AT DAR ES
SALAAM
CIVIL
APPLICATION NO. 100 0F 2006
IDDI SEMVUA MSANGI……………………………..……………….APPLICANT
VERSUS
THE LIQUIDATORS OF TANZANIA CROWN
COCK COMPANY LIMITED ………………………………….1ST
RESPONDENT
MR. VICENT BRUNO MINJA…………………………………2ND
RESPONDENT
(Application
for Extension of Time to file a memorandum
of Appeal and a record of appeal from the
Judgment
of the High
Court of Tanzania (
Land Division )
at Dar
es Salaam )
(Kileo J.)
Dated the 29th
day of July, 2004
in
Land Case No.
132 OF 2004
R
U L I N G
11th October, & 16th
November,2006
MSOFFE,
J. A.
This is an application for enlargement
of time made under Rules 83(1) and 8 of the Tanzania Court of Appeal Rules,
1979. By a notice of motion the applicant Iddi Semvua Msangi is moving the
Court for two orders which read as follows:-
1. That
the period of time within which the appeal can be instituted by filling the
memorandum of Appeal together with other necessary accompanying documents as
required by Rule 83 (1) of the Tanzania Court of Appeal Rules 1979, be
extended, on the grounds that the delay was occasioned by sufficient reasons as
detailed in the Affidavit attached and accompanying this Notice of motion.
2. And for an order that the costs of and
incidental to this
Application abides the results of the said
Application.
In order to appreciate the spirit
behind the application the following background information is helpful. In the
High Court of Tanzania (Land Division) the applicant filed a suit in a claim
for, inter alia, rescission of a sale
of the premises on Plot No. 21 Ada Estate, Kinondoni, Dar es Salaam . He also prayed for specific
performance of the contract of sale. Before the suit could be determined on
merit the 1st respondent raised and argued a preliminary point of
objection to the effect that the suit was res
judicata in view of the fact that the subject matter and the reliefs claimed
were the subject of Civil Case No. 54/2002 of the District Court of Kinondoni involving
the same parties, and was conclusively determined thereat. In a Ruling dated
29/ 7/ 2004 the High Court (Kileo, J. (as she then was))
upheld the objection and struck out the suit. On 2/ 8/
2004 the applicant filed a notice of appeal to this Court against the decision.
At the same time, on the same date i.e. 2/ 8/ 2004, the applicant wrote a letter
to the Registrar, High Court (Land Division) requesting to be supplied with the
necessary copies of proceedings for appeal purposes. Of particular interest to
this application is item 3 of the letter where he applied for:-
“Copy
of the complete proceedings in RM’S Court at Kinondoni Civil case No. 54 of
2002 together with all Exhibits, Annextures, correspondences and submissions by
Advocates, Rulings, Orders and Decrees etc.”
In
a letter dated 14/12/2004 the Registrar wrote to the applicant to say that “the
requisite copies of Judgment, decree/Drawn order, and proceedings” were ready
for collection on payment of fees of Tshs. 5,500/=. On the following day i.e. on 15/12/2004, the
Registrar issued a certificate to certify that the days from 29/7/2004 to
15/12/2004 were to be excluded in terms of the proviso to Rule 83 (1) of the
Court Rules, 1979. So, under the
sub-rule the intended appeal was required to be filed within 60 days thereafter
i.e. on or before 15/2/2005 to be exact.
After receiving the above documents the applicant realized that the
documents referred to under item 3 of the letter dated 2/8/2004 were not
supplied to him. So, on 19/12/2004 he
wrote a letter to the Registrar asking for the documents in question. The letter was followed by other letters
reminding the Registrar to supply him with the aforesaid documents. The letters were not responded to by the
Registrar. On 11/1/2006 he wrote a
fourth reminder but, as in previous occasions, the letter was not answered to
either, and the applicant was not supplied with the documents. On 2/8/2006 the applicant lodged this
application – seven or so months after he wrote the fourth reminder to the
Registrar.
In
the meantime, it is also on record that the applicant realized that the
intended appeal needed leave in terms of S. 5(1) (c) of the Appellate Jurisdiction
Act, 1979. He accordingly filed an
application to the High Court seeking leave.
On 25/2/2004 the High Court (Kileo, J. (again, as she then was))
dismissed the application. In terms of
Rules 43(b) and 46(3) the applicant made
an application to this Court seeking leave.
On 3/4/2006 this Court (Kaji, J,A.) marked the application withdrawn
following an oral application to that effect made by Mr. Nyangarika, learned
advocate, who was at the material time representing the applicant. Needless to say, in the light of the withdrawal
it will follow that todate no leave was sought and granted to appeal against
the decision of the High Court dated 29/7/2004.
The application is supported by an
affidavit deponed to by the applicant.
In the affidavit one major point is raised. That inspite of the several letters to the
Registrar the applicant is yet to be supplied with copies of the documents
mentioned under item 3 of the above mentioned letter. At the hearing of the application Mr. Makange,
learned advocate for the applicant, submitted that in terms of Rule 89(1) (k)
the said documents are vital for purposes of the intended appeal. Without the documents the intended appeal
could not be filed within time hence this application, he emphasized.
On his part Mr. Eustace Rwebangira,
learned advocate for the respondents, adopted the contents of the affidavits in
reply filed by Messrs. Thomas Eustace Rwebangira and Vicent Bruno Minja on
behalf of the 1st and 2nd respondents, respectively. He then asserted that so far the applicant
has not sought and obtained the necessary leave to appeal. So, in his view this application is an
exercise in futility. Thereafter, he
went on to urge that it was not proved whether the above letters were actually
served on the Registrar. Having said so,
he contended further that if the applicant had been diligent he could have
still filed the intended appeal within time on the basis of the documents
already supplied to him. It was not
necessary for him to wait for the other documents before filing the intended
appeal, he emphasized. At any rate, he
went on to say, the other documents requested by the applicant are not the sort
of documents envisaged by Rule 89(1) (k).
The documents referred to under (k) presuppose those which were before
the High Court. In this case, the other
documents mentioned under item 3 of the letter were not before the High Court,
Mr. Eustace Rwebangira contended. In any
case, he went on to submit, if the applicant thought that the documents were necessary
for purposes of the intended appeal then
copies of the said documents were in his possession because they were annexures
to the pleadings before the High Court.
In
substance, therefore, Mr. Eustace Rwebangira was of the general view that no
sufficient reason had been advanced by the applicant to warrant the exercise of
this Court‘s discretionary power under Rule 8 in his favour.
I wish to say from the outset that I do
not propose to deal with the following two points. One,
the effect on the application of the fact that so far no leave to appeal has
been sought and granted. Two, whether or not the documents sought
by the applicant are essential under Rule 89(1) (k) for purposes of the
intended appeal. In my view, these two
points are not relevant in this application.
These are points which could best be taken up in another forum, possibly
in the intended appeal if one is to be filed eventually.
I have given careful consideration to
the arguments advanced by both sides.
Under Rule 8 the Court has power to grant the extension of time sought
if sufficient cause is shown. The power
is at the discretion of the Court. The
crucial issue in this application is whether the applicant has shown sufficient
cause to warrant the grant of the extension sought.
My understanding of Rule 8 is that it is
a rule of procedure. Rules of procedure
have to be adhered to strictly unless there are good reasons for relaxing
them. For example, in Wankira Benteel Versus Kaiku Foya, Civil Reference No. 4/2000 (unreported) this Court quoted with approval a passage relevant to
the above point from the case of Edwards
Versus Edwards (1968) I W. L. R. 149, where at page 151 it
was stated:-
“So far as procedural delays are
concerned, Parliament has left discretion in the Courts to dispense with the
time requirements in certain respects. That does not mean however, that the
rules are to be regarded as, so to speak, antique timepieces of an ornamental
value but of no chronometric, so that lip service only need to be paid to
them. On the contrary, in my view, the
stipulations which Parliament has laid down or sanctioned as to time are to be
observed unless justice clearly indicates that they should be relaxed.”
In my considered opinion, in the instant
application the applicant is himself to blame for the failure to institute the
intended appeal within the period of sixty days stipulated under Rule
83(1). As already observed, in the
Registrar’s certificate the days from 29/7/2004 to 15/12/2004 when “copies of
proceedings/Ruling and Drawn order” were delivered to him were excluded for
purposes of computation of time. So,
ideally the appeal was supposed to be filed on or before 15/2/2005, as already
stated above. Apparently, the applicant
did not take advantage of the certificate.
Instead, according to him, he thought he could not file the appeal
without the documents mentioned under item 3 of his letter dated 2/8/2004. With
respect, the applicant ought to have known that there is no provision in the Court
Rules for the Registrar to issue more than one certificate. The Rules provide for one certificate only.
Therefore, with that knowledge in mind, since he already had the certificate he
could have instituted the intended appeal within time on the basis of the
documents already supplied to him by the Registrar. After doing so, if he still thought that
there were other documents which were necessary for a fair determination of the
appeal then he could continue pursuing them and eventually file a supplementary
record of appeal in terms of Rule 92(3).
After all, under sub- rule (3) thereto a supplementary record of appeal
may be lodged “at any time” which, in my view, presupposes that such record
could be filed at any time before an appeal is called on for hearing.
In the event, for the above reason, I am
satisfied that no sufficient reason has been shown to warrant the exercise of
this Court’s discretionary power under Rule 8 in favour of the applicant. I dismiss the application with costs.
DATED
at DAR ES SALAAM this 16th the
day of November, 2006.
J. H. MSOFFE
JUSTICE
OF APPEAL
I certify that this is a true copy of
the original.
S. M. RUMANYIKA
DEPUTY REGISTRAR
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