AT
DAR ES SALAAM
(CORAM: MUNUO, J.A. KAJI, J.A., And KIMARO, J.A.)
CRIMINAL
APPEAL NO. 203 OF 2004
HASHIMU SELEMANI
POLO MADUKA
AND 2 OTHERS……………………………………….……APPELLANT
VERSUS
THE REPUBLIC………………………………………….RESPONDENT
(Appeal
from the decision of the High Court of Tanzania at Mtwara)
(Kaganda,
J.)
dated
the 22nd day of September, 2004
in
Criminal Appeal No. 22 of
2003
------------
JUDGMENT OF THE COURT
4 & 17 March,
2008
MUNUO, J.A.:
This is a second appeal from Newala
District Court Criminal Case No. 88 of 2002 in which the appellants were
jointly charged with the offence of armed robbery c/s 285 and 286 of the Penal
Code, Cap 16 as amended by Act No. 10 of 1989.
The appellants allegedly broke into the house of one Adinani Abdallah Machwiha
on the night of the 11th January, 2002 and therein stole assorted
clothing and valuables including cash Sh. 145,000/=, the total value of stolen
items being Tsh. 547,000/=, the property of the complainant, and at the time of
stealing, the appellants used actual violence by threatening to shoot the
victim with a pistol besides cutting him on the face with a panga. The trial court grounded a conviction and
sentenced the appellants to thirty years imprisonment. The trial court further ordered the
appellants to pay Tsh. 547,000/= compensation for the stolen property. Aggrieved, the appellants appealed to the
High Court vide Criminal Appeal No. 22 of 2002 in the High Court of Tanzania at
Mtwara. The appeal was dismissed by
Kaganda, J. giving rise to this appeal.
The facts of the case are not
complex. On the material night, a gang
of about six suspects struck at the house of the complainant, P.W.1 Adinani
Abdallah Machwiha, and upon entering the house, hit the victim with a panga thence
inflicting a cut wound on his face. P.W.1
tendered his PF3 to show that he suffered a cut wound on the frontal part of
his head measuring 200ml long and 1 inch deep, by a sharp object. P.W.1 said that he identified the appellants
by face. His wife, P.W.2 Philomena
Augustino, who escaped from the house when the gangsters stormed in, said that
she only identified the 3rd appellant by his voice. With the assistance of the victim of robbery,
the police arrested the appellants a few days later. P.W.3 No. C.2020 Dt/Clp Juma recorded the
statements of the appellants under caution.
According to P.W.3, the appellants admitted the offence but during their
defences they retracted the alleged confessions saying the police extracted the
caution statements through torture.
Each appellant filed an elaborate
memorandum of appeal reiterating that they were not identified by the single
eye witness, that the conditions of identification during the night were
difficult so possibilities of mistaken identity existed, and that the
prosecution evidence against them was riddled with serious contradictions so
the conviction should be quashed and set aside.
The appellants did not wish to appear for the hearing.
Mr. Luena, learned State Attorney,
represented the Respondent
Republic . He did not support the conviction principally
because the identification evidence was not watertight. Observing that the robbery was committed at
night, the learned State Attorney doubted whether the sole witness, PW1,
identified the gangsters given that he only had torch light and the size of the
torch or the intensity of its light was not disclosed. He referred us to the cases of Waziri Amani versus Republic (1980) TLR
250; Mohamed Musero versus Republic (1993) TLR 290; and Nuhu Selemani versus Republic (1984)
TLR 93 in which the court quashed convictions based on poor/weak visual and
unreliable identification by voice.
The learned State Attorney contended
that although the complainant stated that he identified the appellants by torch
light, he did not give their descriptions to prove that he recognized them on
the material night. P.W.2, on the other
hand, said that she escaped from the scene of crime and yet she claimed to have
identified the 3rd appellant by voice. She, however, did not say what words the 3rd
appellant spoke during the robbery or how she identified him by voice when she
escaped from the scene of crime implying she had no opportunity to identify the
robbers. Given the doubtful and weak
evidence of identification, the learned judge ought to have quashed the
conviction, the learned State Attorney argued.
With regard to the retracted caution
statements, Exhibit P3 to P5, the learned State Attorney opined that the said
statements were erroneously admitted because the trial court did not put the
exhibits to the appellants before admitting them. This is reflected on Page 10 of the record:
P.W.3 I pray for them
(statements) to be accepted and mentioned as exhibits.
Court: The caution statements accepted and
mentioned as Exhibits P3, P4 and P5 respectively as tendered in court.
All
in all, the learned State Attorney found it unsafe to support the conviction
given the weak identification evidence on record and the plausible defence of
the appellants that the police extracted the caution statement through torture.
The issue before us is whether the two eye witnesses, P.W.1
and P.W.2 properly identified the appellants.
In the case of Nuhu
Selemani versus Republic cited supra,
the Court held that –
It
is notorious that voice identification by itself is not very reliable.
As
observed by the learned State Attorney, the robbery was committed at night. It appears there was no light save for the
torch light of the complainant.
Conditions of identification were definitely difficult and unfavourable for
there was no reliable source of light at the scene of crime. According to P.W.2 she identified the 3rd
appellant by his voice, but she did not disclose how familiar she was with the
particular voice or what words the 3rd appellant uttered at the
scene of crime to enable P.W.2 to recognize his voice. In fact P.W.2 said that she fled from the
room when the suspects invaded their house.
It being night time, P.W.1 and P.W. 2 might not have identified the
suspects visually, let alone P.W.2 managing to identify the 3rd
appellant by voice.
It appears that there is no proof on
record that the caution statements, Exhibits P3 to P5 were made voluntarily by
the appellants. Furthermore, the caution
statements were not put to the appellants to get their comments before they
were admitted. Section 127 of the
Evidence Act, Cap 6 R.E. 2002 states, inter-alia:
27. (1) A confession
voluntarily made to a police officer by a person accused of an offence may be
proved as against that person.
(2) The onus of
proving that any confession made by an accused person was voluntarily made by
him shall lie on the prosecution.
(3) A confession shall
be held to be involuntary if the court believes that it was induced by any
threat, promise or other prejudice held out by the police officer to whom it
was made or by any member of the Police Force or by any other person in
authority.
As
the caution statements, Exhibits P3 to P5, could have been obtained
involuntarily as alleged by the appellants, and because the appellants had no
opportunity to challenge their admission during the trial, we find it unsafe to
rely on the said caution statements.
In the light of the above, the learned
State Attorney correctly declined to support the conviction in view of the weak
identification evidence against the appellants.
We accordingly allow the appeal, quash
the conviction, and set aside the sentence and the compensation order. We order that the appellants be released
forthwith if they are not detained for other lawful cause.
DATED at DAR ES SALAAM this 11th
day of March, 2008.
E. N.
MUNUO
JUSTICE OF APPEAL
S. N.
KAJI
JUSTICE OF APPEAL
N. P.
KIMARO
JUSTICE OF APPEAL
I
certify that this is a true copy of the original.
(S. M.
RUMANYIKA)
DEPUTY REGISTRAR
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