IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF TANZANIA
AT DAR ES SALAAM
CIVIL
APPLICATION NO. 75 OF 2005
In the Matter of Intended Appeal
BETWEEN
ESMAIL CHOKA … APPLICANT
AND
1.
NATIONAL TRANSPORT }
CORP.
(NTC) }
}
RESPONDENTS
2.
THE LIQUIDATOR, }
KAMPUNI YA }
USAFIRISHAJI
LTD. DODOMA
(KAUDO)}
(Application to Stay Execution of the
Decision of the High Court of Tanzania
at Dar es Salaam )
(Bubeshi, J.)
dated the 20th day of
September , 2001
in
Civil Case No. 352 of 2000
RULING
RAMADHANI, J.A.:
The
applicant, Esmail Choka, was employed by Respondent 1 National Transport
Corporation and was later made the General Manager of KAUDO, the post he held
up to the time both, Respondent 1 and KAUDO, were put under receivership. The
applicant sued both Respondent 1 and Respondent 2 in Civil Case No. 352 of
2000. Respondent 1 raised a preliminary objection which was dismissed by
BUBESHI, J. on 20th
September, 2001 . That ruling is the subject of appeal in Civil
Appeal No. 49 of 2003.
Meanwhile,
the applicant, being represented by Mr. Francis P. Mgullu, learned advocate,
seeks two orders: One, to restrain Respondent 2 from processing any bids for
KAUDO properties, and two, to strike out Civil Appeal No. 49 of 2003 filed by
Respondent 1.
Mr.
Mgullu started his submissions with the second prayer of striking out the
notice of appeal by Respondent 1. He said that the ruling of BUBESHI, J. is not
appellable because it did not “finally determine … the suit” as provided by
section 5 (2) (d) of the Appellate Jurisdiction Act, 1979, (AJA, 1979) as
amended by Act No. 25 of 2002. Mr. Jovin Lyimo, learned advocate for the
Respondent 1 underscored that the application is to strike out the appeal and
not the notice of appeal. He pointed out that the notice of appeal was lodged
on 02 October, 2001
while the new section 5 (2) (d) of the AJA, 1979, came into force on 20 December 2002 . So, he
submitted, the notice of appeal cannot be caught up by the amendment. Mr.
Wilfred Mnzava, learned counsel for the Respondent 2, adopted the submissions
of Mr. Lyimo.
In
reply Mr. Mgullu said that the notice of appeal is an expression of an
intention to appeal and that it is not the appeal itself. He also cited William
Shija v. Fortunatus Masha [1997] TLR 213 as authority that once an appeal
has been struck out then the notice of appeal is also struck out.
Notice
of appeal in civil matters is dealt with by Rule 76 and sub-rule (3) provides:
Every notice of
appeal shall state whether it is intended
to appeal against the whole or part of the decision and where it is intended to appeal against part only of
the decision, it shall specify the part complained of … (The emphasis is mine)
The
word “intended” also appears in sub-rule (5) as follows:
Where it is intended to appeal against a decree or order, it shall not be
necessary ….
Every
notice of appeal is required to be substantially in the Form D which again
bears a title “In the matter of intended
appeal/Criminal/Civil Appeal No. ………of 20…”. May be I better reproduce some
relevant parts of the Form:
NOTICE OF
APPEAL
TAKE NOTICE that
………………………. being dissatisfied
With the decision of
the Hon Mr. Justice ………………….
given at
………………………………on the ……………………..
day of ……………………20…. intends to appeal to the
Court of Appeal of Tanzania
against ….
(Emphasis is mine)
It is obvious that the notice of appeal is
a declaration of an intention to appeal and that an appeal is instituted under
Rule 83 (1) by lodging:
(a)
a memorandum of appeal;
(b)
the record of appeal
(c)
the prescribed fee; and
(d)
security for the costs of
the appeal.
A
civil appeal is different from a criminal appeal under Rule 61 (1) where it is
stated “the notice of appeal shall institute the appeal”.
Now,
the new section 5 (2) (d) of the AJA, 1979, provides that “no appeal … shall lie
against or be made in respect of any preliminary or interlocutory decision or
order of the High Court …” The prohibition is against an appeal and not an
intention to appeal. The appeal in the instant case was instituted on 25 July, 2003 , that is,
after the new provision had come into force. Therefore, the appeal is
incompetent and I hereby strike it out.
What
is the fate of the notice of appeal lodged on 02 October, 2001 ? It was held in William
Shija, which followed an earlier decision of this Court in Arusha
International Conference Centre v Damas Augustine Ndemasi Kavishe, Civil
Appeal No 34 of 1988 (unreported):
Applicant was
correct in contending that when the appeal had been struck out the notice of
appeal was also struck out: in that situation if a party still wished to appeal
a fresh application had to be filed in the High Court seeking extension of time
in which to give notice of appeal;
Now
that I have struck out the appeal, and consequently the notice of appeal, then
there is nothing before the Court. Can I then entertain an application for
restraining the Respondents from disposing the property of KAUDO? Mr. Mgullu
submitted that this Court can step into the shoes of the High Court under
section 4 (2) of the AJA, 1979 and also under the authority of Mathias
Eusebi Soka v. Registered Trustees of Mama Clementina Foundation, Civil
Appeal No. 40 of 2001.
Section
4 (2) provides as follows:
For all purposes of and incidental to
the hearing and determination of any appeal in the exercise of the jurisdiction
conferred upon it by this Act, the Court of Appeal shall, in addition to any
other power, authority and jurisdiction conferred by this Act, have the power
of revision and the power, authority and jurisdiction vested in the court from
which the appeal is brought.
This provision can be used for “purposes of
and incidental to the hearing and determination of any appeal” and then this
Court may exercise its powers of revision and step into the shoes of the lower
court from which the matter has come.
In Mathias Eusebi Soka this Court
was asked to strike out the notice of appeal and it did so saying:
We uphold the preliminary
objection and strike out the notice of appeal. However, that is not enough
because the decision of the High Court will still remain intact though illegal.
Therefore, we invoke the provisions of section 4 (2) of the Appellate
Jurisdiction Act, 1979, and exercise our jurisdiction to cure the illegality at
the High Court.
In
that appeal a party was joined to a suit at the High Court without there being leave
to do so as was required by law. That was the basis of the preliminary
objection. The Court then, suo motu, decided to revise the proceedings
before the High Court so as to cure what this Court was satisfied to have been
an illegality. In fact the Court acted under section 4 (3) which empowers the
Court to call for records of lower court suo
motu. That was in order.
In the present application there is no
illegality at the High Court and so, I cannot purport to revise anything. Besides,
I am of the decided opinion that the power of this Court to revise cannot be
exercised by a single Judge who does not have jurisdiction to hear an appeal.
Since there is no notice of appeal in this
Court and since I cannot step into the shoes of the High Court, then I have no
jurisdiction to order injunction or restraint as requested by the applicant
and, therefore, there is no point of dealing with it.
The application succeeds in one ground and
fails in another as explained above. As the issue of this Court’s jurisdiction
to entertain injunction after striking out the notice of appeal was raised by
the Court, I order that the applicant gets half his costs.
DATED at DAR ES
SALAAM this 25th day of August, 2005.
A. S. L. RAMADHANI
JUSTICE OF APPEAL
I
certify that this is a true copy of the original.
( S. M. RUMANYIKA )
DEPUTY
REGISTRAR
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