A rule of strict liability in the case of Ryland V Fletcher

The rule in Rylands v Fletcher (1886)[1] is a rule of strict liability, that is, it does not require proof of negligence or lack of care, or wrongful intention, on the part of the defendant. However, actual damage must be proved; it is not a tort that is actionable per se.

Rylands employed independent contractors to build the reservoir. The contractors came across some mine shafts that that were no longer in use and made ‘no attempt to fix the shafts. After completion, water burst and flooded into Fletchers land, a neighbouring land, which had operated mines.

Fletcher argued the enjoyment of his land had been invaded and Rylands should be liable for the damages caused by inherently dangerous activities. Rylands argued that he was acting reasonably and lawfully on his land and should not be held responsible for an accident which resulted without any negligence. The case went from the court of Liverpool way up to the House of lords where the case developed a strict liability principle.

The case then established a landmark principle which it has become important principle applied by judges and relevant in many cases both in common law and in Tanzania. It is the notable statement by Blackburn J[2] which gave the grounds of it applicability. The applicability of the principle in Ryland v Fletcher will be in the following circumstances.

Accumulation is of the important condition of the applicability of the rule in Ryland v fletcher. In he case of Miles v Forest Rock Granite Co (Leicestershire) Ltd, The defendant used some explosives to blast some rocks on his land. Some rocks fell onto the land below and injured the plaintiff. The court found that although the rocks were not purposely collected or kept on the land, the explosives were purposely collected and kept. It was held that the defendant was liable due to his deliberate accumulation which caused the escape of the rocks, and because the way in which the injury was sustained was through rock- blasting, which was not a natural use of land.

The applicability of the rule also depends on the things accumulated, they must be likely to cause mischief (dangerous) if they escape. In the case of Ang Hock Tai v Tan Sum Lee & Anor, the plaintiff rented a shop house and lived on the first floor of the building. The ground floor was sublet to the defendant who was in the business of repairing and disturbing tyres. The defendant stored petrol for business purpose. One morning defendant’s premises caught fire and it spread to the first floor and the plaintiff’s wife and child died in the tragedy. It was held that the defendant was liable under the rule in Rylands v Fletcher as the petrol was a dangerous thing.

Lastly there must be an escape for the rule to be applicable. in the case of  SALIM OMARI v. JACKTON ONGEA (1972)[3]. The appellant gave the respondent permission to use part of his land. When clearing this portion the respondent not ire to the grass and in spite of precautions taken the fire escaped because of strong winds and burnt the whole of the appellant’s shamba.Bramble, J applied the principle in ryland vs fletcher, and found the defendant liable  as he failed to prevent the fire from spreading.

Despite the situations which the rule have been applied, the courts in various situation have found it relevant to situations that where not particularly similar to those exactly in the case of Ryland v Fletcher.

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[1] [1868] UKHL 1, (1868) LR 3 HL 330, ([1866] LR 1 Ex 265)

[2] Blackburn J stated “..any person, who for his own intentions brings on to his land, accumulates and keeps on that land anything likely to cause trouble if it escapes, must keep it at his own risk, and, if he does not do so is prima facie, answerable for all the damage which is the natural effect of its escape.”

[3] HCD 145 Tanga Civ. App. 2-A-71; 31/7/72