AT
ARUSHA
CIVIL
APPLICATION NO. 2 OF 2006
AWINIA MUSHI……………………………..…………….APPLICANT
VERSUS
TROPICAL PESTICIDES
RESEARCH
INSTITUTE……………………………………………….RESPONDENT
(Application
for Execution of decree from the Decision of the High Court of Tanzania at
Arusha)
(Kileo,
J.)
dated
the 13th day of March, 2006
in
Land Case No. 3 of 2005
------
RULING
5 October 2007
KAJI, J.A.:
By
a notice of motion the applicant, Awinia Mushi, is moving the Court for an
order that the execution of the decree in High Court Land Case No. 3 of 2005
delivered at Arusha on 5th December, 2005 be stayed pending
determination of the intended appeal.
The application has been made under Rule 9 (2) (b) of the Court of
Appeal Rules, 1979. The notice of motion
is supported by the affidavit deponed to by the applicant.
The
matter refers to house No. 163 (hereinafter to be referred to as the suit
premises) situated on Plot No. 74 Block I Haile Sellasie Road within Arusha City . According to the applicant’s affidavit he is
in occupation of the same as a lawful tenant since 1981 as Director of Kibo
Agromed Services, and that he rented the suit premises from the Arusha
International Conference Centre. But
according to the respondent, Tropical Pesticides Research Institute (TPRI), the
applicant is a trespasser, and that they are the lawful owner of the said suit
premises. As owner of the suit premises
the respondent wanted vacant possession of the same and to be paid arrears of
rent/mesne profit for the whole period the applicant had been in
occupation. The applicant refused to
comply with. The respondent took the
matter to the High Court Land Division and claimed for, inter alia, declaration of ownership and vacant possession.
On
the hearing date neither the applicant who was the defendant nor his advocate
appeared. The hearing proceeded exparte
and the respondent was declared to be the sole owner of the suit premises, and
the applicant was declared a trespasser.
It was also declared that the applicant, at all material times, had
occupied the suit premises illegally. He
was ordered to give vacant possession of the suit premises immediately. He was also ordered to pay rent to the respondent
for all the time he had been in occupation of the suit premises. The applicant was also ordered to pay the
costs of the suit and an interest at 10% on the decretal amount.
The
applicant was aggrieved with the exparte judgment. However he opted to apply in the same court
for setting aside the exparte judgment rather than to appeal against the merits
of the judgment itself. The learned
trial judge was not satisfied with the applicant’s grounds for his absence and
that of his advocate on the hearing date.
The applicant was aggrieved with the refusal and lodged a notice of appeal
and applied for leave which was granted.
While the intended appeal is pending the applicant has filed this
application on the following grounds: -
(a)
That
there are good and sufficient reasons for the grant of a stay of execution on
grounds of hardship.
(b)
That
there are good and sufficient reasons for the grant of stay order on the
balance of convenience.
(c)
That
the appeal has good chances of success; and
(d)
That
the applicant is in peril of being evicted from the suit premises before
determination of the intended appeal unless a stay order is granted.
The
grounds were elaborated on by the applicant’s counsel Mr. Nelson S. Merinyo who
also adopted the applicant’s affidavit in his oral submission. Dr. A. M. Mapunda, learned counsel for the
respondent, strongly objected the application in his oral submission which was
mainly based on the respondent’s counter affidavit deponed to by Morandi M.
Matemu, the Principal Personnel and Administrative Officer of the respondent.
On my part I think, before considering
whether the grounds given by the applicant are sufficient to grant the order
applied for, there is one issue which must be resolved first. As indicated above, the application is for
stay of execution of the decree in High Court Land Case No. 3 of 2005, which
was delivered at Arusha on 5.12.2005, pending determination of the intended
appeal. On its face value it gives the
impression that the decree which is sought to be stayed is the one which is
intended to be appealed against. Indeed
that is what it should be, otherwise how can a party apply for stay of
execution of a decree which he is not intending to appeal against? But incredibly that is what the applicant is
doing in the instant case. The applicant
is applying for stay of execution of the decree delivered on 5.12.2005. It is the decree in the exparte
judgment. But according to the oral
submission by his advocate, the intended appeal is not against the merits of
the exparte judgment but against the refusal to set it aside. Mr. Merinyo was very categorical that the
notice of appeal which was filed on 26.3.2006 is against the refusal to set
aside the exparte judgment.
Unfortunately a copy of the said notice of appeal was not annexed with
the application. But there is no reason
to doubt what the learned counsel said on the bar in his oral submission. In fact even paragraphs 11, 12 and 13 of the
applicant’s affidavit accompanying the notice of motion appear to suggest what
the learned counsel said. These
paragraphs read as follows: -
11.
On
becoming aware of the exparte judgment and decree I immediately applied for the
setting aside of such judgment and decree principally for the reason that I had
been prevented from appearing on account of poor health. Annexed and collectively marked Annexture A
‘5’, is a copy of the doctor’s report on his diagnosis;
12.
On
March 13, 2006 my application was refused.
Annexed and marked Annextures A ‘6’ and A ‘7’ respectively, are copies
of the Ruling and Order.
13.
Dissatisfied with such
order I filed a Notice of Appeal and applied for copies of the relevant documents, duly
serving such notice and application on the respondent (emphasis supplied).
Since
the intended appeal is not against the merits of the exparte judgment delivered
on 5.12.2005 but against the refusal delivered on 15.3.2006, in my view, it
would be improper to invoke the provisions of Rule 9 (2) (b) of the Court of
Appeal Rules 1979 and grant the order sought.
Rule 9 (2) (b) reads:
……….the Court may, in any
Civil proceedings, where a notice of
appeal has been lodged in accordance with Rule 76, order a stay of execution,
on such terms as the Court may think just (emphasis supplied).
In
my view this provision confers jurisdiction to the Court to order stay of
execution of a decree or order where the said decree or order is intended to be
appealed against as reflected in the notice of appeal. In the instant case the decree which is
sought to be stayed is not intended to be appealed against, and the refusal
order which is intended to be appealed against is not executable, and so
incapable of being stayed. The applicant
appears to be in a dilemma. He is asking
the Court to invoke the provisions of Rule 9 (2) (b) to stay execution of a
decree which he is not intending to appeal against, and the order which he is
intending to appeal against is unexecutable and incapable of being stayed. Perhaps if the notice of motion had been made
under Rule 3 (2) (a) or (b) the position would have been different.
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