IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF TANZANIA
AT DAR ES SALAAM
(CORAM: H.
R. NSEKELA, J. A., J. H. MSOFFE, J. A. AND N. P. KIMARO,J. A.)
CIVIL REFERENCE NO. 3 OF 2004
K. V.
CONSTRUCTION LIMITED…...............................…...APPLICANT
AND
MWANANCHI
ENGINEERING &
CONSTRUCTION
CORPORATION
...............................…... RESPONDENT
(Reference
from the Ruling of a single judge of the
Court of
Appeal of Tanzania
at DAR ES SALAAM)
(Munuo,
J. A.)
Dated the 31st day of March, 2004
in
Civil
Application No. 11 of 2004
R U L I N G OF THE COURT.
MSOFFE,
J. A.:
This is a reference made under Rule 57
(1) (b) of the Court of Appeal Rules, 1979 from a decision of a single judge of
this Court (Munuo, J. A.) in Civil Application No. 11 of 2004 dated 31/3/2004. Mr.
Rweyongeza assisted by Mr. Ukwong’a, learned advocates, argued the reference on
behalf of the applicant and the effort was resisted by Mr. Mgongolwa, learned
advocate for the respondent.
In
a letter ref no. CIV/APP/11/03/1/04 dated 1/4/2004 and signed by Mr. Ukwong’a
it is evident that the reference was preferred mainly because:-
“The ruling and the said
order appears to be a judgment on an appeal that was not before the Court and if a ruling it
was on a matter that was not before the Court……….”
In
essence, therefore, the main complaint in the reference is that the single
judge considered matters which were not before her.
The
following background information is essential for purposes of a determination
of the reference. On 2/12/1998, the High
Court (Chipeta,J.) in Civil case No. 255 of 1997 entered a consent judgment in
favour of the respondent against the applicant herein in the sum of shs.
40,000,000/=. Todate, the consent
judgment was never challenged anywhere.
At best, the applicant filed an application in the High Court seeking, inter alia, an extension of time to file
an application for review of the consent judgment. On 24/11/2003 the High Court
(Ihema,J.) dismissed the application. On
8/12/2003 the applicant filed a Notice of Appeal against the decision of Ihema,
J. And on 22/1/2004 the applicant filed
an application for a stay of execution of the decision given by Ihema, J. The single judge allowed the application and
in the process she opined and held that the applicant having been declared a
specified authority under Government Notice No. 543 of 1997 had no capacity to
negotiate the consent judgment in Civil Case No. 255 of 1997. Having said and held so, the single judge
nullified the consent judgment, decree and a garnishee order that had been
issued in the matter.
In
his submission before us, Mr. Rweyongeza contended that it was the decision of
Ihema, J. which gave rise to the notice of appeal and the application for a
stay of execution. That being the position,
it was not open to the single judge to deal with the matter as if the decree
sought to be stayed was that of Chipeta, J.
Furthermore, he went on to say, the single judge ought not to have
nullified the consent judgment, decree and the garnishee order.
On his part Mr. Mgongolwa was of the
general view that the single judge had a discretion to or not to grant the
orders sought in the application. In his
view, the single judge properly exercised her discretion in the matter.
To
start with, we are in agreement with Mr.Rweyongeza that the application before
the single judge was for a stay of execution of the decision given by
Ihema,J. Indeed, this is clearly borne
out by the notice of motion wherein the court was asked to make the following
order:-
1.
The
execution of the judgment of the High Court in Civil Case No.255 of 1997 by Honourable Justice Ihema be stayed
pending the hearing and final determination of the Appeal in the court of
Appeal of Tanzania .
(Emphasis
supplied)
It
was not, therefore, open to the single judge to make orders relating to the
decree given by Chipeta,J. because that decree was not the subject of the
application before her.
As already stated, in granting the
application for a stay of execution the single judge also nullified the
“consent judgment, decree and garnishee order”.
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that she could make that decision in
an application for stay of execution, then there should have been no need for
ordering a stay of execution because there would have been no decree left to be
stayed.
In
fairness to the single judge, we wish to point out here in passing that she was
probably misled into making the above mentioned decision. We say so because a look at the written
submissions made to her will show that she was not addressed by learned counsel
on the gist of the application for a stay of execution of the decision given by
Ihema, J. Rather, the submissions centred
mainly on the decree passed by Chipeta, J. and the resultant garnishee order.
There
is yet a final point which falls for consideration here. This is whether the decision of Ihema, J. was
capable of a stay order. With respect, we are of the view that it was not. As already stated, Ihema, J. dismissed an
application for enlargement of time to file an application for review. He did not, therefore, grant a remedy capable
of execution. Thus, in law no application for a stay of execution of his
decision could lie for that matter.
For
the reasons we have given, we allow the reference with costs.
DATED
at DAR ES SALAAM this 30th day of July, 2007.
H.
R. NSEKELA
JUSTICE OF APPEAL
J.H.
MSOFFE
JUSTICE
OF APPEAL
N.
P. KIMARO
JUSTICE
OF APPEAL
I
certify that this is a true copy of the original.
I.
P. KITUSI
DEPUTY
REGISTRAR
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