The complaints of the
appellants are that they did not understand the nature of the proceedings and,
therefore, their pleas of guilty were equivocal. We do not think that that
claim is entirely unfounded.
The
record of appeal reads as follows:
Court: Charge
read over and explained to the accused persons to the language understood by
them and asked to plea thereto in Kiswahili.
From
that passage it seems to us that “the language understood by them” is different
from the language they were asked to plead, that is, Kiswahili. There is no
mention in the record of appeal of there being an interpreter as the language
the accused persons understand is Kimasai.
But
even assuming that they did understand the charges against them, which we hold
that they did not, the facts as recorded to have been narrated by the
prosecutor leave much to be desired. The
prosecutor stated:
The accused persons admitted that they stole cows. Thus I
pray to produce caution statement of the accused persons which they admitted
before the Police as Exhibit. That is why they were brought before the court as
they stand in dock box. That is all. (The emphasis is ours.)
Three
matters stand out from that statement of the prosecutor which he gave to
support their conviction. First, assuming that the appellants made a confession
in their caution statement, what they owned was that “they stole cows”. The
learned District Magistrate’s certification was also to the same effect:
On being asked as to
whether they admit the facts as outlined by the prosecution side, the accused
replied that we have heard the facts and admit
all it is true that they (sic) stole
those cows as produced by the prosecution in court as exhibit. As the facts
outlined by the prosecution and upon their own admission to the correctness, I
find them guilty as charged and convict them under section 228(2) of CPA on
their own unequivocal plea of guilty to the charge. (The emphasis is ours.)
So,
their pleas were that “they stole those cows” NOT that they committed robbery
with violence. At most they could have been taken to have pleaded guilty to a
lesser offence of stealing. The plea was not unequivocal. This revision could
be disposed off on this ground alone but for the sake of completeness we shall deal
with the other two matters.
The
second matter is that the learned trial Magistrate ought to have been satisfied
that the caution statements were freely given. That was not done. Third, there
was no order of the trial Magistrate admitting the caution statements after the
prosecutor tendered them though they have been erroneously referred to as Exh. P1.
We
are of the decided view that there were no pleas of guilty to the offence of
robbery with violence and so, the convictions were unlawful. We, therefore,
quash the conviction and set aside the sentences. The appellants have been
serving their sentences from 27/02/2001 ,
a total of seven years and two months leave alone the time they had been in
remand awaiting trial. We, therefore, are of the decided opinion that an order of
a retrial would be prejudicial to the appellants and, so, we order that they be
discharged from custody unless they are otherwise lawfully held. It is so
ordered.
DATED
in DAR ES SALAAM, this 28th
day of May, 2008.
E. N. MUNUO
JUSTICE OF APPEAL
H. R. NSEKELAJUSTICE OF APPEAL
I
certify that this is a true copy of the original.
(S.A.N. WAMBURA)
REGISTRAR
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