AT DAR ES
SALAAM
(CORAM: MUNUO, J.A, KAJI, J.A, AND KIMARO, J.A)
CRIMINAL
APPEAL NO. 165 OF 2004
HASANI ALLY SALUM NYANDAU @ JAMBO
……………… APPELLANT
VERSUS
THE REPUBLIC
…………………………………………………… RESPONDENT
(Appeal from
the conviction and sentence
of the High
Court of Tanzania
at Mtwara)
(Lukelelwa,
J)
dated the 17th
day of February, 2004
in
Criminal
Sessions Case No. 165 of 2004
---------------------
JUDGEMENT
OF THE COURT
KAJI, J.A.:
On
27.4.2001, at Mtama
Village office, Mtwara
District, a quarrel erupted between Pw1 Ismail Salum Livanga, the chairman of
the Village, and the appellant, over the office keys which the appellant had
grabbed by force from Pw1. The matter was settled by the secretary of the
Village Pw2 Jabir Mohamed Nampondi, who retrieved the keys from the appellant.
However, later on that day, while Pw1 and the appellant were at the Village
market, the deceased Ally Salum Livinga, who was PW1’s brother, came. Just when
he arrived, the appellant picked a stool which was nearby and charged towards
where the deceased was. Sensing the impending danger, the deceased ran away.
The appellant ran after him furiously. Unfortunately the deceased tripped on a
stone and fell down. The appellant drew a knife and stabbed him to death. The
appellant who ran away from the scene of crime was subsequently arrested and
charged with the offence of murder, contrary to section 196 of the Penal Code, Cap
16.However at the conclusion of the trial he was acquitted of murder but was
convicted of the offence of manslaughter, contrary to section 195 of the Penal Code,
Cap 16. He was sentenced to life imprisonment. It is against this sentence that
the appellant preferred this appeal.
At the hearing of the appeal the
appellant was represented by Mr. Kalolo Bundala, learned counsel. Ms Hilda Kabisa, learned Principal state
Attorney, appeared for the respondent Republic. Mr Kalolo Bundala contended
vehemently that, the sentence of life imprisonment to the appellant who was a
first offender who had been in custody since early 2001 was manifestly
excessive. He cited the decisions of the Court in the cases of Hatibu Ghandhi & Other vR (1996)
TLR 12; and Brighton Boniface vR (CAT) Criminal Appeal No 54 of
1999 (unreported). Mr Kalolo Bundala observed that, a sentence of life imprisonment
is the maximum for the offence, and that it was not called for for the
appellant who was a first offender. He cited the decision of the Court in the
case of Gaidon Nelson Mapunda vR
(1982) TLR 318. Mr Bundala pointed out that, in assessing the
sentence the learned trial judge appeared to have ignored the appellant’s
mitigation, although he recorded that he had considered the same. The learned
counsel took the view that, had the learned trial judge properly considered all
these he would have imposed a lesser sentence than the maximum.
On
her part Ms Hilda Kabisa, learned Principal State Attorney, did not resist the
appeal. She concurred with what the appellant’s advocate had submitted.
As
pointed out earlier on, this appeal is against sentence. It is trite principle
that an Appellate Court will not interfere with a sentence just because it
would not have imposed that sentence if it were the trial court, as was held by
this Court in the case of Wilson Fanuel
vR (1993) TLR 267. However the Court of Appeal can
interfere with the trial court’s sentence
where it is satisfied that:-
(i)
The
sentence imposed was manifestly excessive; or
(ii)
The
trial Court ignored an important matter or circumstance which ought to have
been considered while passing the sentence; or
(iii)
Where
the sentence imposed was illegal or wrong in principle.
There are numerous decisions by the
Court to that effect. See for instance the cases of Rashid Kaniki vR (1993) TLR 258, and Yohana Balicheko vR (1994) TLR 5.
In the instant case the appellant’s
complaint is that, the sentence imposed was manifestly excessive, and that the
learned trial judge failed to consider an important matter that the maximum
sentence is uncalled for for a first offender who has been in custody for a
long time. Indeed it is the practice of courts not to impose manifestly
excessive sentences to first offenders who have been in custody for a long
time. See for instance the case of Brighton Boniface vR (CAT) Criminal Appeal No 54 of 1999 (unreported), just
to mention one. In the instant case, the appellant was a first offender, and at
the time of sentence he had been in custody for about 32 months, that is, from
April 2001 to February 2004.Under the circumstances, in our view, the sentence
of life imprisonment was manifestly excessive. Also it is the practice of courts
to desist from imposing a maximum sentence to a first offender as see that will
leave no margin for a subsequent offence as was held by the Court in Gaidon Nelson Mapunda v R (1982)TLR 318.
In
the instant case where the appellant was a first offender, it was improper to
be sentenced to the maximum sentence of life imprisonment. As demonstrated
above, the learned Principal State Attorney did not resist the appeal and, in
our view, rightly so.
Since
the appellant was a first offender who had been in custody for a reasonably
long period, we are satisfied that the
maximum sentence of life imprisonment was manifestly excessive. We have taken
note of the circumstances in which the offence was committed. Indeed it was
pathetic. The circumstances were very close to murder. But even with this in
mind we are still satisfied that the maximum sentence of life imprisonment was
manifestly excessive.
In
the event, and for the reasons stated above,we set aside the sentence of life
imprisonment and substitute with a sentence of twenty (20) yeans imprisonment.
Appeal allowed to that extent.
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